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1.1 Context of the thesis 
This thesis examines the information production and dissemination role of the media re-
garding financial and non-financial disclosure. In three empirical studies, the thesis ad-
dress two motivating questions: (1) How does the financial press disseminate and produce 
information? And (2) how do stakeholders react to non-financial information dissemina-
tion through the press?  
The first and the second study of the thesis (chapters three and four) address the first 
motivating question. While the first study focuses on the supply of quantitative infor-
mation in press articles, the second study exploits the textual features of these articles, 
such as the topics or the sentiment. Both studies contribute to the literature related to the 
financial press as an intermediary of financial information. To that end, the thesis ad-
dresses and extends the debate about the value of financial press articles for investors and 
provides detailed evidence about the information production in those articles. 
The third study (chapter five) shifts the focus with regard to the information dissemination 
from the perspective of investors and their need for financial information to another stake-
holder group, namely employees and their information demand. For stakeholders, non-
financial information is of great importance, as stakeholders such as customers or em-
ployees are at the core of non-financial activities (Christensen et al. (2019)). To provide 
answers related to the second motivating question, in chapter five, the study examines the 
short-term and long-term implications of increased stakeholder attention in response to 
non-financial information in the press. The evidence of the third study extends the scarce 
literature about the link between stakeholder theory and non-financial disclosure.  
The following section presents the literature stream related to the financial press as an 
intermediary of financial information and the stream about the link between stakeholder 
theory and non-financial disclosure to define the terminology of each literature stream. 
Additionally, the section points out important gaps in the literature that the three empirical 





Financial press as an intermediary of financial information  
Beaver (1998, p. 10) defines information intermediaries as „an industry whose factors of 
production include financial information and other types of data and whose product is 
analysis and interpretation”. Investors can choose from a vast array of information inter-
mediaries in capital markets such as analysts, proxy advisors, or the financial press, which 
offer different information related products (Healy and Palepu (2001)). Though just one 
among many information intermediaries, the financial press traditionally has the broadest 
and most diversified audience of all common information intermediaries. Prior literature 
mainly discriminates two sources of value creation for press articles: information dissem-
ination and information production.  
Information dissemination 
The financial press collects and rebroadcasts information about accounting events such 
as the publication of quarterly financial statements and makes this information available 
to their readers through the articles. This information can take various forms, such as 
earnings figures or quotes from firm executives. This task potentially saves transaction 
costs of information gathering on behalf of investors. Also, it creates common knowledge 
of the information among market participants (Dyck and Zingales (2003)). Part of the 
information gathering is the reduction of all information available to focus on key items 
such as performance measures, which also means that journalists only partly disseminate 
public information. The dissemination occurs via various news outlets either in the tradi-
tional print version or via the online version of the newspaper. 
There is ample evidence supporting the dissemination role of the financial press. For ex-
ample, Peress (2014) examines the impact of press coverage using the exogenous reduc-
tion in coverage due to a sample of national newspaper strikes in several countries. His 
results show a significant decline in trading volume and volatility on strike days and 
strongly support the information dissemination role of the press. This evidence comple-
ments the results of Engelberg and Parsons (2011) for local trading markets and is con-
sistent with media contributing to the speed of information diffusion into prices. Bushee 
et al. (2010) examine the financial press coverage around earnings announcements and 
find that higher press coverage is associated with lower bid-ask spreads and increased 
market depth. This result indicates that press coverage reduces information asymmetry 
and thus contributes to market efficiency. Information dissemination by the financial 
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press is particularly relevant for firms with a low information environment. To that end, 
Dyck and Zingales (2003) show that the market price impact of press articles is stronger 
for companies with low analyst following.  
Recent evidence by Drake et al. (2014) documents that increased press coverage of annual 
earnings announcements mitigates cash flow mispricing, but not accrual mispricing. De-
tailed analyses reveal that this result only holds for newsflashes, i.e., pure rebroadcasting 
news excerpts but not for full articles, which might provide incremental journalist content. 
Blankespoor et al. (2018) examine computer-generated articles and thus eliminate any 
information production from the articles. The authors show that this kind of coverage 
increases market liquidity, while the speed of the price discovery seems rather unaffected. 
They attribute this effect to retail investors because they become aware of investment 
opportunities due to the “robo-coverage”. Consistent with this, Kothari et al. (2009) argue 
that the financial press is a more reliable source for (retail) investors compared to the 
firms or analysts. Financial press publications generally attract investor attention, even 
though the information provided may not be new or specifically value relevant. To that 
end, Madsen and Niessner (2019) show an increase in trading volume due to a higher 
level of investor attention following print advertisements in newspapers. 
Information production 
Complementary to the dissemination role, prior literature identifies an information pro-
duction role of the financial press, which broadly encompasses the content that articles 
provide incremental to rebroadcasting information. There are two main sets of infor-
mation with which the financial press can produce information. First, journalists can col-
lect, aggregate, and combine information taken from various public sources. For example, 
the press may rely on the expertise of other information intermediaries like analysts (Rees 
et al. (2015); Guest and Jaewoo (2019)) or may discover the information in public court 
actions (Miller (2006)). This way, the press extends mere firm information and makes 
valuable but less broadly known information available to a larger audience. Second, jour-
nalists may discover new information through private interactions with company repre-
sentatives or other experts in the respective field.  
Additionally, the professional skills of journalists enable them to present the information 
consistent with the informational needs of their readers and to collect key items, which 
enhances the understanding of the (retail) investors. To create valuable content for 
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readers, journalists need to feature items in their articles that are useful for the decision-
making of investors with regard to the information content and materiality to avoid infor-
mation overload.  
By documenting abnormal returns upon the publication of press articles with original 
content, event studies provide evidence that the press assumes an information production 
function, e.g., with respect to identifying low-quality accounting (Foster (1979)), or fraud 
cases (Miller (2006)). Miller (2006) further introduces a ‘watchdog function’, which re-
lates to the monitoring behavior of the press. This monitoring function helps investors to 
hold firms accountable, e.g., for excessive executive pay, corporate governance violations 
or insider trading (Core et al. (2008); Dyck et al. (2008); Bednar (2012); Dai et al. (2015)).  
Tetlock et al. (2008) examine the sentiment of news articles and find that the fraction of 
negative words in an article is associated with lower future earnings on a firm level. Thus, 
the information production is not limited to the facts presented in the articles, but also 
includes the choice of words and the resulting sentiment as another article attribute. Build-
ing on these results, Guest (2018) finds that Wall Street Journal (WSJ) coverage of earn-
ings announcements is associated with higher trading volume and more efficient price 
responses, especially when the article contains more original content. The author 
measures original content as the similarity between the earnings press release and the 
WSJ article.  
While the studies mentioned above are aligned with the information dissemination and 
production role und thus support the role of the financial press as an information interme-
diary, prior literature also provides a more critical view of the financial press. Tetlock 
(2011) indicates that individual investors overreact to articles when they contain stale 
news (i.e., similar content (phrasing) as previous articles). The results of Ahern and Sos-
yura (2015) and Ahern and Sosyura (2014) further question the view of the financial press 
as an intermediary. The authors show that firms can influence their own press coverage 
by publishing more press releases. Furthermore, the press wants to appeal to its readership 
and thus publishes articles that might be less accurate and based on rumors. Cahan et al. 
(2015) show that firms manage their public image in the media through CSR activities. 
These results are in line with the argument of Jensen (1979) that the press mainly exists 
to entertain its readers. Gurun and Butler (2012) argue that news outlets might be subject 
to a conflict of interest when they report about a local firm or one with high (local) ad-
vertising expenditures resulting in biased reporting.  
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Overall, it remains an open empirical question how financial press articles create value 
for their audience, i.e., if the information dissemination or the information production role 
is economically more meaningful or if the value is indeed limited to the entertainment of 
readers. With regard to information production, prior literature also lacks evidence about 
how the press produces original content or what kind of editorial content is supplied.  
Stakeholder theory and non-financial disclosure dissemination  
Corporate social responsibility disclosure  
Based on Christensen et al. (2019), this thesis defines corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) as “corporate activities and policies that assess, manage, and govern a firm’s re-
sponsibilities for and its impacts on society and the environment”. Consequently, CSR 
reporting refers to the disclosure of this kind of information. Prior literature shows that 
the dissemination of CSR information has value implications for the firms, which is com-
parable to financial information. For example, Flammer (2013) and Krüger (2015) exam-
ine short-term market reactions to positive and negative CSR events published in the press 
or the Kinder Lydenberg Domini (KLD) database and find that investors react negatively 
to the publication of negative non-financial information such as news about eco-harmful 
firm behavior. While Flammer (2013) finds that investors value news implying social 
responsibility (i.e., positive news), Krüger (2015) argues that investors only react favor-
ably to the release of positive information when the events relate to resolving prior stake-
holder relationship issues. Edmans (2011) documents positive long-term capital market 
effects and an increase in positive earnings surprises for firms signaling good CSR per-
formance. 
For CSR information published by the firms, e.g., CSR reports, the literature distinguishes 
between implications of mandatory and voluntary disclosure. With regard to voluntary 
disclosure, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) document high cost of capital as a motive to initiate the 
disclosure of stand-alone CSR reports for US firms. However, positive effects from issu-
ing such a report, e.g., the reduction of cost of capital and higher analyst coverage, only 
materialize for firms whose CSR performance exceeds the industry median. For an inter-
national sample, Dhaliwal et al. (2012) find a positive association between the publication 
of a CSR report and the analyst forecast accuracy. Additionally, the results of Cahan et 
al. (2015) suggest a positive association between voluntary CSR disclosure and firm 
value, which is more pronounced in countries where non-financial information is less 
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transparent, e.g., due to weak institutions. The results of Christensen (2016) imply that 
the voluntary publication of non-financial information is beneficial for firms, as it mod-
erates the negative capital market effects if the reporting firm is charged with social or 
environmental misconduct in the following year creating a kind of “insurance function”.  
In recent years, several jurisdictions implemented legislation requiring firms to publish 
CSR reports. For example, since 2017 the EU requires large firms to publish reports con-
taining information about environmental matters, social and employee-related matters, 
respect for human rights, anti-corruption and bribery matters (Directive 2014/95/EU, re-
cital 6). Grewal et al. (2019) examine market reactions for events leading to the EU di-
rective and find an overall negative market reaction, which is muted for firms with higher 
CSR performance or disclosure before the new regulation. Fiechter et al. (2019) examine 
how firms react in anticipation of the EU disclosure mandate and find that EU firms in-
crease their CSR activities compared to U.S. control firms. This increase is positively 
associated with the treatment intensity, i.e., the pre-regulation disclosure level and the 
resulting required increase in CSR disclosure. Chen et al. (2018) report a deterioration of 
performance and an increase in expenses following the implementation of mandatory 
CSR disclosure in China. However, the authors also report a reduction in environmental 
pollution in cities with a high proportion of treatment firms, which suggests that the reg-
ulation creates positive externalities.  
In contrast to the EU and China, US regulation does not require firms to publish full-
fledged CSR reports. However, several separate regulations demand the disclosure of 
specific CSR dimensions. For example, Christensen et al. (2017) examine the effects of 
implementing mandatory mine-safety disclosure in financial reports. Previously, the 
safety records were publicly available via the Mine Safety and Health Administration’s 
(MSHA) website. Following the implementation of the new disclosure rule, the authors 
find an increase in safety regulation compliance, which is in line with the documented 
decrease in injury rates. The results additionally show an increase in analyst and media 
attention, which suggests that the public awareness of the information depends on where 
it is published, i.e., how easily investors and other stakeholders can collect this non-fi-
nancial information. Similarly, Hombach and Sellhorn (2019) examine the SEC require-
ment for oil and gas firms to disclose extraction payments. Using an event study method-
ology for the likelihood of this regulation, the authors find that investors react more neg-
atively when the firms exhibit higher reputational risks from the disclosure requirement.  
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Stakeholder theory  
Regulators like the EU stress that CSR disclosure should “meet the needs of investors and 
other stakeholders as well as the need to provide consumers with easy access to infor-
mation on the impact of businesses on society” (Directive 2014/95/EU, recital 3). There-
fore, stakeholders are an essential group to consider when examining CSR disclosure. 
Freeman (1984) defines a stakeholder as “any group or individual who is affected by or 
can affect the achievement of an organization’s objectives”. Important stakeholders are 
customers, employees, or shareholders. Prior literature further distinguishes between in-
ternal stakeholders with close ties to the firm such as investors or employees, and external 
stakeholders like customers (Wood (1995); Madsen and Rodgers (2015)). As non-inves-
tor stakeholders comprise rather diverse groups, it is difficult to examine all of them at 
once. Regarding CSR activities, employees are an essential stakeholder group of a firm. 
Therefore, this thesis focuses on employees as a specific group of stakeholders.  
Firms can benefit from a strong commitment to their employees and their well-being, as 
the stakeholder hypothesis suggests that a strong bond between the employees and the 
firm strengthens the firms’ reputation in the market and stimulates employee productivity. 
Additionally, a strong commitment reduces the risk of strikes or high fluctuation among 
highly qualified employees (Ben-Nasr and Ghouma (2018); Edmans (2011); Jones 
(1995)). As internal stakeholders, employees are subject to the internal and potentially 
long-term CSR activities, for example, how a firm tries to promote diversity among its 
employees. Additionally, employees are affected by the external non-financial perfor-
mance, which has an impact on the entire society, for example, based on environmental 
issues.  
While the link between stakeholders and non-financial information is an important, there 
are very few papers examining this link. One of these papers is Madsen and Rodgers 
(2015), who examine stakeholder attention to corporate disaster relief efforts. The authors 
measure attention using short-term and long-term newspaper coverage. The results show 
a positive association between the stakeholder attention and their measures for the legiti-
macy, urgency, and enactment of the relief programs, which ultimately results in financial 
benefits for the firms. However, the authors cannot provide evidence about the internal, 
long-term CSR activities of a firm and how the stakeholders react to it directly. Therefore, 
it remains an open empirical question if and how non-investor stakeholders use non-fi-
nancial disclosure and what implication their use of it might have for the reporting firms.  
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1.2 Motivation and objective of the thesis 
Based on the context of the thesis and the respective open empirical questions outlined 
above, this thesis examines the role of the financial press as an information intermediary 
and the link between stakeholders and non-financial information disseminated through 
the press. As outlined in Figure 1.1, the thesis examines two main motivating questions 
related to each literature stream and research gap.  
Regarding the literature stream related to the financial press as an intermediary of ac-
counting information, there is an ongoing debate about how journalists create value for 
their readers, especially when the articles feature information about earnings announce-
ments. On the one hand, authors such as Drake et al. (2014) and Bushee et al. (2010) 
argue that the value of press articles is limited to information dissemination, while others 
such as Guest (2018) or Coyne et al. (2019) stress that the press also produces valuable 
information, i.e., editorial content.  
If the press only assumed an information dissemination role, it would be arguably why 
the various news outlets spend resources on covering these earnings announcements in-
stead of relying on automated articles as in Blankespoor et al. (2018). Additionally, mere 
information dissemination would not be in line with the journalists’ perspective on their 
job. In the survey paper of Call et al. (2018), journalists state that they have incentives to 
provide exclusive content (e.g., from private conversations with managers or analysts) 
and high-quality articles, which supports that journalists want to produce supplemental 
information. Assuming that the financial press indeed produces valuable information, we 
know very little about the origin of such production because prior literature so far has 
only established fairly general proxies for information production. For example, Drake et 
al. (2014) and Coyne et al. (2019) measure information production based on a sample 
split into so-called newsflashes and full articles. While newsflashes do not produce any 
information, the information production in articles varies substantially.  
Financial press articles feature various attributes, which can influence the way journalists 
produce information (Graf-Vlachy et al. (2019)). First, articles, especially those about 
earnings announcements, feature quantitative items. Second, press articles feature various 
textual characteristics such as the sentiment, various topics, and the readability. Guest 
(2018) uses such a textual feature of the articles and measures information production 
based on the similarity of earnings announcements and the related article. While this 
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proxy is more related to the article itself than the one of Drake et al. (2014), it merely 
suggests if an article produces information without establishing how the information is 
produced. Therefore, it is an open empirical question how and what kind of news outlets 
produce information.  
The aim of study 1 and study 2 of this thesis is to provide evidence regarding this question. 
As outlined in Figure 1.1, both studies have a similar motivating question. However, each 
paper examines a specific though related research question and uses a different article 
attribute and methodological approach to answer it. The first study features an explorative 
approach and uses the quantitative items of the articles based on a manual content analysis 
to answer the question about what kind of information various news outlets supply in their 
articles. An item-based reconciliation of the supplied information with firm disclosure 
and conference calls allows a direct distinction between information dissemination and 
production.  
 
Figure 1.1: Context of the thesis  
The second study examines what kind of, and how journalists produce information in 
their articles. To that end, the study exploits the textual features of the articles instead of 
quantitative items. The study uses a Bayesian topic modeling algorithm to provide evi-
dence about the topics featured in the articles and to distinguish information production 
and dissemination. Additionally, the study captures the sentiment of each topic to get 
directional insights into the production of news outlets. Overall, both studies provide ex-
tensive evidence about the production in financial press articles based on their main at-
tributes and therefore extend the prior literature about the potential value of financial press 
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articles. Extending the first study, the second study additionally employs market tests to 
provide evidence about the potential value of information production for investors. 
As outlined in Figure 1.1, the second motivating question aims at providing evidence 
about how stakeholders react to non-financial information dissemination through the 
press. Therefore, the information dissemination is the key link between the first two stud-
ies and the third one. Study 3 relies on the range and credibility of the press to disseminate 
the non-financial information to the target group. The third study focuses on non-investor 
stakeholders rather than investors, as this kind of information is of special interest to 
stakeholders. The dissemination through the press enhances the likelihood that stakehold-
ers become aware of the CSR information because it is less likely that stakeholders use 
traditional disclosure channels such as SEC filings to collect information.  
Stakeholders such as employees or customers are at the core of CSR, as they are often 
affected by the related firm actions (Christensen et al. (2019)). Though firms ought to 
consider stakeholders when disclosing non-financial information, e.g., based on the recent 
EU directive, it is an open empirical question if and how stakeholders actually use this 
information and how they react to its disclosure (Hombach and Sellhorn (2018)). This 
lack of evidence partly derives from the non-monetary interests of stakeholders. Addi-
tionally, the information demand of stakeholders changes over time, based on external 
influences such as the recent debate about climate change (Christensen et al. (2019)). 
However, it is essential to understand the information demand of stakeholders to draft 
effective legislation and provide useful information. Thus, the third study extends the still 
scarce literature about the stakeholders’ use of and reaction to non-financial information 
and therefore provides valuable insights for users, regulators, and preparers. 
1.3 Content of the thesis 
The thesis comprises three studies. As outlined in Figure 1.2, the thesis proceeds as fol-
lows. The first study of this thesis investigates the supply of quantitative accounting in-
formation in financial press articles (Chapter 2). The second study examines whether and 
how useful the information that is provided to investors in financial press articles using a 
topic modeling approach (Chapter 3). The third and final study of this thesis provides 
evidence on short and long-term stakeholder reactions to non-financial disclosure (Chap-
ter 4). The final chapter concludes (Chapter 5).  
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Chapter 2: Supply-side evidence on the role of the financial press as an intermediary of 
accounting information 
The first study of this thesis examines the supply and content of financial articles follow-
ing quarterly earnings announcements. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms between Q1-
2013 and Q2-2016, the study provides explorative evidence about 1) the decision of an 
outlet to cover a firm, 2) the content of the articles, and 3) the extent to which journalists 
rely on sources other than the firms. The study analyses three different news outlets: The 
Wall Street Journal, as a specialized news outlet, and the New York Times and USA 
Today as general-interest outlets. Results from estimating a probit regression suggest that 
the coverage of quarterly earnings announcements is associated with the richness of the 
firms’ information environment and the extent of public interest. Coverage decisions do 
not vary substantially between the three news outlets. A detailed content analysis of the 
financial press articles reveals that news outlets feature accounting items such as perfor-
mance or revenue metrics prominently in their articles. Furthermore, the articles supply 
external information like analyst forecasts or stock market information. Non-accounting 
items only play a subordinate role in the sample articles.  
The study further investigates the sources of the information supplied in the articles. The 
results suggest that items about firm performance and revenue emanate from firm disclo-
sure and are therefore subject to information dissemination. Additionally, the analysis 
reveals that articles feature items from conference calls or other (private) sources, such 
as M&A activities and expenses. Therefore, the articles also produce new and potentially 
valuable information for the readers/investors. An analysis of the quotes featured in the 
articles further reveals that information production is not limited to “hard information” 
but extends to the verbal level. The amount of information production in financial press 
articles is again associated with firm fundamentals such as size or liquidity. Overall, the 
results of the study indicate that the financial press assumes both an information dissem-
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Chapter 3: Information production by the financial press: A closer look 
The second study extends the insights about the role of the financial press as an infor-
mation intermediary and focuses on how and what kind of information the press produces 
in its articles. In contrast to the first study, the second study examines article narratives 
and excludes quantitative items. Based on 6,540 WSJ articles about S&P 500 firms’ earn-
ings announcements between 2010 and 2016, the study uses a topic modeling approach 
to identify the original content of the press articles. Based on the topic model, the study 
identifies four sources of information production: 1) adding new topics, 2) omitting po-
tentially irrelevant content from the earnings announcement, 3) emphasizing specific top-
ics, and 4) the sentiment of the narratives.  
Descriptive analyses show that financial press articles feature, on average, 1.5 additional 
topics and omit 5.5 topics from the earnings announcement. Journalists in the sample 
emphasize key performance topics such as earnings and sales and de-emphasize topics 
like non-GAAP earnings or firm segments. While the sentiment of press articles is gen-
erally lower compared to earnings announcements, the sentiment of topics added to the 
articles is, on average, higher than the sentiment of topics also featured in the earnings 
announcement.  
Multivariate analyses reveal that both adding and omitting topics in financial press arti-
cles are associated with larger investor responses to the announced earnings. This positive 
association increases with the level of information production, i.e., with articles that fea-
ture more original content or omit more potentially irrelevant content. Interestingly, only 
the sentiment of topics featured in the earnings announcement and the corresponding 
press article has a positive association with the investor response, while the sentiment of 
additional topics does not. These results suggest that what journalists report in their arti-
cles is more important than how they phrase it. Overall, the results of the study support 
that the financial press creates additional content for its audience. Thus, the results sug-
gest that the value of the articles exceeds the mere entertainment of the readers.  
Chapter 4: Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder attention 
The third and final study of this thesis investigates the long and short-term consequences 
of non-investor stakeholder attention to non-financial disclosure. It uses a sample of For-
tune’s “100 best companies to work for” list between 2005 and 2017 as a specific form 
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of non-financial disclosure. This list ranks firms based on an employee and a culture audit 
survey and rates areas such as respect, fairness, or benefit programs. This setting offers 
three main advantages. First, the dissemination of the financial information occurs 
through the media as an information intermediary, which enhances the credibility of the 
information. Additionally, the disclosure through this channel makes it more likely that 
the stakeholders become aware of the information. Second, there are two key dates for 
the publication of the list data. The first date is the first disclosure of the Fortune infor-
mation, e.g., through the Fortune web page, while the second event is the official issue 
date of the Fortune (print) issue. Thus, the information is disseminated via two different 
channels on two different dates, which facilitates the separation of stakeholder and inves-
tor effects. Third, the Fortune list contains information about the CSR performance of the 
firms regarding a specific non-investor stakeholder group, which makes it possible to 
isolate the reaction of specific stakeholders. This, in turn, simplifies the identification of 
the effects.  
The study answers two different research questions. First, it examines whether stakehold-
ers increase their attention to a firm after the release of externally validated non-financial 
information, as they need to be aware of the information to react to it. It measures the 
stakeholder attention using the abnormal Google search volume index based on firm name 
searches and finds significant increases in stakeholder attention following both the first 
disclosure of the list and its wider dissemination through the Fortune issue. A comparison 
with the investor reaction shows that only the first event contains valuable information 
content for investors.  
The second research question examines how stakeholder attention may have long-term 
consequences for firms based on stakeholder reactions and their own actions. To that end, 
the paper examines if stakeholders react to the list information by applying for jobs at the 
list firms. It finds an increase in job applications, which is not statistically significant. 
Using a difference-in-difference analysis based on a matched sample of list and non-list 
firms, the paper shows that firms increase their CSR activities once they are featured on 
the list. Overall, the results of this study suggest that stakeholders pay attention to the 
publication of stakeholder related non-financial information but do not act upon it, 
whereas the firms invest in their CSR activities in anticipation of the stakeholder atten-
tion. 
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Abstract: I shed light on the economic role of the financial press as an intermediary of 
accounting information by providing explorative, descriptive evidence on the supply of 
newspaper coverage and content. My content analyses of three different news outlets of-
fer detailed insights into the structure of information provided and hence helps to under-
stand factors that shape demand for newspaper coverage. I find that the supply of financial 
press information is associated with the quality of the firm’s information environment 
and that media attention focuses on firm size. My analyses of the sources of information 
contained in press articles also reveal that journalists systematically provide additional 
information beyond re-broadcasting items taken from firms’ earnings announcements. I 
contribute to the literature by providing an explorative supply-side perspective on the role 
of the financial press as an information intermediary, which is consistent with the press 
assuming both an information dissemination and a production role. 
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The financial press is an important information intermediary in capital markets, which 
presumably has the broadest audience of all intermediaries. Prior research shows that the 
dissemination of firm information through this channel increases trading volume and mar-
ket liquidity (e.g., Blankespoor et al. (2018); Engelberg and Parsons (2011)). Addition-
ally, the press has got the potential to shape the view of its readers and trigger significant 
market reactions. For example, Wirecard AG shares plunged up to 30% when the Finan-
cial Times published an article accusing the firm of “money laundering” and “falsification 
of accounts” in January 2019. Following these reports, Wirecard filed a lawsuit against 
the Financial Times, accusing the outlet of unethical reporting and market manipulation. 
While cases like this show how important it is that (financial) news outlets publish trust-
worthy and high-quality information, we know little about how the press creates value 
for its readers. Prior literature provides contrasting evidence attributing the value of fi-
nancial press articles merely to information dissemination (e.g., Drake et al. (2014)), 
while others stress the information production (e.g., Guest (2018)). I contribute to this 
stream of literature by providing an explorative supply-side perspective based on a con-
tent analysis. My approach differs from prior research, as it allows me to divide all quan-
titative items into information dissemination, i.e., items based on firm disclosure and pro-
duction, i.e., items from other (public) sources. Such an analysis promises to provide new 
insights into the demand for the services of the financial press and provides a new angle 
on how these services potentially create value based on the production and dissemination 
role.  
Following Bushee et al. (2010), this paper defines an information intermediary as “an 
agent that provides information that is new and useful to other parties, either because it 
has not previously been publicly released or because it has not been widely disseminated” 
(Bushee et al. (2010), p. 1). These tasks potentially save transaction costs for investors. 
As outlined above, prior literature broadly distinguishes two roles of the financial press 
as an intermediary of accounting information: information dissemination and information 
production. By assuming an information dissemination role, the financial press helps to 
broadcast information released by firms, e.g., to the target audience such as investors, 
hence contributing to the proliferation of information and its recognition in market prices 
(e.g., Soltes (2009); Blankespoor et al. (2018)). The importance of the information pro-
duction role of the financial press is more difficult to identify, also because it can take 
various forms and is consequently harder to isolate within financial press articles (Miller 
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and Skinner (2015)). First, the press may assume an information aggregation function by 
linking information from various public sources, for example, by combining coverage of 
an earnings announcement with feedbacks from analysts during the conference call. Sec-
ond, journalists may create original content using their individual analytical skills, filter-
ing out critical items from a vast array of disclosed items, or by exploiting their access to 
private information from firm executives or analysts (e.g., via interviews). Moreover, 
journalists can create value by interpreting the disclosed information and by writing an 
article that is (more) understandable than the original disclosure.  
In this paper, I examine the supply of accounting information. I use the release of the 
quarterly financial statements as the accounting event of interest and focus on the perti-
nent earnings announcements. The choice of a recurring event renders the results more 
generalizable to the principle work of business journalists, as the supply is independent 
of individual cases such as fraud. I choose three different news outlets: the Wall Street 
Journal (WSJ) as a financial newspaper and the New York Times (NYT) and USA Today 
(USAT) as general-interest newspapers. I analyze quarterly earnings announcements and 
corresponding articles of S&P 500 firms that are a permanent constituent of the index 
between Q1-2013 and Q2-2016. Overall, I analyze 323 firms. For each of these firms, I 
retrieve the quarterly earnings announcement and match the pertinent financial press ar-
ticles. 
I address three questions of interest. First, I am interested in the factors associated with 
the decision of news outlets to provide coverage of the earnings announcement of a firm. 
Particularly, I examine whether the coverage decision differs for outlets with varying 
reader sophistication. To answer this question, I consider the coverage pattern of the sam-
ple firms in the three different news outlets in a first step. I find that about 56% of the 
sample firms receive coverage in a news outlet over the sample period. This result is 
mainly driven by the WSJ, as the USAT and NYT only cover about 15% or 11%, respec-
tively. The coverage decision of the different outlets appears to be sticky. Building on 
prior literature such as Thompson et al. (1987) and Fang and Peress (2009), I shed light 
on the very firm characteristics that shape demand for financial press intermediation using 
a determinants model in a second step. The analysis reveals that coverage by the financial 
press is positively associated with firm fundamentals like the size. Additionally, I find a 
positive association between the coverage and some of my proxies for the information 
environment, like analyst coverage. 
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On the other hand, I find no association with free float and Google searches, which are 
proxies of the general retail investor information demand. Also, my proxies for negative 
information contained in the earnings announcements yield mixed results. The coverage 
determinants do not vary substantially for the three different outlets, though it seems that 
general-interest newspapers favor more controversial firms. Taken together, the infor-
mation environment of firms appears to be the primary driver of financial press coverage.  
My second question pertains to the content of press articles, i.e., the nature and amount 
of information that they convey. Mostly, I am interested in the specific types and respec-
tive weight of information that the press decides to publish. To provide evidence on this 
matter, I examine the supply of information in financial press articles on the level of 
quantitative items and assign them to different categories. A systematic analysis of the 
content reveals that the outlets include an average of 17.7 items per article. When com-
paring the three different outlets, I find that specialized newspapers provide more quan-
titative items (20.5 vs. 16.0 and 16.7), which give readers more insights into the current 
and future development of a firm. In line with the prominent role of performance metrics, 
most accounting data that journalists decide to report are measures of profit and revenues. 
I include firm and analysts quotes into my analysis to assess how private communication 
may affect the information supply in financial press articles, as this supply is most likely 
based on information production. I find that journalists regularly include quotes in their 
articles and that about 75% of executive quotes in articles are based on information pro-
duction. The NYT and USAT include more quotes from analysts and firm executives than 
the WSJ.  
Finally, I am also interested in a potential production role of the press and therefore ana-
lyze to what extent press articles covering accounting events solely rely on firm items 
(i.e., disseminate information) or glean additional information from other sources (i.e., 
produce information), thereby providing a potential value-added to readers. To that end, 
I reconcile the quantitative items of the articles with quarterly firm disclosure. I find that 
journalists systematically include financial items and information gleaned from sources 
other than the earnings announcement, e.g., from the conference call or analysts into their 
articles. This result is consistent with press articles not only disseminating firm disclo-
sures but also providing extra value by creating additional information. Mergers and ac-
quisitions (89.5%) and expenses (37.4%) are among the categories for which news outlets 
supply most production items. Besides, I examine firm characteristics that are associated 
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with additional information supply and therefore estimate a determinants model on the 
article level. Probit regressions reveal that the supply of this additional intermediation 
service increases with firm size and share turnover but is also markedly pronounced when 
retail investor information demand varies in the month leading up to the earnings an-
nouncement.  
Overall, my analyses reveal that the press assumes its dissemination function by 
channeling information from earnings announcements, in particular on firm performance, 
to market participants. More importantly, I show that journalists also assume an infor-
mation production role by combining information from various other sources and includ-
ing expert quotes, providing potential transaction cost savings to their readers. Both the 
demand for dissemination and the supply of additional content increase with measures of 
the firm’s information environment, such as size, which also reflects the notion of ‘public 
interest’.  
I contribute to the existing literature by providing an explorative supply-side perspective 
on the role of the financial press as an information intermediary. Generally, we know too 
little about whether and how the financial press assumes an information production func-
tion. Guest (2018) finds that articles add more value when they include more information 
that is original (i.e., uses a different wording than the earnings announcement), which 
suggests information production by the press. This finding contrasts Drake et al. (2014) 
who find that financial press coverage mitigates cash flow mispricing, but that this effect 
can be attributed only to news flashes disseminating news. My paper adds to this literature 
in at least two ways. First, to my knowledge, I am the first to provide detailed, content 
analysis-based evidence on the coverage decisions of the financial press, and on the 
choice of information items to be reported. Hence, I provide insights into the supply of 
intermediation activities by the press to the market. Second, my analysis of press article 
content enables me to discern the information dissemination role from the information 
production role of the financial press on a granular level. This way, my evidence helps us 
better understand how the press assumes its dissemination and production role and how 
journalists might create value through either role. My results complement Call et al. 
(2018), who offer insights into the information intermediary role of the press from the 
perspective of journalists.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2.2 elaborates on the theo-
retical role of the financial press as an information intermediary and prior literature. 
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Sections 2.3 to 2.6 present research design choices and findings from the analyses, which 
speak to my three research questions outlined above. Section 2.7 concludes. 
2.2 Background and related research  
Beaver (1998, p. 10) defines information intermediaries „an industry whose factors of 
production include financial information and other types of data and whose product is 
analysis and interpretation”. The financial press is traditionally the information interme-
diary with the largest audience. Nevertheless, the capital market features various other 
information intermediaries such as financial analysts. Prior literature such as Drake et al. 
(2014) and Guest (2018)distinguishes two potential sources of value generation for the 
financial press, which I summarize in Figure 2.1: the dissemination of information (In-
formation set I), and the production of information (Information set II and III).  
 
Figure 2.1: The financial press as an information intermediary 
This figure shows the role of the financial press as an information intermediary through infor-
mation dissemination (Information set I) and information production (Information set II and 
III). For both functions, the journalists collect, reduce, and weight the information available in 
each information set and base their articles on it. Subsequently, the articles become an infor-
mation source for retail and institutional investors.  
Generally, news outlets collect information from the three different information sets and 
make it available to their readers through their articles. Information set I features items 
from firm disclosure, for example, the earnings announcement press release (8-K) or fi-
nancial statements. As these items are publicly available, Information set I relates to in-
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like information stated in conference calls, while Information set III includes journalists’ 
private information, e.g., based on interviews with firm executives. Information from set 
II and III relate to information production because this kind of information expands the 
mere rebroadcasting of items. The journalists collect all items from the various infor-
mation sets, decide which of them to include in the article, and how prominent they fea-
ture each item in the article. This collection and aggregation save information processing 
costs for investors.  
There is ample evidence in the literature supporting the dissemination role of the financial 
press. For example, Peress (2014), Engelberg and Parsons (2011), Bushee et al. (2010), 
and Blankespoor et al. (2018) show a reduction in information asymmetry and a facili-
tated price discovery when the financial press covers a firm’s earnings announcement. 
Supporting the information production role, Miller (2006) documents abnormal returns 
upon the publication of press articles discovering fraud cases. Miller (2006), alongside 
Core et al. (2008), further introduces a monitoring role of the financial press. The broad 
audience and the credibility of the financial press enhance the investor reaction to both 
disseminated and produced information (e.g., Kothari et al. (2009)). Based on these re-
sults, market reactions following press articles about earnings announcements could de-
rive from either information production or dissemination.  
In the context of earnings announcement related articles, Guest (2018) stresses the pro-
duction role. He finds higher trading volume and more efficient price responses for arti-
cles with more production. His measure of information production focuses on the textual 
similarity between the earnings announcement press release and the press article. Based 
on this production measure, there are two ways in which journalists can create additional 
value to meet investor demand. The journalists can interpret the results and rephrase it in 
a way that is more understandable for (retail) investors. The more they rephrase the press 
release, the smaller the similarity between the two text documents. Alternatively, the jour-
nalists might include items from Information set II, or III in their articles, which results 
in a wording different to the earnings announcement. The proxy of Guest (2018) cannot 
discriminate between these two channels.  
Contrasting the evidence outlined above, Drake et al. (2014) provide evidence that attrib-
utes the value of financial press articles to information dissemination. Their results show 
that press coverage of earnings announcements decreases cash flow mispricing. Yet these 
results only hold for newsflashes, which merely disseminate information. The authors fail 
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to find a significant association for full articles, which might feature some degree of in-
formation production. One explanation for the contrasting findings might be that Guest 
(2018) focuses on the WSJ, a major financial newspaper, while Drake et al. (2014) ex-
amine a broader set of sources. Thus, the information production of different newspapers 
may vary with their degree of specialization. This difference might emanate from the 
demand of the readers the news outlets want to target. If news outlets were aware of in-
vestor demand in their target group, they might be more likely to write an article about a 
firm. Supporting this argument, Schütt (2019) finds evidence of market segmentation 
with differences in investor optimism and financial sophistication among various news 
outlets.  
My paper contributes to the conflicting literature about the value of financial press arti-
cles. I conduct an exploratory analysis, which allows me to clearly distinguish between 
the information production and information dissemination within financial press articles. 
Thus, I show how the press assumes its two roles and how journalists might create value 
through either one of them. To account for diverging investor belief and sophistication, 
which leans them towards a particular newspaper, I examine the information supply of 
three different outlets. I believe that insights into coverage with respect to supply and 
content decisions of newspapers are important to better understand the factors that shape 
demand for press articles, and hence the channels of value creation. In line with the three 
questions of interest outlined in the introduction, I aim to (i) infer factors that shape the 
decision to supply intermediation and how they might differ between outlets with differ-
ent target groups, to (ii) glean insights into the nature and relative proportion of infor-
mation provided, and (iii) to understand whether and on what occasion journalists decide 
to not only disseminate information but also to assume an information production role. 
2.3 Sample 
I analyze S&P 500 firms between Q1-2013 and Q2-2016. I examine earnings announce-
ments because they are scheduled in advance, can contain both positive and negative 
news, and investor information demand increases up to the event (Drake et al. (2012)). 
Additionally, they are independent of individual cases such as accounting fraud.  
Following Hillert et al. (2014) and Fang and Peress (2009), I analyze articles covering 
quarterly earnings announcements published in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ), USA To-
day (USAT), and The New York Times (NYT). For a sample ending in 2002, Fang and 
Supply-side evidence on the role of the financial press as an intermediary of accounting 
information 
 23 
Peress (2009) find an overlap of about 75% between the different sources. Therefore, I 
can exploit the potential variation in coverage between the different outlets. While the 
WSJ is a specialized financial newspaper, the other two outlets are general-interest news-
papers, thus I can analyze whether the information supply varies with outlet sophistica-
tion.  
Table 2.1: Sample description 
Panel A: Sample selection  
   Firms  Quarters  Firm-quarters 
S&P 500 firms between 2013 and 2016  500  14  7,000 
- Name conflicts Ticker Google  42  14  588 
- Missing data  51  14  714 
- balanced Panel  84  14  1,176 
Balanced Sample coverage analysis   323   14   4,522 
Panel B: Sample selection random sample 
   Firms  Firm-quarters   
Balanced Sample coverage analysis  323  4,522   
-Firms without press coverage in any quarter  49  686   
-Firms without press coverage in some quarter 0  1,306   
Potential Articles  274  2,530   
Random article sample for content analysis  134   420     
Panel C: Sample distribution per industry 
  Firms  Firm-quarters  Percent 
(1) Consumer Non-Durables 24  336  7.43% 
(2) Consumer Durables  7  98  2.17% 
(3) Manufacturing  24  336  7.43% 
(4) Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction (Energy)  18  252  5.57% 
(5) Chemicals and Allied Products  14  196  4.33% 
(6) Business Equipment  49  686  15.17% 
(7) Telephone and Television Transmission  10  140  3.10% 
(8) Utilities  24  336  7.43% 
(9) Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services  32  448  9.91% 
(10) Healthcare, Medical Equipment  25  350  7.74% 
(11) Finance  58  812  17.96% 
(12) Other (e.g., Hotels, Entertainment)  38  532  11.76% 
Total  323  4,522  100.00% 
Notes: This table provides details on the sample selection process for the coverage (Panel A), 
the content analysis (Panel B), and sample distribution (Panel C). 
Following Drake et al. (2014), I use RavenPack News Analytics to identify financial press 
articles. I only include full articles in my sample, which the news outlets publish in a 
seven-day window starting on the day before the earnings announcement day and ending 
five days afterward. To ensure that articles only deal with the sample firms, I exclude 
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articles with a Ravenpack relevance score below 903. If a firm is featured in an outlet 
multiple times during the seven-day window, I keep the article closest to the earnings 
announcement day for the analysis.  
I use a balanced panel and therefore exclude all firms that are not a permanent constituent 
of the S&P 500 are have missing data in some quarters. Overall, I end up with 323 sample 
firms and 4,522 quarter-firm observations. Table 2.1, Panel A provides an overview of 
the sample selection process of the coverage sample, while Panel C provides information 
about the Fama and French 12-industry distribution of the sample. 
2.4 Financial press coverage  
My first research question relates to the factors associated with the decision of the finan-
cial press to provide coverage of a major accounting event (quarterly earnings announce-
ment) for a firm. To provide evidence relating to those factors, I employ two different 
analyses. The first one provides descriptive evidence about the coverage distribution of 
the sample firms in the three outlets. For example, I am interested in how coverage varies 
between the different quarters and how sticky the coverage decision is on the news outlet 
level. This way, I can provide first evidence about potential differences between the var-
ious news outlets. The second analysis estimates a probit model to provide evidence 
which firm characteristics increase the likelihood of press coverage about the earnings 
announcement. In addition to the full model, I estimate the regressions for all news outlets 
separately, to provide further evidence about differences in the coverage decisions of the 
three outlets. Additionally, I investigate whether the supply is associated with retail in-
vestor demand. For these two analyses, I use the balanced sample outlined in Table 2.1 
(Panel A).  
2.4.1 Descriptive Analysis  
In a first step, I am interested in the coverage distribution with regard to the weekday of 
the earnings announcement. In line with prior results (e.g., Tsileponis et al. (2020)), I find 
that coverage is most pronounced on the day of the earnings announcement (82.4%). Most 
                                                 
3 For any news story that mentions an entity, RavenPack provides a relevance score between 0-100 that 
indicates how strongly related the entity is to the underlying news story, with higher values indicating 
greater relevance. A score of 0 means the entity was passively mentioned while a score of 100 means the 
entity was prominent in the news story. Usually, a relevance value of at least 90 indicates that the entity is 
referenced in the main title or headline of the news item, while lower values indicate references further in 
the story body. 
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of the sample firms report their earnings between Tuesday and Thursday. The percentage 
of firms covered does not differ substantially on these days (around 56% respectively). 
The likelihood of being covered is lowest on Monday and highest on Friday, though con-
siderably fewer firms report their earnings on these days (Table 2.2, Panel A).  
Table 2.2: Press Coverage of earnings announcements 
Panel A: Press coverage of sample firms over earnings announcement weekdays  
Weekday  Total  Without Coverage  With Coverage 
Monday  293  153  52.2%  140  47.8% 
Tuesday  1,044  461  44.2%  583  55.8% 
Wednesday  1,182  513  43.4%  669  56.6% 
Thursday  1,576  700  44.4%  876  55.6% 
Friday  422  164  38.9%  258  61.1% 
Saturday  4  0  0.0%  4  100.0% 
Sunday  1  1  100.0%  0  0.0% 
Total   4,522   1,992   44.1%   2,530   55.9% 
Panel B: Press coverage of sample firms over the sample period     
Year/Quarter  All Papers  WSJ   USAT  NYT   
2013q1  0.33  0.30  0.11  0.09   
2013q2  0.33  0.30  0.12  0.09   
2013q3  0.46  0.43  0.13  0.09   
2013q4  0.59  0.59  0.13  0.08   
2014q1  0.60  0.59  0.14  0.12   
2014q2  0.64  0.63  0.14  0.12   
2014q3  0.65  0.64  0.15  0.13   
2014q4  0.64  0.63  0.19  0.14   
2015q1  0.60  0.56  0.15  0.13   
2015q2  0.60  0.60  0.19  0.12   
2015q3  0.59  0.58  0.17  0.13   
2015q4  0.64  0.63  0.17  0.14   
2016q1  0.59  0.57  0.16  0.13   
2016q2  0.57  0.56  0.12  0.11   
Total   0.56   0.54   0.15   0.11     
Notes: This table provides information on the press coverage of earnings announce-
ments. Panel A shows the coverage regarding the weekday of the earnings announce-
ment. Panel B shows the median coverage of all 323 sample firms for all sample quar-
ters in total and by news outlet.  
In a second step, I examine the average coverage of the 323 sample firms in the three 
outlets to provide preliminary evidence about potential differences between them. Table 
2.2, Panel B shows the coverage for each news outlet over the sample period. I find that 
the news outlets feature about 56% of the sample S&P500 firms over time. The coverage 
varies substantially between the outlets. While the WSJ covers 54% of the firms on aver-
age, the USAT and NYT only pick up 15% and 11% of earnings announcements, respec-
tively. For the USAT and WSJ, these numbers are comparable to Fang and Peress (2009), 
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whereas the NYT coverage is considerably lower in my sample4. In line with Guest 
(2018), I find an increase in coverage during 2013, when the WSJ merged its news desk 
with the Dow Jones Newswire5.  
Out of the 323 sample firms, 49 are not featured in any of the three outlets during the 
sample period, whereas 48 of them receive coverage in every quarter of the sample in at 
least one outlet. Interestingly, 27 firms receive constant coverage in one specific news 
outlet after the initial coverage during the sample period. This effect might be comparable 
to analyst coverage (Clement (1999)): Once an analyst or a journalist decides to follow a 
firm, she keeps publishing reports about that firm and uses firm-specific knowledge/ex-
perience to provide more accurate information. However, the WSJ mainly drives the cov-
erage distribution. While the WSJ keeps publishing articles about a firm once the cover-
age started, the it is less constant for specific firms in the other two outlets. Figure 2.2 
provides an overview of the firm coverage distribution of the sample based on 14 quarters.  
 
Figure 2.2: Coverage distribution of sample firms 
This figure shows the number of quarters in which one of the three new outlets (WSJ, NYT, 
USAT) features the firms (N Quarters=14, N Firms =323). 48 firms are covered in all quarters, 
while 49 firms are never included in a press publication.  
 
                                                 
4 The sample does not include articles below a relevance score of 90. This means that a firm could be 
mentioned in either NYT or USAT in an article covering various firms, in which it would be of subordinate 
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2.4.2 Determinant Analysis  
2.4.2.1 Design 
To provide insights into the coverage decision of the outlets, I examine which firm char-
acteristics increase the likelihood of coverage and especially whether these characteristics 
differ for the news outlets. I estimate a probit determinants model using the coverage 
(indicator variable set to one if a firm is covered in the current quarter and zero otherwise) 
as the dependent variable. My determinants model aims to capture firm characteristics 
that potentially shape demand for financial intermediation via newspaper articles. To that 
end, I distinguish three sets of test variables. 
My first vector of variables relates to the general information environment of the firm. 
While institutional investors have access to costly information intermediaries, e.g., finan-
cial analysts, retail investors rely on less costly information intermediaries like newspa-
pers. I include the free float of total shares outstanding (Freefloat) (Drake et al. (2014)) 
as a proxy for the ownership structure. My descriptive evidence suggests that journalists, 
similar to analysts, continuously cover a firm once they initiated coverage. Therefore, I 
include the press coverage in the previous quarter (Cov Q-1) as an additional variable 
(Drake et al. (2014)). Journalists and news outlets have limited resources. Consequently, 
they might be less able to devote resources to an article when multiple firms are announc-
ing their earnings on the same day. Therefore, I use a median split to create the variable 
BusyDay, which captures days on which more firms than usual announce their earnings. 
According to Call et al. (2018), the main attribute that influences the coverage decision 
of a journalist is the question of whether a firm is controversial. Prior research about the 
coverage decisions of news outlets has so far neglected this argument in the analyses. To 
capture the controversy of a firm leading up to the earnings announcement, I use the Rav-
enpack aggregated event sentiment score (AES), which captures the ratio of positive to 
negative news stories within a 91-day window. The score does not consider neutral arti-
cles. A score of 0 indicates that all articles within the window are negative, while a score 
of 1 indicates all articles are positive.  
Financial analysts are among the essential information intermediaries. For some inves-
tors, analysts represent an important alternative information source to the press. So far, 
the literature has not clearly established whether the two information intermediaries are 
complementary or substitutes (Miller and Skinner (2015)). Hillert et al. (2014) and Fang 
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and Peress (2009) provide results indicating that the two intermediaries are substitutes. 
On the other hand, Call et al. (2018) provide evidence that journalists include analyst 
information in their articles, suggesting that they consider both intermediaries to be com-
plementary. In line with this argument, the results of Guest and Jaewoo (2019) indicate 
that financial press coverage decreases when fewer analysts are available as a potential 
source to journalists. Besides, Rees et al. (2015) argue that financial press coverage is 
favorable for the career prospects of analysts. To provide evidence on this ongoing de-
bate, I include the analyst following into the determinant model. I measure AF as the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of EPS estimates.  
As I am interested in the supply-demand relation of news outlets and their target groups, 
I include a proxy for investor information demand in my model. If news outlets were 
aware of retail investor demand, they might be more likely to publish an article about the 
earnings announcement. Da et al. (2011) use the Google search volume index (SVI) based 
on firm tickers as a proxy for (retail) investor demand for information about a firm. Using 
the SVI data, Drake et al. (2012) find that Google searches are positively associated with 
media coverage.6 Following these papers, I use the Google SVI as a proxy for the retail 
investor information demand leading up to the earnings announcement. In the various 
analyses, I use two different versions of this variable. The first one is the natural logarithm 
of the mean SVI during the 28 days leading up to the earnings announcement (SVI_mean). 
The second one uses the standard deviation of SVI during the same time (SVI_sd). The 
variables based on the Google data are of special interest to me because they capture 
whether demand is associated with supply.  
My second vector of variables captures the information contained in the earnings an-
nouncement. Broadly, I conjecture that demand for newspaper coverage increases with 
the novelty of the information, e.g., the earnings surprise (Engelberg and Parsons (2011)). 
I use the analyst forecast error (AFE) as a measure for earnings surprise. I calculate AFE 
as the difference between the actual earnings and the last analyst forecast before the earn-
ings announcement and scale the difference by the stock price at the quarter-end (Bushee 
et al. (2010)). Additionally, prior literature shows that journalists are more likely to cover 
negative firm events, as they anticipate increased investor demand. I use the indicator 
                                                 
6 The authors examine S&P 500 firms between 2005 and 2008 and find an increase in Google searches in 
the two weeks leading up to the earnings announcement with a spike on the earnings announcement day. 
They use the media data of Soltes (2009), which includes the WSJ, New York Times, The Washington Post 
and USA Today.  
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variable Loss_firm to proxy for the disclosure of bad news (i.e., reported loss) in a specific 
quarter. As an alternative proxy for negative firm events, I include the indicator variable 
AF_miss, which captures if firms meet the analyst forecast. Call et al. (2018) argue that 
journalists compare the reported earnings to the analyst forecast. Therefore, they might 
be more likely to cover an earnings announcement when they can write about a missed 
forecast.  
My third vector includes variables capturing the fundamentals of the sample firms. In 
general, larger and potentially growing firms are more interesting for the market partici-
pants. Additionally, less sophisticated news outlets might mainly feature large firms, as 
their readers might be less familiar with smaller firms. I measure Size as the natural log-
arithm of market capitalization at the fiscal quarter-end. I include the book-to-market ratio 
(BTM) to capture the growth potential of the firm (Bushee et al. (2010)). I use the return 
volatility during the previous quarter beginning on the day of the last earnings announce-
ment and ending one day before the current earnings announcement (Volatility) to proxy 
for the risk of a firm. I capture the liquidity of the firm’s stock using the mean share 
turnover (Turnover) over the previous quarter (Fang and Peress (2009)). For the same 
period, I calculate buy and hold returns (BHR) to include the stock performance of a firm 
into the model. Call et al. (2018) show that journalists take the stock performance (weak 
or strong) of a firm into consideration when deciding whether to cover a firm or not.  
I obtain weekly Search Volume Index (SVI) data from Google Trends. Following prior 
literature (e.g., Drake et al. (2012); Da et al. (2011); Madsen and Niessner (2019)), I use 
company tickers to collect the search data. I exclude 42 firms with tickers with potential 
alternative meanings (e.g., CAT) and one firm because it does not have enough search 
requests for Google to provide SVI data7. I use firm fundamentals data from Compustat 
and market data from CSRP. To include analysts as a different outlet of information in-
termediaries, I use I/B/E/S data. I obtain ownership data from Datastream. 
I use the Fama and French 12 industry classification to control for industries that generally 
interest the public, e.g., banks. To deal with outliers, I winsorized Size and AFE at the 1% 
level. Additionally, I include quarter-year fixed effects and cluster standard errors on the 
firm level. I provide variable definitions in Table 2.A1 (Appendix) and the summary 
                                                 
7 Google SVI data ranges from 0 to 100. If a term does not have enough searches, Google does not display 
results for the term.  
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statistics in Table 2.3. Table 2.A2 in the appendix shows the correlation between the var-
ious variables. 
Table 2.3: Summary statistics (Balanced coverage analysis) 
Variable  mean  sd  median  Min  max  Count 
Coverage All Papers 0.56  0.50  1.00  0.00  1.00  4,522 
WSJ Coverage  0.54  0.50  1.00  0.00  1.00  4,522 
USAT Coverage  0.15  0.35  0.00  0.00  1.00  4,522 
NYT Coverage   0.11  0.32  0.00  0.00  1.00  4,522 
Cov Q-1  0.55  0.50  1.00  0.00  1.00  4,522 
NYT Cov Q-1 0.12  0.32  0.00  0.00  1.00  4,522 
USAT Cov Q-1 0.14  0.35  0.00  0.00  1.00  4,522 
WSJ Cov Q-1 0.53  0.50  1.00  0.00  1.00  4,522 
AES  0.65  0.15  0.65  0.15  1.00  4,522 
BusyDay  0.48  0.50  0.00  0.00  1.00  4,522 
Size  10.03  0.99  9.88  8.05  12.68  4,522 
Freefloat  0.91  0.10  0.93  0.48  1.00  4,522 
BTM  0.40  0.30  0.32  -0.92  2.18  4,522 
Loss firm  0.03  0.16  0.00  0.00  1.00  4,522 
SVI_mean  3.73  0.62  3.88  0.00  4.61  4,522 
SVI_sd  6.05  5.26  4.51  0.00  44.40  4,522 
Turnover  8.35  5.51  7.01  0.01  83.58  4,522 
Volatility  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.10  4,522 
AF  2.97  0.45  3.04  0.69  4.04  4,522 
AFE  -0.04  0.02  -0.04  -0.14  0.02  4,522 
AF_miss  0.02  0.13  0.00  0.00  1.00  4,522 
BHR   0.04   0.12   0.04   -0.71   1.70   4,521 
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the variables of the coverage anal-
ysis. Sample selection is defined in Table 2.1. All variables are defined in Table 2.A1 
(Appendix). Variables comprise Coverage (outlets combined and separately), prior 
coverage (outlets combined and separately), AES (press sentiment score), BusyDay 
dummy, Size, Freefloat, BTM (Book-to-market), loss firm dummy, SVI_mean 
(Google search mean), SVI_sd (Google search standard deviation), Turnover, volatil-
ity, AF (number of analyst forecasts), AFE (analyst forecast error), AF_miss (dummy 
for missed forecast), and BHR (buy-and-hold return).  
 
2.4.2.2 Results 
Table 2.4 reports findings for estimating the determinants model based on the variables 
outlined above. Column (1) shows the results for all newspapers.8 Columns (5) and (6) 
show various model specifications using the same dependent variable but different test 
variables to assess the robustness of the results. The coefficient estimates for Size are 
                                                 
8 The results remain mainly unchanged when estimating the determinants model without clustering the 
standard error or including fixed effects.  
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highly significant (1% level) in all model specifications. The positive coefficients suggest 
that a firm is more likely featured in the financial press when it has a high market capi-
talization. This result is in line with readers’ information demand, as retail investors, who 
particularly rely on information provided in the financial press (Kothari et al. (2009)), are 
more likely to invest in well-known firms and thus want more information about them 
(Barber and Odean (2008)). Share turnover during the quarter is also positive and signif-
icant (1% level), indicating that news outlets provide more information about highly 
traded stock and therefore cater to the demand of their readers.  
SVI_sd and SVI_mean, which capture the investor information demand leading up to the 
earnings announcement, yield no significant results in any model specification. This re-
sult suggests that news outlets do not adapt their supply to a short-term increase in de-
mand. Coefficient estimates for the number of analyst EPS forecasts (AF) are significant 
(1% level) and obtain positive signs in all models. This indicates that firms, which attract 
attention by analysts, are also more likely to receive public attention in a newspaper. To 
that end, there seems to be a certain overlap between the target groups of analysts and the 
news outlets, which suggests that the press and analysts complement rather than substitute 
each other. Prior press coverage (Cov Q-1) is positive and highly significant (1% level) 
in all models, confirming the descriptive results that journalists keep writing about a firm 
once they started covering. The BusyDay dummy is significantly negative, which sug-
gests that press coverage is less likely on days with many earnings announcements, which 
is in line with time and newspaper space constraints. The variable for the ownership struc-
ture (Freefloat) remains insignificant in all model specifications. The results for AES, 
which is a proxy for the degree of controversy surrounding the firm, are positive and 
significant at a 1% level in all model specifications. This suggests that coverage is more 
likely when prior articles are more favorable.  
The coefficient of the analyst forecast error (AFE) is negative and significant on a 1% 
level in all model specifications. Additionally, the loss firm indicator variable has a pos-
itive association with press coverage on the 5% level. These results are consistent with 
journalists supplying more information when the earnings announcement conveys bad 
news. The positive association between volatility and press coverage (column (5) further 
suggests that high-risk firms are more likely featured in a newspaper.  
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Notes: This table shows the results of a probit regression with the coverage as the dependent 
variable. In columns (1), (5), and (6) the dependent variable refers to all news outlets, while 
columns (2) to (4) estimate the model for the three different outlets outlined in the column's 
headline. All variables are defined in Table 2.A1 (Appendix). Variables comprise Coverage 
(outlets combined and separately), prior coverage (outlets combined and separately), AES 
(press sentiment score), BusyDay dummy, Size, Freefloat, BTM (Book-to-market), loss 
firm dummy, SVI_mean (Google search mean, SVI_sd (Google search standard deviation), 
Turnover, volatility, AF (number of analyst forecasts), AFE (analyst forecast error), 
AF_miss (dummy for missed forecast), and BHR (buy-and-hold return). ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using two-tailed tests 
and standard errors clustered at the firm level. (N firms=323). Maximal VIF in all models 
is 3.38.  
Supply-side evidence on the role of the financial press as an intermediary of accounting 
information 
 33 
Table 2.4, columns (2) to (4) show the results for estimating the model for the three outlets 
separately. The results for Size, Turnover, Cov Q-1 (in the respective newspaper), and 
BusyDay remain mostly unchanged. Interestingly, the coefficient estimate for the number 
of analyst forecasts is only highly significant for the WSJ. This suggests that analyst cov-
erage is increasing the coverage of a specialized newspaper, while it is less likely for 
newspapers of general-interest. The coefficient estimate for AES is positive and slightly 
significant in the full models. This result holds for the WSJ, but the sign switches for the 
other two outlets. The negative coefficient estimate is significant at the 5% level for the 
USAT. Therefore, the results suggest that the two general-interest newspapers of my sam-
ple are more likely to cover an earnings announcement when prior press coverage is more 
negative. This is in line with the results of Call et al. (2018) that journalists feature more 
controversial firms, which speaks more to the entertainment role of the press rather than 
disseminating or producing information (Jensen (1979)). While the results for AFE re-
main mainly unchanged, the loss firm indicator variable only has a positive association 
with the WSJ coverage. This hints that the WSJ is more likely to feature information 
about constrained firms that do not meet the market expectations. In contrast to the other 
outlets, USAT coverage is significantly negative associated with the number of free float 
shares.  
Overall, my results suggest that the general firm fundamentals and the information envi-
ronment of the firm are a vital factor for the decision of a news outlet to cover the earnings 
announcement. Additionally, there seems to be more coverage when the information con-
veyed in the earnings announcement is negative. While the results suggest that most firm 
characteristics drive coverage in all three outlets, the WSJ journalists react stronger to 
professional information sources, for example, analysts, whereas USAT and NYT jour-
nalists supply articles for more controversial firms, which might be more interesting to 
their targeted readers. These results are in line with the level of specification of the news 
outlets and complement those of Schütt (2019) regarding news market segmentation from 
a supply perspective.  
2.5 Information supplied in financial press articles  
2.5.1 Design 
My second research question relates to the content of press articles, i.e., the information 
that journalists supply in their articles. I expect insights into the choice and weighting of 
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content in press articles to be reflective of readers’ demand for information and hence for 
intermediation services provided by the press. To provide evidence on the information 
supplied in the articles, I perform a content analysis aimed at collecting all quantitative 
items and all quotes. While the quantitative items represent hard information, which is 
value relevant for investors, the quotes are indicative of additional content and reflect 
possible private communication (i.e., information production; Call et al. (2018)). By per-
forming a content analysis, I can provide detailed evidence about the information supply 
in articles, which is more granular compared to the textual similarity measure of Guest 
(2018) and complements the arguments Call et al. (2018) make in their survey paper about 
the information supply from the perspective of journalists. I identify 2,530 articles about 
the sample firms during the sample period. I use a random sample for each news outlet in 
each quarter containing 10 articles for the manual collection. In sum, I analyze 420 arti-
cles. The analyses are based on the balanced sample for the coverage analysis outlined in 
Table 2.1, Panel A. For the content analysis, I obtain the text of the articles from ProQuest 
and Nexis.  
The content analysis focuses on three main areas of interest. First, I am interested in the 
general characteristics of the financial press articles and how they differ between the three 
outlets. To that end, I examine the length, the overall supply of quantitative items, and 
the information density in the different articles. As readers of a specialized newspaper 
might be more sophisticated, WSJ articles present the information differently than the 
more general outlets.  
Second, I examine the time horizon of the quantitative items (current, forecast, prior). 
Most items likely refer to the quarter of the current earnings release. Nevertheless, it 
might be beneficial for readers if the journalists include items from the previous quarter 
or year to facilitate a comparison and, thus, the evaluation of the development of the firm. 
Additionally, it might be in line with the readers’ demand if the articles feature manage-
ment and/or analyst forecasts to compare the forecasted firm development with their own 
expectations.  
Third, I categorize the quantitative items to examine the depth of the articles and to assess 
the level of supply of each news outlet. This way, I can provide evidence on how diver-
sified journalists portray the firms, e.g., by reporting segment performance or disaggre-
gated earnings components. While disaggregated earnings might be helpful to mitigate 
investor fixation on earning (Elliott et al. (2011)), a broader choice of firm items such as 
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segment performance indicators might facilitate the investment decision for investors. I 
assign each quantitative item to a group: accounting data, non-accounting data, and ex-
ternal data. I then further divide the groups into different categories.  
Table 2.5: Category examples 
Panel A: Internal Accounting data 
Category  Examples 
Balance Sheet assets, provision, debt   
Cash Flow  FCF, cash flow, operating cash flow  
EB  operating earnings, core earnings, operating income 
Expenses  impairment, expense, restructuring costs  
GAAP  net income, earnings, EPS   
Industry-specific tenant retention, mortgage applications, display ads, corn volume  
M&A  acquisition, takeover bid   
Non-GAAP  adjusted earnings, adjusted profit, adjusted eps 
Revenue  revenue, sales, gross margin  
Segment  segment earnings, segment operating income, segment revenue  
Share related dividend, share buyback  
  
Panel B: Internal Non-Accounting data 
Category  Examples 
Employees  workforce, wages, bonus   
Exchange rate currency effect, currency hedge  
Legal  settlement, litigation, lawsuit  
Other  customers, stores, taxes, Brexit  
Product related product price, production, backlog 
 
Panel C: External data 
Category  Examples 
Analyst  revenue forecast, EPS forecast  
Capital Market share price, S&P500, FTSE   
Competitor  sales, earnings, EPS   
Industry  market share, federal funding, coal shipments 
Macro Data 
 
GDP, oil price 
   
Panel D: Quotes 
Category  Examples 
Internal Quote CFO quote, CEO quote, Conference Call quote 
Analyst Quote Analyst quote   
External Quote Former employees, research       
Notes: This table shows examples for the items in each of the categories accounting data 
(Panel A), non-accounting data (Panel B), external data (Panel C), and quotes (Panel D).  
The accounting data group comprises categories like revenue, performance, and segment 
measures. There is an ongoing debate about the motive of managers to disclose non-
GAAP figures (e.g., Leung and Veenman (2018)). Consequently, it is of interest which 
performance metrics journalists choose to include in their articles. I follow Hitz (2010) 
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and divide the performance category into three subcategories: GAAP, EB, and non-
GAAP. I define GAAP items as a bottom-line measure from the income statement and 
EB items as “earnings before” metrics, for example, EBIT or EBITDA. Non-GAAP met-
rics are adjusted performance metrics such as a recurring EBITDA. For these metrics, the 
management decides to eliminate expenses like restructuring costs. Therefore, additional 
information is needed for these metrics to be reconciled with the income statement.  
The non-accounting data group contains information about employees or product-related 
items, while the external data group contains analyst forecasts, market prices, and mac-
roeconomic figures such as GDP growth. I assign all quotes to my last group. I split this 
group into analyst, firm, and external quotes. For the firm and analyst quotes, I addition-
ally analyze whether they emanate from public sources like a conference call (Information 
set II) or private communication like interviews (Information set III). While firm execu-
tives have incentives to talk to journalists to impact the reporting about their firms, ana-
lysts might draw career benefits from their public coverage (Rees et al. (2015)). Featuring 
quotes allows news outlets to include the perspective of users and preparers into the arti-
cles and signals access to background information to the readers. The inclusion of this 
kind of information is likely to produce valuable information for the readers. Table 2.5 
gives an overview of the different categories in the groups and provides examples for 
each category.  
2.5.2 Quantitative items: general article information 
Overall, I collect 7,447 quantitative items and 546 quotes from the articles. Table 2.6 
(Panel A) reports the general characteristics (mean lengths, items, and density) of all ar-
ticles in total and for the different news outlets, while Figure 2.A3 (Appendix) shows the 
mean items per outlet for the different quarters to evaluate a time trend. Table 2.6 (Panel 
B) provides the results of t-tests comparing the mean items and mean length among the 
different outlets. The articles have a mean word count of 484.4. On average, articles of 
the NYT have more words than the ones of the other two outlets, while WSJ articles have 
a larger minimum of words. The difference between the NYT and the other two outlets is 
statically significant at a 1% level, whereas WSJ articles are also significantly longer than 
USAT articles (1% level) (Panel B). News outlets include a mean of 17.7 items in each 
article, which results in a mean of 0.04 items per word in each article. WSJ articles contain 
an average of 20.5 key items in each article, while the NYT (16.0) and the USAT (16.7) 
include significantly fewer items (significant on a 1% level). The difference between the 
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two general-interest newspapers is not statistically significant (Table 2.6, Panel B). Over-
all, it seems like the specialized WSJ has a higher information density. As its target group 
is likely made of more sophisticated readers/investors, the WSJ might choose to supply 
more detailed information. This is in line with Schütt (2019), who suggests that news 
outlets cater to their specific target group.  
Table 2.6: Quantitative items in financial press articles 











































































Panel B: Outlet comparison 
   N  Mean Items per article  Mean word count 
NYT  140 16.0 612.9 








































Notes: This table shows quantitative items in financial press articles in total and by news 
outlet. Panel A reports the word count, items, and items per article in the sample news 
outlets. Panel B shows the results of t-tests comparing mean items and word counts of 
articles published in the different outlets. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. The analysis is based on 420 articles from 
three news outlets (140 each). 
2.5.3 Quantitative items: time horizon  
Table 2.7, Panel A shows the time horizon of the quantitative items. As expected, most 
items are based on the current quarter. In line with the results of Call et al. (2018), nearly 
all articles (N=410 out of 420) feature some information about a previous quarter, as 
journalists often use them as a comparison for the current results. Table 2.7, Panel B splits 
the items into different groups. Newspapers compare accounting items to the previous 
quarter more often, while they chose not to compare the non-accounting items. Table 2.7, 
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Panel C shows the time horizon distribution by news outlet. The WSJ supplies relatively 
more forecasts than the other two outlets. For the accounting items, this larger number is 
mainly due to earnings and revenue forecasts. Additionally, the WSJ features much more 
analyst forecasts than the other two outlets (N=62 vs. N=16 and N=17). Therefore, read-
ers can evaluate the firm performance based on expert input, which might be more in line 
with the information demand of a WSJ reader. Overall, the journalists focus on the new 
information presented in the earnings announcement, with the WSJ giving a more detailed 
outlook for future development.  
Table 2.7: Time horizon of quantitative items  
Panel A: Time horizon 
  N (Items)  %  N (Articles)  %     
Current FY  4,524  60.7%  420  100.0%     
Forecast  585  7.9%  224  53.3%     
Prior FY  2,338  31.4%  410  97.6%     
Total  7,447  100.0%  420  100.0%       
Panel B: Time horizon by group 
  External data  Accounting data  Non-Accounting data 
  N (Items)  %  N (Items)  %  N (Items)  % 
Current FY  1,082  69.3%  3,117  57.7%  325  67.0% 
Forecast  116  7.4%  384  7.1%  85  17.5% 
Prior FY  364  23.3%  1,899  35.2%  75  15.5% 
Total  1,562  100.0%  5,400  100.0%  485  100.0% 
Panel C: Time horizon by news outlet 
  NYT  USAT  WSJ 
  N (Items)  %  N (Items)  %  N (Items)  % 
Current FY  1,458  65.3%  1,443  61.7%  1,623  56.4% 
Forecast  118  5.3%  146  6.2%  321  11.2% 
Prior FY  658  29.5%  748  32.0%  932  32.4% 
Total  2,234  100.0%  2,337  100.0%  2,876  100.0% 
Notes: This table shows the time horizon distribution of quantitative items for all items 
(Panel A), by group (Panel B), and by news outlet (Panel C). The analysis is based on 
420 articles from three news outlets (140 each). Percentage number refer to all items of 
the total number of items.  
2.5.4 Quantitative items: categories  
Table 2.8 (Panel A) summarizes the results of the content analysis for the different groups. 
Out of all items, 79% are based on internal (accounting and non-accounting) data. My 
results show that most items (5,400/72.5%) belong to the accounting data group. Nearly 
every article contains information about at least one item of this group. As performance 
and revenue are two important key figures for investors, it is not surprising that journalists 
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often report items of these categories (Panel B). Together, the two categories comprise 
more than 50% of the accounting group (2,033 items/37.7% performance; 1,208 
items/22.4% revenue). More than 90% of the articles (91.9% performance and 97.1% 
revenue) contain at least one item out of these two categories.  
Another important category in the accounting data group are the segment items (1,464 
items/ 27.1%). As the performance of segments can differ from the performance of a full 
firm, this information might be valuable to readers to assess the current and future per-
formance of a firm in a more diversified way. The use of segment information varies 
between the outlets. While nearly 80% of WSJ articles provide this more detailed insight, 
the percentage of articles containing segment information decreases for the general-inter-
est newspapers (NYT: 70.7%; USAT: 63.6%). For segment items, the difference between 
the WSJ and the general-interest outlets is significant at a 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
While the two general outlets provide a comparable amount of performance items (603 
and 571, respectively), the WSJ includes most of them (859) (Panel C). Of the three per-
formance categories, journalists include the GAAP metrics most often in their articles. 
The frequency with which the general-interest newspapers report the three different per-
formance metrics are comparable (GAAP: 92.9% vs. 93.6%; EB: 11.4% vs. 11.4%; non-
GAAP: 27.9% vs. 36.4%), whereas the WSJ features EB performance measures in 20% 
and non-GAAP metrics items in more than half of their articles (52.1%). As Regulation 
G requires firms to present a comparable GAAP measure and an at least equal presenta-
tion of both metrics when disclosing a non-GAAP measure, performance items clearly 
show a supply choice by the news outlets. In general, the WSJ supplies more quantitative 
items that allow investors to differentiate transitory and persistent performance compo-
nents, as it includes prior mergers and its effects as well as detailed information about 
expenses in the articles. This disaggregation of earnings might mitigate earnings fixation 
on behalf of the investors. However, the disclosure of non-GAAP measures by the WSJ 
might also undermine the requirement of equal presentation of Regulation G if the news 
outlet fails to report the corresponding GAAP metrics. 25% of journalists in the survey 
paper of Call et al. (2018)state that they are not likely to evaluate the difference between 
GAAP and non-GAAP metrics in their articles.  
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Table 2.8: Items in financial press articles 
Panel A: All items       
   Total  NYT  USAT  WSJ 
Group  Items  %  Art.  %  Items  %  Art.  %  Items  %  Art.  %  Items  %  Art.  % 
Accounting 5,400  72.5%  417  99.3%  1,656  74.1%  138  98.6%  1,567  67.1%  139  99.3%  2,177  75.7%  140  100.0% 
Non-Accounting 485  6.5%  316  75.2%  156  7.0%  106  75.7%  154  6.6%  114  81.4%  175  6.1%  96  68.6% 
External  1,562  21.0%  400  95.2%  422  18.9%  129  92.1%  616  26.4%  137  97.9%  524  18.2%  134  95.7% 
All items/Articles 7,447   100.0%   420   100.0%   2,234   100.0%   140   100.0%   2,337   100.0%   140   100.0%   2,876   100.0%   140   100.0% 
Panel B: Accounting data       
   Total  NYT  USAT  WSJ 
Category  Items  %  Art.  %  Items  %  Art.  %  Items  %  Art.  %  Items  %  Art.  % 
Balance Sheet 33  0.6%  21  5.0%  18  1.1%  12  8.6%  9  0.6%  5  3.6%  6  0.3%  4  2.9% 
Cash-Flow 35  0.6%  24  5.7%  16  1.0%  11  7.9%  2  0.1%  2  1.4%  17  0.8%  11  7.9% 
Expenses  206  3.8%  109  26.0%  51  3.1%  28  20.0%  47  3.0%  30  21.4%  108  5.0%  51  36.4% 
Industry-specific 253  4.7%  84  20.0%  71  4.3%  25  17.9%  43  2.7%  18  12.9%  139  6.4%  41  29.3% 
M&A  65  1.2%  53  12.6%  13  0.8%  11  7.9%  13  0.8%  12  8.6%  39  1.8%  30  21.4% 
Performance 2,033  37.6%  408  97.1%  603  36.4%  135  96.4%  571  36.4%  134  95.7%  859  39.5%  139  99.3% 
Revenue  1,208  22.4%  386  91.9%  378  22.8%  126  90.0%  360  23.0%  127  90.7%  470  21.6%  133  95.0% 
Segment  1,464  27.1%  296  70.5%  474  28.6%  99  70.7%  488  31.1%  89  63.6%  502  23.1%  108  77.1% 
Share related 103  1.9%  56  13.3%  32  1.9%  20  14.3%  34  2.2%  18  12.9%  37  1.7%  18  12.9% 
All items/Artciles 5,400  100.0%  420  100.0%  1,656  100.0%  140  100.0%  1,567  100.0%  140  100.0%  2,177  100.0%  140  100.0% 
Panel C: Performance Items 
   Total  NYT  USAT  WSJ 
Category  Items  %  Art.  %  Items  %  Art.  %  Items  %  Art.  %  Items  %  Art.  % 
GAAP  1,617  79.5%  397  94.5%  509  84.4%  130  92.9%  460  80.6%  131  93.6%  648  75.4%  136  97.1% 
EB  132  6.5%  60  14.3%  37  6.1%  16  11.4%  28  4.9%  16  11.4%  67  7.8%  28  20.0% 
Non-GAAP 284  14.0%  163  38.8%  57  9.5%  39  27.9%  83  14.5%  51  36.4%  144  16.8%  73  52.1% 
All items/Articles  2,033  100.0%  420  100.0%  603  100.0%  140  100.0%  571  100.0%  140  100.0%  859  100.0%  140  100.0% 
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Table 2.8: Items in financial press articles (continued) 
Panel D: Non-Accounting data 
   Total  NYT  USAT  WSJ 
Category  Items  %  Art.  %  Items  %  Art.  %  Items  %  Art.  %  Items  %  Art.  % 
Employees 102  21.0%  58  13.8%  35  22.4%  21  15.0%  35  22.7%  20  14.3%  32  18.3%  17  12.1% 
Exchange rate 37  7.6%  26  6.2%  5  3.2%  4  2.9%  7  4.5%  5  3.6%  25  14.3%  17  12.1% 
Legal  11  2.3%  7  1.7%  10  6.4%  6  4.3%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  1  0.6%  1  0.7% 
Other  195  40.2%  93  22.1%  59  37.8%  34  24.3%  75  48.7%  29  20.7%  61  34.9%  30  21.4% 
Product related 140  28.9%  64  15.2%  47  30.1%  24  17.1%  37  24.0%  19  13.6%  56  32.0%  21  15.0% 
All items/Articles 485   100.0%   420   100.0%   156   100.0%   140   100.0%   154   100.0%   140   100.0%   175   100.0%   140   100.0% 
Panel E: External data       
   Total  NYT  USAT  WSJ 
Category  Items  %  Art.  %  Items  %  Art.  %  Items  %  Art.  %  Items  %  Art.  % 
Analyst  652  41.7%  326  77.6%  172  40.8%  95  67.9%  233  37.8%  119  85.0%  247  47.1%  112  80.0% 
Capital Market 642  41.1%  289  68.8%  140  33.2%  82  58.6%  313  50.8%  121  86.4%  189  36.1%  86  61.4% 
Competitor 165  10.6%  39  9.3%  78  18.5%  15  10.7%  33  5.4%  12  8.6%  54  10.3%  12  8.6% 
Industry  88  5.6%  50  11.9%  28  6.6%  20  14.3%  29  4.7%  14  10.0%  31  5.9%  16  11.4% 
Macro Data 15  1.0%  10  2.4%  4  0.9%  3  2.1%  8  1.3%  4  2.9%  3  0.6%  3  2.1% 
All items/Articles  1,562   100.0%   420   100.0%   422   100.0%   140   100.0%   616   100.0%   140   100.0%   524   100.0%   140   100.0% 
Notes: This table shows the number of items in the different groups (Panel A). Panels B to D split the groups into the various categories: accounting 
data (Panel B), and thereof the performance items (Panel C), non-accounting data (Panel D), and external data (Panel E). The analysis is based on 
420 articles (Art.) from three news outlets (140 each). The percentage numbers for items refer to all items collected in a category, while the 
percentage number of articles refer to all sample articles (420 or 140 each, respectively).  
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Panel D shows the non-accounting data group. The largest category in this group refers 
to product-related information like the current production (28.9%). Another important 
category relates to employees, for which news outlets supply information like wage in-
creases. For nearly all categories of this group, the number of items and articles does not 
vary substantially between the different news outlets. There are 485 items in the non-
accounting data group, which account for only 6.5% of all items in the sample. This result 
suggests that non-accounting items only play a subordinate role in articles about earnings 
announcements, which might also be since firms disclose less non-accounting infor-
mation when announcing their earnings. Furthermore, this category might be of less in-
terest to the readers right after an accounting event.  
The external data group (Panel E) is the second largest group with 1,562 items (21%). 
The highest proportion in this group belongs to analysts. Journalists mention this category 
in 326 (77.6%) out of 420 articles. In line with the sources of journalists state in Call et 
al. (2018), news outlets often use the analyst forecasts as a benchmark for the expected 
performance and compare them to the reported items to evaluate the performance of the 
firms and thus verbally state the forecast error. USAT articles contain analyst information 
in about 85% of the sample, while the proportion is smaller but still comparably high for 
the other two outlets (WSJ: 80%; NYT: 67.9%). In total, WSJ articles contain most ana-
lyst items. Additionally, journalists report the capital market reaction based on the earn-
ings announcement or a prior long-term trend in 68.8% (298) articles. The proportion of 
capital market information is larger for the USAT than for the WSJ and NYT (86.4% vs. 
58.6% and 61.4%). Again, this result matches the sources states in Call et al. (2018) sur-
vey paper. 
2.5.5 Quotes  
Table 2.9 shows the descriptive results for the content analysis of the quotes. These results 
are especially interesting because the quotes can either emanate from public information 
such as the earnings announcement or private communication, e.g., with firm executives. 
The former would be in line with information dissemination, while the latter is a strong 
indicator of information production. The results show that about 72% of all sample arti-
cles feature a quote from a firm executive. I find analyst quotes in about 25% of all arti-
cles, while the use of third-party experts is relatively rare (3%).  
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Table 2.9, Panel A shows the number of quotes for the internal, analyst, and external 
quotes in total and separately by news outlet. Though the WSJ contains most quantitative 
items per article, it includes fewer quotes from all categories than the other two outlets. 
This is surprising, as one would not expect that the access to analysts or firm executives 
differs for WSJ journalists. The supply of executive quotes is comparable for the NYT 
and USAT, but the NYT includes more analyst quotes.  
About 25% of all quotes in articles emanate from analysts. As already outlined in a prior 
section, the WSJ includes most analyst items. However, the other outlets supply nearly 
twice as many quotes from analysts. Therefore, it seems like the WSJ relies on quantita-
tive items instead of statements from analysts and produces information on a different 
level. Additionally, Call et al. (2018) state that some analysts do not want to be quoted in 
financial press articles, which might be another explanation for this diverging result.  
Table 2.9, Panel B splits the results for executive and analyst quotes into the stated 
sources9 and thus clearly splits information dissemination and production.10 While pre-
pared remarks reflect information dissemination (e.g., because they are based on the earn-
ings announcement), the other three sources (interview, conference call, other (private) 
communication) in Panel B relate to information production. I further split the executive 
quotes into different management positions. Overall, most executive quotes derive from 
the conference call or prepared remarks. Nevertheless, about one-third of them are based 
on an interview or private communication, which is indicative of the clearest form of 
information production, as journalists include information that is not publicly available. 
The sources of the quotes differ slightly for the different executives. For example, nearly 
25% of CFO quotes are based on an interview, while the CEO is more often quoted from 
prepared remarks. Nearly 80% of all analyst quotes derive from private communication, 
while about 17% reference to prepared remarks like research notes. The analyst results 
support the argument in Call et al. (2018), which states that journalists frequently try to 
include private comments from analysts in their articles to supply more relevant infor-
mation.
                                                 
9 When the article does not state a source, I assume the quote is based on private communication.  
10 In contrast to section 2.6, I do not reconcile the quotes word by word but rely on the source stated in the 
article.  
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Table 2.9: Quotes in financial press articles 
Panel A: Quotes by news outlet 
   Total  NYT  USAT  WSJ     
Category  Items   %  Items   %  Items   %  Items   %     
Internal Quote 393  72.0%  163  68.2%  123  70.3%  107  81.1%     
Analyst Quote 139  25.5%  70  29.3%  45  25.7%  24  18.2%     
External Quote 14  2.6%  6  2.5%  7  4.0%  1  0.8%     
Total  546  100.0%  239  100.0%  175  100.0%  132  100.0%     
Panel B: Quotes by source 
   
Total  Prepared remarks  Conference Call  Interview  
other (private)  
communication 
Category  Items   %  Items   %  Items   %  Items   %  Items   % 
Internal Quote 393  100.0%  96  24.4%  166  42.2%  42  10.7%  89  22.6% 
CEO 271  69.0%  86  31.7%  105  38.7%  20  7.4%  60  22.1% 
CFO 82  20.9%  4  4.9%  44  53.7%  19  23.2%  15  18.3% 
Other executives 40  10.2%  6  15.0%  17  42.5%  3  7.5%  14  35.0% 
Analyst Quote 139  100.0%  23  16.5%  8  5.8%  0  0.0%  108  77.7% 
Notes: This table shows the quotes in financial press articles by news outlet (Panel A) and by source (Panel B). Percentage numbers in Panel A refer 
to the total number of quotes per news outlet (e.g., NYT). Percentage numbers in Panel B refer to the total number of items for the respective quote 
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2.6 Information production in financial press articles  
My third research question relates to the potential production role of the press. To answer 
this question, I perform two different analyses building on the content analysis of the 
previous section. First, I analyze how many of the quantitative items are based on infor-
mation dissemination and production, respectively. Second, I provide evidence on the 
firm characteristics increasing the amount of information production and therefore esti-
mate a determinants model.  
2.6.1 Breakdown of supply into dissemination and production  
As a first step, I include references on sources of quantitative items in my analysis. This 
way, I can infer the extent of information production (Information set II and III) and dis-
semination (Information set I). To that end, I reconcile the previously collected quantita-
tive internal items with the earnings announcement press release and the quarterly con-
ference call.11 Earnings announcement press releases (Basu et al. (2013)) and the confer-
ence call (Matsumoto et al. (2011)) are the most important form of disclosure types for 
an earnings announcement. Journalists in Call et al. (2018) state they use both disclosure 
types as sources when writing an article. Earnings announcement press releases (Infor-
mation set I) are readily available to investors, while the collection of conference call 
information is more time-consuming. I consider conference call information to belong to 
Information set II, as it does not only contain firm disclosure but also analyst opinions 
and information disclosed at analyst requests.  
By reconciling the different items, I can establish whether the preponderance of the in-
formation derives from firm disclosure or additional sources and can clearly distinguish 
between information production and dissemination items. To reconcile the item, I collect 
the earnings announcement data from the SEC (earnings announcement press release filed 
as 8-K) and from Thomson Reuters Street events (conference calls transcripts). If the firm 
does not disclose the item in the earnings announcement, I check if the item is discussed 
in the quarterly conference call. If both sources do not contain the item, I assign the item 
to “other sources”. The newspaper archives are an example for other sources, as journal-
ists tend to include information in new articles, which has already been part of a previous 
                                                 
11 I do not reconcile the quotes, as they are partly based on private communication and thus not necessarily 
reconcilable. I only examine sources of external items when they journalists state them directly in the arti-
cle.   
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article about the firm. Another alternative source might be a private conversation with a 
CEO or similar. Overall, I assume that “other sources” mainly refers to the information 
set III of Figure 2.1 and is indicative of information production.  
Table 2.10: Sources of internal items in financial press articles 
Panel A: All items 
  
 N (Items)  Earnings Announcement  Conference call  Other 
    N (Items)  %  N (Items)  %  N (Items)  % 
All categories  5,885  5,026  85.4%  295  5.0%  564  9.6% 
Panel B: Accounting data 
Category 
 N (Items)  Earnings Announcement  Conference call  Other 
    N (Items)  %  N (Items)  %  N (Items)  % 
Balance Sheet 33  23  69.7%  1  3.0%  9  27.3% 
Cash-Flow  35  25  71.4%  7  20.0%  3  8.6% 
Expenses  206  129  62.6%  29  14.1%  48  23.3% 
Performance 2,033  1,962  96.5%  17  0.8%  54  2.7% 
GAAP  1,617  1,571  97.2%  9  0.6%  37  2.3% 
Non-GAAP 284  265  93.3%  6  2.1%  13  4.6% 
EB  132  126  95.5%  2  1.5%  4  3.0% 
Industry-specific 253  203  80.2%  15  5.9%  35  13.8% 
M&A  65  7  10.8%  5  7.7%  53  81.5% 
Revenue  1,208  1,104  91.4%  30  2.5%  74  6.1% 
Segment  1,464  1,258  85.9%  77  5.3%  129  8.8% 
Share related 103  65  63.1%  10  9.7%  28  27.2% 
Total  5,400  4,776  88.4%  191  3.5%  433  8.0% 
Panel C: Non-accounting data 
Category 
 N (Items)  Earnings Announcement  Conference call  Other 
    N (Items)  %  N (Items)  %  N (Items)  % 
Employees  102  32  31.4%  18  17.6%  52  51.0% 
Exchange rate 37  26  70.3%  9  24.3%  2  5.4% 
Legal  11  3  27.3%  1  9.1%  7  63.6% 
Other  195  114  58.5%  32  16.4%  49  25.1% 
Product related 140  75  53.6%  26  18.6%  39  27.9% 
Total  485  250  51.5%  86  17.7%  149  30.7% 
Notes: This table shows the sources of the quantitative items for all items (Panel A). Panels 
B and C further split the internal items into groups accounting data (Panel B) and non-
accounting data (Panel C). The analysis is based on 420 articles from three news outlets 
(140 each).  
Table 2.10 shows the results for all items in Panel A and (non-) accounting data in Panel 
B and C, respectively. Overall, I reconcile about 90% of all items with the earnings an-
nouncement and the conference call. Most of the items (85.4%) derive from the earnings 
announcement, while about 5% are based on the conference call. 9.6% of the items orig-
inate from other information (Panel A). In total, I reconcile nearly 89% of all accounting 
items with the earnings announcement (Panel B). 97.2% of all GAAP items are 
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reconcilable with the press release, which is the highest percentage of all categories. The 
portion for the other two performance categories is a bit lower but still above 93% and 
thus higher than any other category.  
While the number of reconcilable items is highest for the performance measures, it is 
lowest for M&A activities (18.5%). Journalists often include previous acquisitions into 
the articles, though the firms do not report them again in their quarterly disclosure. M&A 
activities of large firms likely receive media coverage, and therefore the journalists can 
include their previous research in their current articles. Apart from the M&A category, 
the main source for all categories is the earnings announcement. For the categories cash-
flow and expenses, the conference call is another relevant source to enhance the infor-
mation in the articles. Surprisingly, the balance sheet category has the highest percentage 
of irreconcilable items (27.3%), though the absolute value of this category is rather small 
(N=33, N other=9).  
For the non-accounting items (Panel C), the earnings announcement and the conference 
call are the major sources, but the number of items with other sources is much higher than 
for the accounting items (30.7% compared to 8%). While firms discuss exchange rate 
effects in their earnings announcement (70.3%) or their conference call (24.3%), the per-
centage of items based on firm disclosure decreases substantially for the other categories. 
Especially employee and legal items are based on other sources. These results are less 
surprising when looking at some examples of each category. The legal category includes 
lawsuits against the firms and settlements in fraud cases. While the employee category 
includes information like wage increases, it also features layoffs and executive payments, 
including their bonus. Particularly excessive executive pay receives negative press cov-
erage, and the press monitors firm behavior in this category (Core et al. (2008); Kuhnen 
and Niessen (2012)). Overall, the two categories often contain negative firm news. While 
firms do not wish to draw attention to these events, the newspapers refer to them in their 
articles, as information production for these topics seems to be of general interest to the 
reader and consequently meets their demand.  
  
Supply-side evidence on the role of the financial press as an intermediary of accounting 
information 
 48 
Table 2.11: Sources of external items in financial press articles 
Panel A: External data 
Category  N (Items)  with source  %  without source  % 
Analyst  652  391  60.0%  261  40.0% 
Capital Market 642  4  0.6%  638  99.4% 
Competitor  165  0  0.0%  165  100.0% 
Industry  88  27  30.7%  61  69.3% 
Macro Data  15  0  0.0%  15  100.0% 
Total   1,562   422   27.0%   1,140   73.0% 
Panel B: Sources of external data 
Source  N (Items)  %  % cumm.     
Thomson  
Reuters 272  64.5%  64.5%     
FactSet  52  12.3%  76.8%     
S&P  33  7.8%  84.6%     
Zacks  20  4.7%  89.3%     
IDC  10  2.4%  91.7%     
Other   35   8.3%   100.0%         
Panel C: Distribution of external data and sources 
Category  Analyst  Capital Market  Industry     
Items  652  642  88     
Sources              
Thomson 
Reuters 272  0  0     
FactSet  52  0  0     
S&P  27  4  2     
Zacks  20  0  0     
IDC  0  0  10     
Other  20  0  15     
with source  391  4  27     
Notes: This table shows the external data items (Panel A), the sources of the external 
data (Panel B), and the distribution of sources and external data (Panel C). The analysis 
is based on 420 articles from three news outlets (140 each).  
Table 2.11 (Panel A) shows the results for the sources stated for the external items. For 
most of the external items, the journalists do not report a source directly. Capital market 
information (e.g., stock prices) is the second-largest external group and easily observable. 
Thus, journalists might not feel the need to state a source. Industry-related information 
and macroeconomic data are also publicly available and, therefore, do not necessarily 
need a source. Journalists in Call et al. (2018) state that they compare firm performance 
to their industry peers. In line with their argument, I collect 165 items related to compet-
itors. Though the outlets do not state a source in these cases, the information likely ema-
nates from earnings announcements of the peer firms.  
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Journalists state items of the largest external category, analysts, with a source in nearly 
52% of the cases. The most important source for analyst information is Thomson Reuters 
(Table 2.12, Panel B and C), as this information provider contains the aggregated analyst 
forecasts. Fact Set and S&P are other important sources but cited considerably less than 
Thomson Reuters.  
Overall, the results suggest that financial press journalists use earnings press releases (In-
formation set I) as their primary information source and rely on the information provided 
by the firms. This way, they act according to the information dissemination function of 
the financial press and rebroadcast publicly available information to a broader public. 
Nevertheless, some news outlets include additional sources like analyst conference calls 
(Information set II) and various other sources (Information set III) in their articles. This 
information production might facilitate information collection for investors, which might 
create additional value for the target group of the news outlets.  
2.6.2 Determinants of information production supply 
2.6.2.1 Design 
In a last step, I estimate a determinants model to shed light on the characteristics of firms 
for which journalists, consistent with information production, choose to include addi-
tional sources like analyst conference calls, and thus enhance the information in their 
articles. To provide evidence on the coherence of the earnings press release and financial 
press article information, I first calculate the percentage of items that can I reconcile with 
the corresponding earnings announcement (EA_cor) for each article. Table 2.A4 (Appen-
dix) shows the distribution of the mean proportion of quantitative items per article that 
can be reconciled with earnings press releases across the different news outlets and in 
total. The overall mean is 66% (NYT: 65%; USAT: 63%; WSJ: 70%).  
I use EA_cor to calculate my dependent variable, Add_supply, using a median split. The 
median in the sample is 0.706. Add_supply equals 1 when the news outlet offers a higher 
than the median percentage (below 0.706) of information that is not based on the earnings 
announcement press release and 0 otherwise (above 0.706). Generally, I expect those firm 
characteristics that drive the coverage in financial press outlets to also influence the 
amount of time the journalists invest in writing their articles and, consequently, the 
amount and sources of article items. Therefore, I use the three sets of test variables (in-
formation environment, information content of the earnings announcement, and general 
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firm fundamentals) outlined for the coverage regression and estimate the regression on 
the article level. The sample of this analysis consists of 420 observations. Table 2.A1 
summarizes the variables, while Table 2.A5 (Appendix) reports descriptive statistics for 
this regression.  
2.6.2.2 Results  
Table 2.12 reports my findings from estimating a probit regression using the test variables 
form my three sets of variables used in the coverage analysis.12 I estimate the probit model 
using quarter-year fixed effects and cluster the standard errors at the firm level. Columns 
(1), (5), and (6) use the additional information supply in all papers as the dependent var-
iables, while columns (2) to (4) present the results for the three different outlets.  
I find a significantly negative association between the additional information supply and 
the sentiment of the prior media coverage (AES) for all papers. This association suggests 
that journalists limit their information production for firms without negative news over 
the prior quarter. One reason for this might be that journalists consider the firms to be of 
less interest to their readers due to the lack of controversy. When splitting the sample into 
the different outlets, the results remain negative but lack a significant association with the 
dependent variable13.  
The coefficient for Size shows a positive sign and is highly statistically significant (1% 
level). This hints that journalists engage in further research and include additional sources 
when writing articles about larger firms, which suggests that information production is 
more pronounced for larger firms. These results are consistent for the NYT and the 
USAT. Coefficient estimates of BTM are negative and significant on a 1% level in all 
model specifications. I find a comparable result when estimating the model for NYT ar-
ticles, but find no significant associations for the other two outlets. This indicates that 
NYT journalists are less likely to supply additional information about potential growth 
firms. Share turnover is positive and significant (1% level). This suggests that newspaper 
outlets include additional items when a firm is highly traded, and thus, more potential 
readers might be interested in quantitative items.  
  
                                                 
12 Due to multicollinearity, I estimate the probit models without the loss firm indicator variable for the 
separate outlets.  
13 The samples used for the three different outlets are rather small and might therefore lack statistical power.  
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Notes: This table shows the results of a probit regression with the median split of information 
supply (Add_supply) as the dependent variable for either all papers or for the three different 
outlets outlined in the column's headline. All variables are defined in Table 2.A1 (Appendix). 
Variables comprise Size, Freefloat, BTM (Book-to-market), AF (number of analyst forecasts), 
AFE (analyst forecast error), SVI_sd (Google search standard deviation), Turnover, prior cover-
age (outlets combined and separately), AES (press sentiment score), BusyDay dummy, loss firm 
dummy, volatility, AF_miss (dummy for missed forecast), and BHR (buy-and-hold return). ***, 
**, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using two-tailed 
tests and standard errors clustered at the firm level. (N articles=420). Maximal VIF in all models 
is 2.68.  
In contrast to the coverage analysis, the coefficients of Cov Q-1 are not significant. This 
suggests that though journalists keep covering a firm, it does not render it more likely that 
they produce additional value beyond the dissemination of information. The standard de-
viation of the Google search index (SVI_sd) has a positive association with additional 
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information. This suggests that news outlets partly anticipate the demand of their readers 
and provide more information when interest varies in the prior quarter, whereas the mean 
interest in the firm yields no significant results (SVI_mean). However, coefficient esti-
mates of SVI_sd yield no significant results on the outlet level. 
Overall, the firm characteristics determining additional effort of the journalists seem sim-
ilar to the determinants of the general coverage and mostly relate to the general infor-
mation environment of a firm. Additional analyses indicate that less specialized newspa-
pers devote more resources to large firms with more liquidity, as their readers might be 
more interested in well-known firms, whereas the instances in which the WSJ produces 
additional information are less predictable.  
2.7 Conclusion  
Prior literature supports the role of the financial press as an information intermediary, 
whose coverage increases trading volume and reduces information asymmetry (e.g., 
Bushee et al. (2010); Blankespoor et al. (2018); Coyne et al. (2019)). However, the evi-
dence about how the press creates value is mixed. While some papers limit the value to 
information dissemination, others argue that the press also produces valuable information. 
My findings on the supply of information by the financial press contribute to a growing 
yet conflicting literature on the economic role of the financial press. First, to my 
knowledge, I am the first to provide detailed, content analysis-based evidence on the 
choice of quantitative information items to be reported. The comparison of a specialized 
newspaper and two general-interest newspapers provide novel insights into the supply of 
intermediation activities to the market, suggesting that the newspapers cater to their dif-
ferent audiences.  
Second, and related, my analysis of press article content enables me to discern infor-
mation dissemination from information production in the financial press and to assess 
how the press fulfills each role. I show that the dissemination function is shaped by de-
mand, in particular for information on large firms and primarily spreads earnings and 
revenue measures. Notably, though, my findings also suggest that there is a demand for 
additional information provided by the press, by assuming a production function, e.g., 
based on additional information on M&A activities or expenses. My results imply that 
information production is not limited to quantitative information, as the quotes feature 
further insights on the verbal level.  
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In this paper, I present explorative evidence on the supply of information intermediation 
provided by the financial press. Based on the analysis of three different news outlets that 
cover quarterly earnings announcements, I show that the supply and width of information 
by the financial press on accounting events are associated with the richness of the respec-
tive firm’s information environment.  
When breaking down the content of the articles based on the sources of information items 
included, my analyses reveal that the financial press assumes its dissemination function 
by channeling information from earnings announcements to market participants. More 
importantly, I show that the press also assumes an information production role by com-
bining information from various other sources, e.g., conference calls. The inclusion of 
analyst and executives quotes from interviews expand the information production from 
quantitative items to the verbal level.  
One limitation of my analyses is that I can draw no inferences about what kind of infor-
mation newspapers might produce beyond the quantitative items. As my results for the 
quotes indicate, journalists frequently include information on a verbal level without ref-
erence to “hard information”. The quotes are regularly based on interviews or conference 
calls and thus produce information. Consequently, there is more research needed on fac-
tors that shape the demand for additional (verbal) content provided in press articles and 
how the supply of this content is economically useful to readers of financial newspapers. 
That said, I need to caution that my findings are based on a comparatively small sample 
of generally large firms and large news outlets with potentially highly qualified journal-
ists. Furthermore, I do not provide evidence about what kind of information news outlets 
decide not the include in their articles, though firms presented items or verbal explana-
tions about the topics in their disclosure. Also, given the descriptive nature of my anal-
yses, I do not claim to provide a comprehensive explanation of the factors that shape 
demand for financial press intermediation in a causal sense. 
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Notes: This table shows variable definitions. * denotes the variable is winsorized at the 
1% and 99% level due to outliers.  
Supply-side evidence on the role of the financial press as an intermediary of accounting information 
 55 
Appendix 2.A2:  Correlation analysis  
Panel A: Regression variables 
  Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
1 Size  1.00                             
2 Freefloat  0.18  1.00                           
3 BTM  -0.09  0.11  1.00                         
4 AF  0.33  0.05  -0.10  1.00                       
5 AFE  0.01  -0.16  -0.38  -0.04  1.00                     
6 AF_miss -0.08  0.00  0.11  0.03  0.37  1.00                   
7 AES  0.22  0.04  -0.08  0.12  -0.02  -0.11  1.00                 
8 loss_firm  -0.07  -0.03  0.10  0.03  0.24  0.53  -0.13  1.00               
9 SVI_mean -0.01  0.08  0.04  -0.10  -0.07  0.01  0.01  -0.01  1.00             
10 BusyDay  -0.06  0.03  -0.02  -0.06  0.01  0.00  -0.01  -0.01  0.03  1.00           
11 Turnover  -0.41  -0.10  0.12  0.10  0.00  0.23  -0.17  0.25  -0.04  -0.03  1.00         
12 SVI_sd  -0.20  -0.02  0.01  -0.11  0.03  0.02  -0.06  -0.01  0.10  0.01  0.10  1.00       
13 Volatility  -0.24  -0.12  0.11  0.09  0.04  0.28  -0.16  0.31  -0.07  -0.02  0.70  0.10  1.00     
14 BHR  0.01  -0.02  -0.06  0.01  0.05  0.01  0.09  0.01  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.00  -0.06  1.00   
15 Coverage Q-1 0.41  0.05  -0.08  0.27  -0.05  -0.03  0.23  -0.01  0.03  -0.11  -0.02  -0.09  0.05  0.00  1.00 
Panel B: News outlets 
  Variable  1  2  3  4    
                              
1 coverage  1.000        
  
                   
2 wsj_cov  0.968  1.000      
  
                   
3 usat_cov  0.368  0.306  1.000    
  
                   
4 nyt_cov  0.320  0.279  0.588  1.000    
                              
Notes: This table shows the variable correlation for the coverage analysis (Panel A) and the newspaper coverage (Panel B).  
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Appendix 2.A3:  Quantitative items over time 
 
This figure shows the mean number of quantitative items overall sample quarters for the 
random sample. I analyze 10 articles each quarter for the three news outlets (N=30 per 
quarter, N=140 per news outlet, N=420 in total) between Q1-2013 and Q2-2016. 
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Appendix 2.A4:  Coherence of press articles and earnings announcements 
  
Quarter 
 Total  NYT  USAT  WSJ 
 SD  Mean  Mean  Mean  Mean 
2013q1  0.2  0.66  0.62  0.7  0.66 
2013q2  0.15  0.73  0.71  0.72  0.75 
2013q3  0.2  0.65  0.64  0.65  0.65 
2013q4  0.2  0.66  0.58  0.68  0.72 
2014q1  0.17  0.64  0.61  0.55  0.76 
2014q2  0.23  0.65  0.64  0.61  0.68 
2014q3  0.22  0.66  0.63  0.63  0.73 
2014q4  0.23  0.62  0.66  0.54  0.67 
2015q1  0.18  0.71  0.71  0.66  0.75 
2015q2  0.18  0.66  0.68  0.6  0.68 
2015q3  0.15  0.69  0.67  0.65  0.74 
2015q4  0.2  0.62  0.69  0.5  0.66 












Total  0.19  0.66  0.65  0.63  0.7 
Notes: This table shows the mean coherence (EA_cor) between earnings announcements 
and financial press articles during the sample period for the three sample outlets (N=420, 
N=140 per news outlet).  
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Appendix 2.A5:  Random sample and summary statistics (content analysis) 
Panel A: Sample distribution per industry (for the random sample)  








  Percent  
(all firms) 
(1) Consumer Non-Durables  29  336  6.9%  7.4% 
(2) Consumer Durables  7  98  1.7%  2.2% 
(3) Manufacturing  31  336  7.4%  7.4% 
(4) Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction (Energy)  18  252  4.3%  5.6% 
(5) Chemicals and Allied Products  11  196  2.6%  4.3% 
(6) Business Equipment  93  686  22.1%  15.2% 
(7) Telephone and Television Transmission  37  140  8.8%  3.1% 
(8) Utilities  2  336  0.5%  7.4% 
(9) Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services  80  448  19.0%  9.9% 
(10) Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs  17  350  4.0%  7.7% 
(11) Finance  65  812  15.5%  18.0% 
(12) Other (e.g., Hotels, Entertainment)  30  532  7.1%  11.8% 
Total  420  457.8  100.0%  100.0% 
Panel B: Summary statistics (for the random sample) 
Variable  mean  sd  p50  min  max  Count 
Coverage All Papers 0.99  0.12  1.00  0.00  1.00  420 
WSJ Coverage 0.97  0.17  1.00  0.00  1.00  420 
USAT Coverage 0.67  0.47  1.00  0.00  1.00  420 
NYT Coverage  0.63  0.48  1.00  0.00  1.00  420 
Cov Q-1  0.92  0.28  1.00  0.00  1.00  420 
NYT Cov Q-1 0.56  0.50  1.00  0.00  1.00  420 
USAT Cov Q-1 0.55  0.50  1.00  0.00  1.00  420 
WSJ Cov Q-1 0.87  0.33  1.00  0.00  1.00  420 
cor_8k_all  0.67  0.19  0.71  0.00  1.00  420 
AES  0.69  0.15  0.71  0.15  1.00  420 
BusyDay  0.34  0.47  0.00  0.00  1.00  420 
Size  11.09  1.09  11.17  8.49  12.68  420 
Freefloat  0.92  0.11  0.94  0.48  1.00  420 
BTM  0.38  0.30  0.30  -0.12  1.73  420 
Loss firm  0.02  0.13  0.00  0.00  1.00  420 
SVI_mean  3.77  0.60  3.86  0.00  4.59  420 
SVI_sd  5.00  4.72  3.37  0.00  29.10  420 
Turnover  7.49  5.22  6.30  0.01  43.25  420 
Volatility_quarter 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.06  420 
AF  3.25  0.34  3.30  1.39  4.04  420 
AFE  -0.05  0.02  -0.05  -0.14  0.02  420 
AF_miss 0.01  0.11  0.00  0.00  1.00  420 
BHR  0.03  0.11  0.03  -0.67  0.33  420 
Notes: This table provides information about the industry distribution (Panel A) and sum-
mary statistics for the variables of the coverage analysis (Panel B). Sample selection is 
defined in Table 2.2. All variables are defined in Table 2.A1 (Appendix). Variables com-
prise Coverage (outlets combined and separately), prior coverage (outlets combined and 
separately), AES (press sentiment score), BusyDay dummy, Size, Freefloat, BTM (Book-
to-market), loss firm dummy, SVI_mean (Google search mean, SVI_sd (Google search 
standard deviation), Turnover, volatility, AF (number of analyst forecasts), AFE (analyst 
forecast error), AF_miss (dummy for missed forecast), and BHR (buy-and-hold return).  
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3 Information production by the financial press: A closer look 
 
Ann-Kristin Großkopf, Jörg-Markus Hitz14, and Harm Schütt15,16 
Working Paper17 
 
Abstract: We use topic modeling (LDA) to investigate in detail how the financial press 
produces information in articles that cover firms’ quarterly earnings announcements. We 
find evidence that journalists potentially create information in a variety of ways: by add-
ing additional topics to their coverage and by omitting presumably less important content 
from earnings announcements, by emphasizing specific topics, and by “toning down” 
firms’ narratives. Market tests demonstrate that the magnitude of investor reactions to 
earnings news contained in earnings announcements increases with our topic-based 
measures of information production by the press. These findings are more pronounced 
for information production by way of modifying content (adding or removing topics) than 
for toning down firms’ earnings news. Taken together, these findings suggest that infor-
mation production by the press creates value to investors by helping to understand earn-
ings news. Specifically, our findings augment prior literature by documenting in detail 
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3.1 Introduction 
This study investigates how journalists produce information for their audiences, distin-
guishing the production of original content from disseminating firm disclosures. The fi-
nancial press is an important information intermediary that potentially reaches the largest 
and most diverse audience among investors. A growing literature investigates this role of 
the financial press as an intermediary of firm information in capital markets, identifying 
two principal functions which the financial press assumes to create value for investors: a 
dissemination role and a production role. The press assumes a dissemination role by dis-
seminating firm information, e.g., from earnings announcements, in capital markets. In 
comparison, the press assumes an information production role by creating or adding ad-
ditional content to their articles, e.g., in the shape of analyses, or by combining infor-
mation from additional sources such as analyst reports, or interviews with firm executives 
(Miller and Skinner (2015)). Both functions are usually intertwined within an article and 
can both affect how investors react to the news (Drake et al. (2014)). 
There is consistent and conclusive evidence in support of a dissemination role of the fi-
nancial press. Various papers investigate this link between information dissemination, 
investor attention, and market outcomes. These papers find that media coverage drives 
trading volume and is significantly related to liquidity, and costs of capital (Peress (2014); 
Fang et al. (2014); Engelberg and Parsons (2011); Kothari et al. (2009); Blankespoor et 
al. (2018)). Hence, the financial press contributes to price discovery in financial markets.  
In contrast to the dissemination role, research on the information production role of the 
financial press is less plentiful and, more importantly, less consistent (Miller (2006); 
Ahern and Sosyura (2015)). Most papers (e.g., Drake et al. (2014)) have been unable to 
demonstrate that press article content, such as in-depth company or industry analyses, or 
criticizing firms’ use of pro forma earnings, creates value for investors. This suggests that 
journalists, by supplementing firm information with additional content, may solely as-
sume an “entertainment role” (Guest (2018)). Only very recently, two papers have 
emerged in support of an information production role. First, Call et al. (2018), in a survey 
among 462 financial journalists, document that journalists expend significant effort into 
sourcing additional content that they factor into their coverage, e.g., of earnings an-
nouncements. Journalists do so by informal communication (background talks, phone 
calls) with firm insiders (investor relations officers, executives) to glean private back-
ground information, and by interacting with financial analysts. Accordingly, journalists 
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explicitly state that producing “exclusive content” is important to their performance eval-
uation by superiors. Second, the paper by Guest (2018) exploits plausibly exogenous 
shocks to the coverage of earnings announcements by the Wall Street Journal (WSJ). 
Guest (2018) provides empirical evidence of a positive, plausibly causal relation between 
the proportion of original analyses in press articles and price discovery, as measured, e.g. 
by the magnitude of earnings response coefficients.  
While the recent literature helps demonstrate that journalists deliberately assume an in-
formation production role, and that this role creates value in the shape of information 
content, these studies are unable to answer how journalists assume this production role. 
For instance, Call et al. (2018) single out topics that journalists find particularly relevant 
to their audiences, such as corporate fraud or insider trading. However, Call et al. (2018) 
do not give a detailed descriptive account of actual content produced by journalists. Also, 
said topics relate to specific firm events and issues and do not explain why and how cov-
erage of earnings announcements by journalists produces content, as demonstrated by 
Guest (2018). The analyses of Guest (2018), likewise, do not speak to this question either, 
as his measure of information production relies on the textual similarity between a firm’s 
earnings announcement press release and the associated WSJ article. Therefore, the Guest 
(2018) approach is unable to discern different sources of information production, e.g., in-
depth analysis of firm fundamentals versus adding other sources such as interviews or 
analyst reports. Also, the textual similarity measure does not discern the production of 
original thematic content by journalists from rephrasing or “toning down” of information 
originated by firms. Hence Guest (2018) is unable to link specific content (topics that 
journalists elect to report on) to capital market outcomes.  
Taken together, although recent papers demonstrate that journalists assume an infor-
mation production role to the benefit of investors, the nature of the editorial content that 
journalists produce is much of a black box, and so is the market digest of this content. 
Our paper sheds light on this black box of information production by the financial press. 
Our objective is to provide a more nuanced perspective on the nature and amount of edi-
torial content that journalists produce and to investigate how different ways of infor-
mation production provide value to investors. Information production is a multi-attribute 
concept because there are multiple ways of producing information. For example, journal-
ists can produce information by preprocessing or removing unimportant information, by 
garnering additional information via communication with firm insiders and experts, or by 
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conducting their own information gathering and analysis. We use topic analysis to meas-
ure four sub-activities related to information production: 1) adding content (adding topics 
to articles that were not contained in the earnings announcement), 2) omitting content 
(omitting topics in articles that were contained in the earnings announcement), 3) empha-
sizing important topics (assigning more relative space to specific topics in the press arti-
cle, compared to the earnings announcement), and 4) applying sentiment to topics in fi-
nancial press articles. These measures enable us to address two intertwined research ques-
tions: How do journalists produce information by creating editorial content, and how do 
these production activities help investors analyze firms’ earnings news? 
We examine a sample of earnings announcements of S&P 500 firms between 2010 and 
2016 and corresponding WSJ articles. We identify topics, i.e., narratives of related the-
matic content, using a Bayesian topic-modeling algorithm termed Latent Dirichlet Allo-
cation (LDA). LDA enables us to efficiently extract topics from a large sample of earn-
ings announcements and corresponding press articles. Further, the application of LDA 
reduces researcher bias: Unlike content analysis techniques, it does not require subjective 
classification decisions on behalf of the researchers. Also, as a “self-learning” algorithm, 
LDA does not rely on a pre-determined, potentially biased dictionary of words (Brown et 
al. (2020)). Based on 35 unique topics, we apply the LDA model to our sample of 6,540 
press articles and earnings announcements pairs. We further aggregate these 35 topics by 
related content to arrive at 18 unique topic groups.  
Armed with our topic-based measures of information production, we first explore the 
magnitude of the four dimensions of information production in the press articles to pro-
vide evidence on how journalists attempt to create value. Our first two measures examine 
how journalists produce information by adding or by omitting topics in the press articles 
compared to the corresponding earnings announcement. Earnings announcements in our 
sample, on average, cover 9.4 topics. We find that, on average, journalists omit 5.5 of 
these topics in their corresponding press articles. While space constraints in press articles 
also necessitate such topic reduction, it reflects at the same time, the objective of focusing 
on topics relevant to the investor audience. In comparison, and again consistent with the 
focused nature of journalists’ narratives, press articles include an average of 1.5 additional 
topics. These additional topics reflect an important aspect of information production, as 
including supplementary content is a strong signal to readers about the importance of 
these specific topics. Our analyses demonstrate that the topic that journalists add to 
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articles most frequently are statements from firm executives or other experts such as an-
alysts, which underscores the value of background information to the target group, i.e., 
the readership of the WSJ. 
To examine our third proxy of information production, journalists (de-)emphasizing spe-
cific topics in their articles, we focus on joint topics, i.e., topics that are featured both in 
the press article and in the earnings announcement. We measure emphasis by examining 
the relative proportion that journalists devote to one specific topic, compared to the earn-
ings announcement. This analysis unveils a relatively high degree of variation in empha-
sis added by journalists between topics, which illustrates that journalists make extensive 
use of quantitative emphasis as a source of information production. For example, while 
journalists on average emphasize topics such as “Sales” or “BusinessOutlook”, they de-
vote less article space to topics like “Risk” or “Segments”.18  
In contrast to the first three measures of information production that capture various di-
mensions of content added, our fourth measure, sentiment, captures how this information 
is presented. Consistent with a generally skeptical approach to firm information, we find 
that, on average, press articles are significantly more negative than the corresponding 
earnings announcements. When splitting the article sentiment for added and joint topics, 
we find that joint topics are, on average, communicated with a more negative tone com-
pared to added topics. However, the variation in tone is also larger for added topics, sug-
gesting that the sentiment of added topics is more contextual compared to topics taken 
from the earnings announcement. Taken together, our first set of analyses documents that 
journalists use various article attributes to produce information for their readers. This un-
derlines the need to explore in more detail how markets respond to these different chan-
nels of information production. 
Building on our descriptive results, our second set of analyses investigates whether and 
with what magnitude the different forms of information production are associated with 
market reactions, holding information content fixed. For these multivariate analyses, we 
aggregate our production measures on the article level and explore three of our production 
measures: added content, omitted content, and sentiment. For the first measure, we find 
                                                 
18 The topic „Sales“ features revenue related information, while “BusinessOutlook” includes firm guidance, 
e.g., earnings forecasts. The “Risk” topic comprises information about factors impacting the future perfor-
mance, while “Segments” features content about the operating segments of the firms.  
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that adding original content to the articles is associated with a stronger investor response 
to earnings announcements. This association increases with the proportion of additional 
content contained in the articles. We obtain very similar results for information produc-
tion via our second measure, the omission of topics. Market reactions are larger for earn-
ings announcements covered by articles that omit topics, and this effect increases with 
the focus of the journalists, i.e., with the amount of content that journalists decide not to 
report.  
Third and last, we analyze the impact of information production through the sentiment of 
an article and find that the earnings response increases with journalists’ sentiment. How-
ever, when we split the sentiment contained in press articles by distinguishing tone for 
additional topics from tone for jointly covered topics, we find that the positive association 
with the earnings response is confined to joint topics only, i.e., topics that pick up content 
from the earnings announcement. This result suggests that the “toning down” of earnings 
announcement topics produces more value relevant content compared to how journalists 
present their additional information. Overall, our results imply that journalists use various 
financial press article attributes to produce information, which alters how investors re-
spond to the earnings news. However, the nature of our tests does not allow for causal 
inferences, as the decision (not) to cover an earnings announcement of the firm is endog-
enous.  
Our paper contributes to the literature on the role of the financial press as an intermediary 
of accounting information. Going beyond Guest (2018), our topic modeling approach en-
ables us to measure how journalists produce information in their articles, and how this 
creates value for their target audience. Our findings suggest that information production 
in financial press articles is a multi-attribute concept and that both principal production 
avenues, modifying content by adding or omitting topics, and toning down firms’ narra-
tives, facilitate the interpretation of reported earnings for investors, albeit at economically 
different magnitudes. While our findings cannot rule out that the financial press also as-
sumes an entertainment function, we find consistent evidence that the various editorial 
modifications that we examine all create value to investors. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 3.2, we outline our topic-based measurement 
of information production. Section 3.3 presents our descriptive analyses of information 
production by the financial press, and Section 3.4 presents results from market tests. Sec-
tion 3.5 concludes. 
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3.2 Topic-based Measurement of Information Production 
3.2.1  Measurement of Information Production 
Graf-Vlachy et al. (2019) argue that press articles have various attributes such as volume, 
tone, topic, and other language characteristics. Consequently, there are multiple ways for 
the press to produce information and information production thus is a multi-faceted con-
cept. For example, journalists can produce information by preprocessing or removing un-
important information, by garnering additional information via communication with firm 
insiders and experts, by conducting their own information gathering and analysis, or by 
applying a distinctly different tone of language than the one adopted in firm publications. 
Using topic analysis enables us to identify four such different activities related to infor-
mation production, hence creating four unique measures.  
Our first measure is additional content (Add_Cont). This measure identifies articles that 
journalists augment by adding additional content not included in the corresponding earn-
ings announcements. By adding topics, journalists effectively produce additional infor-
mation, since they “add” a signal about the relevance of certain topics versus others. For 
example, journalists may choose to supplement the discussion of a firm’s financials with 
comparative data for industry peers, taken from other sources (e.g., databases). As another 
example, journalists may add an analysis of governance-related problems, e.g., a critique 
of inefficient director monitoring based on background analyses to their discussion of a 
firm’s underperformance. In Call et al. (2018), 75% of the journalists state providing ex-
clusive content impacts their evaluation by their superior. Consequently, they have an 
incentive to offer background information, such as analyst opinions. On the topic level, 
we measure ADD_CONT as an indicator variable, which equals one if the topic is featured 
in the press article but not in the earnings announcement and zero otherwise.  
Our second measure is omitted content (Omit_Cont). We measure irrelevant content 
based on whether journalists decide not to cover topics in their article that are included in 
the corresponding earnings announcement. The motivation behind Omit_Cont is analo-
gous to the motivation behind Add_Cont: By choosing which topics to neglect, journalists 
effectively produce additional information, since they “add” a signal about the (ir)rele-
vance of certain topics versus others. In that sense, the interpretation of Omit_Cont is 
twofold: Journalists signal that particular topics covered in the earnings announcements 
are not relevant for the informational needs of readers, and / or journalists want to devote 
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more of the scarce space available for their article to topics that they deem particularly 
important. As firms tend to extend their disclosure over time (e.g., Dyer et al. (2017)), 
focusing the article on important information might prevent the distraction of investors. 
Comparable to Add_Cont, we measure Omit_Cont as an indicator variable, which equals 
one if the topic is included in the earnings announcement but not in the corresponding 
press article.  
Our third measure is the emphasis on specific topics (Emphasis). We define Emphasis as 
the topic proportions in articles vs. earnings announcements. This enables us to assess in 
detail which information is deemed important enough to allocate a bigger portion of the 
article to it. For example, the additional analysis could result in a higher topic proportion 
in the article versus the earnings announcement. We expect the press to engage in infor-
mation production in the form of a stronger emphasis in cases where journalists judge a 
few pieces of information disclosed to be significantly more important than the remaining 
earnings announcement disclosure. This emphasis creates value relevant information ei-
ther by signaling which information is important and which is not, by providing a detailed 
discussion of the topic or by explicitly providing additional analysis. All three aspects 
would lead to additional information being produced. However, as Emphasis relies on 
joint topics, i.e., topics featured in both the press article and earnings announcement, this 
proxy partly captures information dissemination through financial press articles. We 
measure Emphasis as the difference between the topic proportion of a specific topic in 
the press article and the proportion for the same topic in the earnings announcement.  
Our first three measures Add_Cont, Omit_Cont, and Emphasis are purely content-based 
and measure to what extent journalists produce information by adding, reducing, or fo-
cusing on topics in their articles. Therefore, in essence, these measures capture what is 
being disclosed by the financial press. In contrast, our fourth and final measure, Senti-
ment, analyzes how journalists choose to cover specific topics (Brown et al. (2020)). The 
information content of financial press articles is not limited to the topics covered in the 
article but includes the way the journalists present the information, e.g., the readability or 
the sentiment conveyed in the article (Graf-Vlachy et al. (2019)). Huang et al. (2014) 
show that managers can use the tone of earnings announcements to convey biased signals 
to the market. Goldman et al. (2019) argue that it is the task of journalists to “debias the 
announcement” to limit the exposure of readers to biased information. To that end, 
Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock et al. (2008) provide evidence that negative financial press 
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articles convey information about negative capital market developments and lower sub-
sequent firm performance beyond analyst recommendations or firm fundamentals. Con-
sistent with this, Kothari et al. (2009) suggest that negative press coverage is associated 
with higher cost of capital. Therefore, the sentiment of financial press articles is another 
channel for journalists to produce information.  
We measure the sentiment of articles (Sent_Art) and earnings announcements (Sent_EA) 
as the difference between positive and negative words, scaled by the sum of positive and 
negative words based on the Loughran and McDonald (2011) lists. For our empirical 
analyses, we further disaggregate Sent_Art into Sent_Add_Topics, which captures the sen-
timent of added content (topics that are only featured in the press article and not in the 
earnings announcement) and Sent_Joint_Topics capturing the sentiment of joint content 
(topics that are featured in both article and earnings announcement).  
3.2.2 Topic Modeling using Latent Dirichlet Allocation 
Our empirical measures that capture various dimensions of information production by the 
press derive from the identification and distribution of topics in press articles and earnings 
announcements, respectively. To obtain these topics, we use Latent Dirichlet Allocation 
(LDA) (Blei et al. (2003)). LDA is an unsupervised Bayesian topic modeling algorithm. 
It is commonly used by internet search engines to improve the search term output (Dyer 
et al. (2017)). Though LDA is comparably new to the accounting literature (see Eickhoff 
and Neuss (2017) for a review of topic models in managerial disciplines), prior literature 
such as Hoberg and Maksimovic (2014), Brown et al. (2020), and Dyer et al. (2017) uses 
this approach to obtain topics from 10-K narratives. 
The LDA model has three main assumptions, which offer key advantages with regard to 
our research question. First, LDA is a “bag of words” method, i.e., the model assumes 
that the order of words in a document and the order of the documents in the sample do 
not matter. In contrast to a costly manual collection, LDA can be applied to large amounts 
of documents. Second, LDA assumes that each document is a collection of topics from a 
finite number of topics. The researcher defines this finite number of topics as an input 
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factor for the LDA, e.g., based on the perplexity score of the topic model.19 Based on this 
topic selection, not each document needs to contain every topic. We obtain the proportion 
of each topic in each document of our corpus (sample documents) from the LDA. By 
comparing the topics of the press articles and earnings announcements, we can distinguish 
between joint and added topics (Huang et al. (2017)). Third, the word distribution of each 
topic follows a Dirichlet distribution. For each word of the corpus, the LDA estimates its 
probability weight within a topic indicating its importance for this topic. A word may be 
associated with multiple topics. Using all words of the corpus, the LDA, therefore, does 
not require predetermined dictionaries or categories, which allows the algorithm to “dis-
cover” the topics independent of the researchers’ expectations and to fully reflect the in-
formation conveyed in press articles and earnings announcements.  
Applying the LDA to a sample of earnings announcements and corresponding press arti-
cles allows us to identify topics used in these respective publications, and from this de-
lineate our first two measures of information production for added content (Add_Cont) 
and omitted content (Omit_Cont). Our third measure, Emphasis, examines the propor-
tions of each joint topic, i.e., the topics that are featured in the press article and the earn-
ings announcement. For our fourth measure, Sentiment, we need to delve deeper: first, by 
measuring the tone of each earnings announcement and corresponding press article as 
outlined in section 2.1, and then by attributing the tone to the narratives that cover one 
specific topic. To attribute the tone to a specific topic, we examine the articles on the 
sentence level. To that end, we use the term-topic matrix of the LDA model, which fea-
tures the probability with which a word belongs to a specific topic. We use this matrix to 
assign each sentence in an article to a topic. To do so, we sum up the topic probabilities 
of each word in a sentence and allocate the sentence to the topic with the highest proba-
bility (Huang et al. (2017)). We then measure the tone of each sentence using the positive 
and negative word lists of Loughran and McDonald (2011). We classify a sentence as 
positive (negative) if the number of positive words is larger (smaller) than the number of 
negative words. We aggregate sentences according to the coverage of the respective topic 
into added content and joint content sentences and measure the tone separately for each 
category. We measure Sent_Add_Topics as the difference between positive and negative 
                                                 
19 Blei et al. (2003) define perplexity as 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝐷𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {∑ 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑝(𝑤𝑑)𝑀𝑑=1∑ 𝑁𝑑𝑀𝑑=1 }. The perplexity score 
evaluates the statistical fit of the overall model based on different numbers of topics by splitting all sample 
documents into a training data and a testing data set. A lower perplexity indicates that the model has better 
generalization performance.  
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added topic sentences scaled by all added topic sentences in an article. Similarly, we 
measure Sent_Joint_Topics as the difference between positive and negative sentences 
scaled by all non-production sentences in an article.20  
3.3 Information Production by the Financial Press 
3.3.1 Sample Selection 
We examine quarterly earnings announcements press releases and the corresponding WSJ 
articles between 2010 and 2016. The WSJ is the main financial newspaper in the U.S., 
and it has been used in several prior studies investigating the role of the financial press as 
an information intermediary (e.g., Dougal et al. (2012); Tetlock (2007); Drake et al. 
(2014)). Following prior literature, we confine our analyses to S&P 500 firms (Tetlock et 
al. (2008); Guest (2018)). As these firms make up about 80% of the U.S. market capital-
ization, we assume they receive the necessary coverage for our analysis. We exclude all 
firms with missing earnings announcement dates from the sample. We identify all WSJ 
articles related to our sample firms around the quarterly earnings announcement day [-
7/+7] using Ravenpack (Drake et al. (2014)). We exclude all articles with a Ravenpack 
relevance score below 70.21 Additionally, we exclude all articles that do not feature any 
information about the earnings announcement, feature earnings information about multi-
ple firms, or focus on specific non-earnings-related topics. We drop firms without WSJ 
coverage and missing data from the sample and end up with 498 sample firms.  
We identify 7,333 WSJ articles related to our sample firms. We obtain the text of these 
articles from ProQuest and the earnings announcement press releases from the 8-K SEC 
filings. We drop articles from the sample when we are unable to obtain the corresponding 
press release from the SEC. Whenever there are multiple articles about an earnings an-
nouncement, we combine these articles into one article observation. We collect firm fun-
damentals like the earnings announcement date from Compustat and analyst data from 
I/B/E/S. We obtain market data from CRSP and ownership data from Thomson 13F fil-
ings. We exclude articles with missing control variables in the respective quarter. Overall, 
                                                 
20 While the aggregation on the sentence level allows us to split the sentiment based on Add_Cont and 
Omit_Cont topics, we lose some variation of the sentiment data compared to the word count proxy, as a 
sentence is either positive or negative regardless of how strong the sentiment in the sentence is, e.g., how 
many positive or negative words it contains.  
21 For any news story that mentions an entity, RavenPack provides a relevance score between 0 and 100 
indicating how strongly related the entity is to the underlying news story, with higher values indicating 
greater relevance. 
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our sample consists of 6,540 earnings announcement and article pairs. Panel A of Ta-
ble 3.1 outlines the sample selection process; Panel B and C show the sample distribution 
across years and industries, respectively.  
Table 3.1: Sample description 
Panel A: Sample selection  N    
S&P500 firms between 2010 and 2016  661   
-Missing earnings announcement dates  (45)   
Sample firms   616   
-Firms without financial press coverage  (105)   
-Missing data  (13)   
Firms in sample  498   
Articles about sample firms  7,333   
-Missing SEC Press Releases  (75)   
-Aggregation of multiple articles   (454)   
-Missing data  (264)   
Final Sample: EA & Article pairs  6,540   
Panel B: Sample distribution per year 
Year  N  in percent (%) 
2010  745  11.39 
2011  721  11.02 
2012  664  10.15 
2013  671  10.26 
2014  1,276  19.51 
2015  1,282  19.60 
2016  1,181  18.06 
Total  6,540  100 
Panel C: Sample distribution per industry 
Fama-French industry code (12 industries)  N  in percent (%) 
(1) Consumer Non-Durables 708  10.83 
(2) Consumer Durables  134  2.05 
(3) Manufacturing  467  7.14 
(4) Oil, Gas, and Coal Extraction (Energy) 350  5.35 
(5) Chemicals and Allied Products  249  3.81 
(6) Business Equipment 930  14.22 
(7) Telephone and Television Transmission 337  5.15 
(8) Utilities  155  2.37 
(9) Wholesale, Retail, and Some Services 1,067  16.31 
(10) Healthcare, Medical Equipment, and Drugs 481  7.35 
(11) Finance  1,015  15.52 
(12) Other (e.g., Hotels, Entertainment)  647  9.89 
Total  6,540  100 
Notes: This table provides details on the sample selection process (Panel A), sample 
distribution per year (Panel B), and sample distribution per industry (Panel C). 
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3.3.2 Topic coverage in earnings announcements and press articles 
Based on the perplexity score, we estimate the LDA model (see Section 3.2.2) using our 
sample of 6,540 observations (earnings announcements and corresponding press articles) 
based on a total of 35 unique topics.22 We label each topic based on its high-frequency 
words. To further validate the topic labels, we read articles with a high proportion of a 
topic and evaluate if the content fits our label. Additionally, we read random articles and 
check whether we can identify all topics, which are included in the article according to 
the topic model. Table 3.2 reports for each topic the topic label and the 15 most frequent 
words for each topic, respectively. While our topics are distinct with respect to the high-
frequency words and their respective probabilities, some topics are similar in their inter-
pretation. For example, we have three different topics that deal with the end of a fiscal 
quarter. They contain words like “end”, “second (quarter)”, or “fourth (quarter)”. Because 
all three sets of words refer to the same business matter (end of a quarter), we combine 
these three topics into one topic group to facilitate our analyses. Overall, we manually 
aggregate our 35 topics into 18 groups. Table 3.2 shows the assignment of each of the 35 
topics into the 18 topic groups.  
 
Figure 3.1: Topic distribution  
This figure shows the number of topics in earnings announcements (EA) and corresponding press 
articles (PA) based on the LDA model.  
                                                 
22 We manually compare the LDA model based on 30, 35, and 40 topics. While 30 topics do not seem to 
identify all important topics, the results of the output based on 40 topics are somewhat overlapping and 
reduces interpretability. Therefore, we conclude that 35 topics seems most suitable for our analysis. 
Information production by the financial press: A closer look 
 72 
Table 3.2: Topic groups 
Topic 
No. 
 Topic  
Group 
No. 










expect, approximately, rate, include, result, base, 





   
cost, high, low, price, volume, expect, increase, 
compare, result, demand, primarily, market, opera-
tion, continue, improve 
3  CashFlow  2  CashFlow  
flow, free_cash, operate, measure, organic, cash, 
cash_flow, growth, operating, eps, margin, busi-
ness, income, statement, core 
4  Compare  3  Compare  
percent, increase, total, report, ago, expense, rate, 
expect, earning, statement, compare, approxi-









gaap, non, financial, measure, result, information, 
exclude, performance, management, provide, oper-
ating, income, net, expense, reconciliation 
6  Earnings    
net, income, expense, cash, total, tax, operating, 
loss, asset, other, cost, operate, end, interest, con-
solidated 
7  EPS    
cent, revenue, rise, earning, profit, earlier, expect, 





   
fiscal, earning, diluted, prior, operation, continue, 











financial, page, measure, gaap, period, consoli-
dated, result, corporation, management, infor-





   
statement, forward_look, result, information, di-
luted, income, include, report, earning, net, finan-








rate, growth, u.s., foreign_currency, impact, ex-
change, basis, constant_currency, currency, report, 
prior, global, dollar, change, business 
12  Growth  7  Growth  
growth, market, business, product, continue, 
strong, new, customer, technology, sale, grow, de-










loan, net, increase, income, interest, expense, aver-
age, low, loss, compare, decrease, high, prior, to-
tal, capital 
14  Insurance    
loss, income, net, insurance, investment, business, 
operating, gain, financial, prior, result, premium, 
ratio, operate, tax 
15  Utilities    
earning, energy, high, include, increase, customer, 
operation, compare, cost, natural_gas, operate, 




   
production, average, oil, natural_gas, drilling, net, 
price, operation, gas, activity, include, operate, 





   
volume, increase, market, brand, high, growth, 
drive, low, decrease, impact, net, reflect, exclude, 
price total 





   
sale, store, increase, comparable, retail, home, end, 





   
investment, asset, management, fund, client, in-
come, revenue, net, performance, fee, equity, ex-





   
contract, program, increase, operate, compare, de-
crease, low, operating, primarily, segment, margin, 
high, system, backlog, volume 
21  M&A  9  M&A  
acquisition, cost, relate, business, integration, in-
clude, acquire, expense, merger, earning, benefit, 










adjust, adjusted, gaap, eps, diluted, income, earn-
ing, report, measure, reconciliation, prior, con-




   
ebitda, net, adjusted_ebitda, measure, cash, adjust, 
gaap, result, performance, loss, financial, interest, 










month, end, september, period, compare, third, in-
crease, net, october, income, primarily, respec-




   
fourth, compare, december, increase, full, income, 
net, end, diluted, january, decrease, result, approx-




   
second, june, compare, july, half, increase, month, 









property, real_estate, include, total, operating, 
lease, interest, debt, investment, market, portfolio, 
development, management, fund, gain 
28  Risk  13  Risk  
include, change, financial, result, business, state-
ment, ability, impact, product, customer, market, 
risk, new, service, forward_look 





sale, net, product, increase, u.s., earning, include, 
compare, decrease, primarily, rate, sales, change, 
high, worldwide 
30  Revenue     
revenue, service, increase, business, compare, pe-
riod, total, services, customer, margin, growth, 
prior, software, operating, technology 
31  Revenue     
revenue, increase, high, operating, income, adver-
tising, growth, include, reflect, digital, result, oper-
ate, network, international, drive 
32  Segments  15  Segments  
segment, profit, operating, business, financial, re-
sult, impact, cost, ago, earning, sale, change, in-








special_item, fuel, group, expense, cost, exclude, 
revenue, net, include, unit, price, operating, total, 
hedge, impact 
34  Statement  17  Statement  
say, business, profit, u.s., not, new, fall, analyst, 
market, earlier, report, plan, expect, rise, inc. 
35  Tax  18  Tax  
tax, charge,relate, include, cost, result, prior, in-
come, expense, impact, business, item, loss, ex-
clude, certain 
Notes: This table provides information about the topic aggregation into groups.  
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Figure 3.1 shows the distribution of topic amounts for both earnings announcements and 
corresponding press articles. It can be gleaned from these distributions that earnings an-
nouncements, on average, cover a larger number of topics, with a mean (median) number 
of 9.4 (9) topics per article and a fairly symmetric distribution. In comparison, press arti-
cles cover a much lower number of topics, with a mean (median) of 5.4 (5) topics per 
article. This finding is consistent with our maintained assumption that owing to space 
constraints and to an aggregation role, press articles are more focused on average. This 
assumption is also underscored by the difference in volumes: the average (median) word 
count of our sample earnings announcements is 2,852 (2,404) compared to 516 (455) for 
press articles, corresponding to roughly five times the volume.  
Table 3.3, Panel A, reports details on the coverage of our 18 topic groups in earnings 
announcements and corresponding press articles and sheds light on the relative frequency 
or importance of these topics. The second column of Panel A shows that most prevalent 
topics are included in almost nine out of ten earnings announcements, with the top spot 
taken by “EarningsRelease” (89.4%), followed by “Earnings” (87.2%), and “Indus-
trySpecific” (86.3%). In comparison, topics such as “Statement” (15.3%), “SpecialItems” 
(16.4%), and “RealEstateInvestments” (17.0%) are least frequently included in earnings 
announcements and are to be found in less than one out of five firm announcements. All 
in all, these findings are in line, in particular, with the prominent role of earnings in cor-
porate communication. 
Column (3) of Panel A of Table 3.3 documents topic coverage in press articles. Consistent 
with a more focused, brief narrative, findings illustrate how journalists are more selective 
about the topics they choose to report on, compared to firms’ earnings announcements. 
For example, only two topic categories are covered more frequently by journalists than 
by firms. This is the case for the category “Earnings”, which receives even more frequent 
attention by the press than the substantial attention there already is in earnings announce-
ments (94.8% versus 87.2%). Second, and not surprisingly, the topic group “Statement” 
appears in press articles in almost 95% of cases, compared to only 15.3% in earnings 
announcements. This finding reflects one archetypal source of information production by 
the press, which is supplementing their coverage of firm announcement narratives with 
statements from additional sources such as financial analysts, of senior firm managers 
(Call et al. (2018)).  
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Table 3.3: Topic Coverage in Earnings Announcements (EA) and Press Articles (PA) 
Panel A: Topic coverage in EA and PA 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Topic  
Total sample  
(EA-PA pairs)  
EAs inclu- 
ding topic  
PA inclu- 
ding topic  
Topic not fea- 
tured in PA/ EA 
  N  Prop.  N  Prop.  N  Prop.  N  Prop. 
BusinessOutlook 6,540 100.0%  4,289 65.6%  2,224 34.0%  1,758 26.9% 
CashFlow  6,540 100.0%  2,403 36.7%  355 5.4%  4,052 62.0% 
Compare  6,540 100.0%  2,758 42.2%  22 0.3%  3,767 57.6% 
Earnings  6,540 100.0%  5,706 87.2%  6,200 94.8%  39 0.6% 
EarningsRelease 6,540 100.0%  5,846 89.4%  175 2.7%  674 10.3% 
ForeignExchange 6,540 100.0%  2,928 44.8%  1,380 21.1%  3,378 51.7% 
Growth  6,540 100.0%  2,871 43.9%  2,030 31.0%  2,962 45.3% 
IndustrySpecific 6,540 100.0%  5,641 86.3%  4,967 75.9%  492 7.5% 
M&A  6,540 100.0%  2,169 33.2%  1,256 19.2%  3,984 60.9% 
NonGAAP 6,540 100.0%  3,363 51.4%  492 7.5%  3,030 46.3% 
QuarterEnd 6,540 100.0%  5,157 78.9%  2,765 42.3%  1,054 16.1% 
RealEstateInvestments 6,540 100.0%  1,110 17.0%  412 6.3%  5,226 79.9% 
Risk  6,540 100.0%  3,916 59.9%  490 7.5%  2,477 37.9% 
Sales  6,540 100.0%  5,358 81.9%  3,913 59.8%  845 12.9% 
Segments  6,540 100.0%  2,629 40.2%  962 14.7%  3,623 55.4% 
SpecialItems 6,540 100.0%  1,074 16.4%  676 10.3%  5,118 78.3% 
Statement  6,540 100.0%  998 15.3%  6,181 94.5%  330 5.0% 
Tax  6,540 100.0%  3,351 51.2%  914 14.0%  2,971 45.4% 
Panel B: Topic coverage in PA 
Topic  PAs including topic   PAs without topic  
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Total  
Topic in EA 
(Emphasis)  
Topic not in EA  
(Add_Cont)  
Topic in EA 
(Omit_Cont) 
  N  Prop.  N  Prop.  N  Prop.  N  Prop. 
BusinessOutlook 2,224 100.0%  1,731 77.8%  493 22.2%  2,558 59.6% 
CashFlow  355 100.0%  270 76.1%  85 23.9%  2,133 88.8% 
Compare  22 100.0%  7 31.8%  15 68.2%  2,751 99.7% 
Earnings  6,200 100.0%  5,405 87.2%  795 12.8%  301 5.3% 
EarningsRelease 175 100.0%  155 88.6%  20 11.4%  5,691 97.3% 
ForeignExchange 1,380 100.0%  1,146 83.0%  234 17.0%  1,782 60.9% 
Growth  2,030 100.0%  1,323 65.2%  707 34.8%  1,548 53.9% 
IndustrySpecific 4,967 100.0%  4,560 91.8%  407 8.2%  1,081 19.2% 
M&A  1,256 100.0%  869 69.2%  387 30.8%  1,300 59.9% 
NonGAAP 492 100.0%  345 70.1%  147 29.9%  3,018 89.7% 
QuarterEnd 2,765 100.0%  2,436 88.1%  329 11.9%  2,721 52.8% 
RealEstateInvestments 412 100.0%  208 50.5%  204 49.5%  902 81.3% 
Risk  490 100.0%  343 70.0%  147 30.0%  3,573 91.2% 
Sales  3,913 100.0%  3,576 91.4%  337 8.6%  1,782 33.3% 
Segments  962 100.0%  674 70.1%  288 29.9%  1,955 74.4% 
SpecialItems 676 100.0%  328 48.5%  348 51.5%  746 69.5% 
Statement  6,181 100.0%  969 15.7%  5,212 84.3%  29 2.9% 
Tax   914 100.0%  696 76.1%  218 23.9%  2,655 79.2% 
Notes: This table shows the topic comparison for press articles (PA) and earnings announcements 
(EA) in Panel A and topic coverage in press articles in Panel B. The proportion of Omit_Cont in 
Panel B is calculated using the N of Omit_Cont (column (4)) scaled by the N of EAs including 
topic in Panel A (column (2)) (e.g., 2.558/4.289 for BusinessOutlook).  
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The “Earnings” and “Statement” topics rank first and second, respectively, within the 
press articles category, followed by industry-specific information (“IndustrySpecific”, 
75.9%). On the lower end of the distribution, we find topics that play a fairly minor role 
for press coverage of earnings announcements: “Compare” (0.3%), “EarningsRelease” 
(2.7%), and “CashFlow” (5.4%). 
3.3.3 Information production in press articles 
3.3.3.1 Adding and omitting topics 
Panel B of Table 3.3 reports descriptive evidence for two of our four information produc-
tion measures, the proportion of topics added in press articles (Add_Cont, Column (3)), 
and of topics omitted (Omit_Cont, Column (4)), respectively. Also, it reports the number 
and proportion of topics that are jointly covered in both documents (Column (2)). These 
statistics shed additional light on the topic coverage by journalists, as documented in 
Panel A. We illustrate this in the following by way of example for the first topic, “Busi-
nessOutlook”. Out of all 6,540 earnings announcements, firms include the topic “Busi-
nessOutlook” in 65.6% of the cases (Column (2), Panel A of Table 3.3), rendering this 
topic a fairly frequent content of firms’ earnings-related disclosures. Journalists, in turn, 
choose to cover the “BusinessOutlook” topic in 2,224 of the corresponding press articles 
(Column (3), Panel A of Table 3.3). Journalists’ topic coverage is further disentangled in 
Panel B of Table 3.3, which reveals that out of the 2,224 press articles covering “Busi-
nessOutlook”, 77.8% represented “joint coverage”, i.e., instances where “BusinessOut-
look” was also a theme in the earnings announcements. Therefore, in the remaining 22.2% 
(493) articles, journalists choose to include information on the business outlook although 
no such topic information was reported in the corresponding earnings announcement, 
consistent with producing editorial content by adding new topics to their coverage 
(Add_Cont). In comparison, journalists choose to omit the topic in their articles much 
more frequently than adding it. According to Column (4) in Table 3.3, Panel B, journalists 
choose not to cover the topic „BusinessOutlook” in 59.6% of the cases, when it was dis-
cussed in the earnings announcement. 
Turning to our first measure of information production, Figure 3.2 shows the distribution 
of Add_Cont topics for all press articles. The figure shows that information production 
via adding topics happens very frequently, as more than nine out of ten press articles 
(91.2%) add this type of information. In most cases, press articles add one or two topics. 
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On average, the press articles provide 1.5 additional topics compared to the earnings an-
nouncement. Topics frequently added are “Earnings” (795 articles), “Growth” (707 arti-
cles), “BusinessOutlook” (493 articles), and “IndustrySpecific” (407 articles) as noted in 
Panel B of Table 3.3. The most frequent “additional topic” is the “Statement” category, 
as a total of 5,212 press articles (84.3%) augment their narrative by adding this topic. It 
reflects journalists (privately) interacting with firm insiders or knowledgeable experts 
such as analysts to provide additional background information about the earnings an-
nouncement (Li (2014)). The prominence of the “Statement” topic complements the sur-
vey paper of Call et al. (2018), in which journalists state firm executives and analysts as 
important sources for their work. Table 3.A2 (Appendix) provides examples of such state-
ments in financial press articles.  
 
Figure 3.2: Distribution of added and omitted topics in press articles 
This figure shows the number added (Add_Cont) and omitted topics (Omit_Cont) in press articles 
(PA) based on the LDA model.  
With respect to our second measure of information production, Omit_Cont, Figure 3.2 
documents that press articles on average leave out 5.5 topics that have been included in 
the corresponding earnings announcements. Panel B of Table 3.2 sheds light on which 
topics are thus considered most “irrelevant” in our sample. Accordingly, the topic “Earn-
ingsRelease” stands out, as it is covered in 5,846 earnings announcements, while rarely 
in the corresponding articles, which chose to exclude this topic in 5,691 cases. This is not 
surprising, as this topic features mostly technical information from the earnings an-
nouncement, such as the page number and the table layout of the balance sheet and in-
come statement. Other frequently omitted topics, ranked from No. 2 to No. 5, are “Risk” 
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(covered in 3,916 earnings announcements, omitted in 3,573 press articles), “NonGAAP” 
(covered in 3,363 earnings announcements, omitted in 3,018 press articles), and “Tax” 
(covered in 3,351 earnings announcements, omitted in 2,655 press articles).  
3.3.3.2 Emphasis 
Our third measure of information production, Emphasis, captures the relative significance 
that journalists assign to a specific topic, thereby choosing to (de-)emphasize that topic 
and thus conveying to readers a signal about relative importance, e.g., by adding addi-
tional analysis on that topic or emphasizing the relevance of a topic. The benchmark for 
relative significance is the corresponding earnings announcement. Emphasis for one par-
ticular topic is therefore defined as the topic proportion in the press article less the topic 
proportion in the earnings announcement.  
By definition, Emphasis can only be computed for topics covered in both the earnings 
announcement and the press article. Therefore, our analysis of this third production meas-
ure anchors on the subsample of “jointly covered topics”, as reported in Column (2), Panel 
B of Table 3.3, which we further reduce to 15 topics.23 Figure 3.3 plots the distribution 
of Emphasis for 15 topics using all respective joint pairs of earnings announcements and 
press articles.24 We present the distribution per topic for two reasons: first, it highlights 
the on average higher emphasis of articles on the topics earnings, business outlook, and 
sales as well as the de-emphasis of the risk and non-GAAP topics. The t-statistics pro-
vided in Table 3.A3 (Appendix) support this notion of (de-)emphasis. Interestingly, Em-
phasis is not significantly different from zero for “Tax” and “RealEstateInvestment”, 
which suggests that journalists do not produce additional information through the empha-
sis channel for these topics. Second, it highlights the cross-sectional variation in Empha-
sis. For example, while the “Sales” topic is emphasized more on average, this positive 
mean is driven by a rather long tail of a few articles significantly focusing on sales. The 
significant cross-sectional variation is important since it hints at the possibility that infor-
mation production is highly contextual. The “IndustrySpecific” topic exemplifies this 
contextuality. The mean emphasis of this topic is close to zero, yet it has a wide 
                                                 
23 We exclude “Statement”, “EarningsRelease”, and “QuarterEnd” from the EMPHASIS analysis. Statement 
is mainly an added topic, while articles nearly completely omit EarningsRelease. Therefore, both topics are 
not suited for this analysis. Additionally, we exclude “QuarterEnd”, because this topic largely features 
technical information about the reporting period.  
24 Corresponding descriptive data is reported in the Appendix in Table A3.  
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distribution of cases where the industry topic is significantly de-emphasized, and a similar 
number of cases significantly increase the emphasis on this topic. 
For the sake of brevity, we confine our discussion to topics with distinct distributions of 
Emphasis, in terms of mean (different from zero) and symmetry of the distribution. On 
this note, coverage of firm performance deserves a closer look. For one thing, the topic 
“Earnings” receives far more relative attention / emphasis in press articles, with a mean 
of 0.24, and shows a long leftward tail indicating that few press articles also quite drasti-
cally de-emphasize the discussion of firm earnings. First and foremost, this finding reso-
nates with the pivotal role of earnings in firm valuation and with journalists catering to 
demands of their readership to focus on firm performance. In contrast, however, the op-
posite appears to hold for “NonGAAP” earnings, which receive relatively less attention 
by the press, with a mean of -0.097. This finding is somewhat surprising given the im-
portant role of pro forma earnings, and, more notably, evidence of potentially opportun-
istic use of these metrics to overstate firm performance (see, e.g. Bhattacharya et al. 
(2007)). There are at least two, non-exclusive explanations. First, firms that choose to 
report non-GAAP earnings are required by Regulation G to provide additional infor-
mation, e.g., on the predictive ability of these metrics and reconciliations to GAAP earn-
ings. Journalists potentially aggregate this information. Second, however, journalists may 
as well coin non-GAAP earnings as GAAP earnings, which refers to the “Earnings” topic. 
In that case, journalists potentially leave out information important to investors / their 
audience, as non-GAAP earnings potentially exhibit less reliability and more bias.  
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This figure shows the density plots for the Emphasis of different topics. It only includes arti-
cle/earnings announcement pairs, which both feature the topic (Table 3.A3 Appendix). A positive 
value means the press emphasizes the topic, while a negative sign shows it understates the topic 
(N 6,540).  
Figure 3.3: Density of Emphasis distribution 
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3.3.3.3 Sentiment 
Our fourth and final measure of information production, Sentiment, captures not what 
topic journalists choose (not) to cover, but how they do so, adding a linguistic angle to 
our analyses. In a first step, we examine the sentiment of the earnings announcements and 
corresponding press articles of the level of the whole document. We compute the senti-
ment on the document level based on the positive and negative word counts. Figure 3.4, 
Panel A shows the boxplots of the sentiment distribution. Generally, the articles have a 
more negative sentiment (mean:-0.17, median:-0.20) than the corresponding earnings an-
nouncements (mean:-0.02, median:-0.04). Both the mean and the median of press articles 
are significantly more negative than the earnings announcements on the 1% level.  
As topic coverage differs between press articles and earnings announcements, we further 
distinguish Sentiment for joint topics, i.e., for topics in the press article which are also 
featured in the corresponding earnings announcements, and for topics added by journal-
ists (see Section 3.3.3.1) in a second step. To make this distinction, we need to aggregate 
the sentiment on the sentence level. Figure 4, Panel B shows the sentiment on the sentence 
level and the split into sentiment based on added and joint topics. Comparable to the word 
count level, the overall article sentiment is negative and significantly different from zero 
at the 1% level (mean:-0.09). The mean sentiment of jointly covered topics 
(Sent_Joint_Topics) shows a negative mean of -0.10, which is significantly different from 
zero at the 1% level. Additionally, the mean sentiment of topics that journalists choose to 
add relative to the firm’s earnings announcements (Sent_Add_Topics) is -0.04 and also 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level. The difference between the mean and 
median (0 vs. -0.09) of Sent_Add_Topics and Sent_Joint_Topics is significant at the 1% 
level. Thus, coverage of firms’ earnings announcements by journalists, on average, is 
more negative, or critical, in tone than coverage of additional topics.  
On the topic level, the median sentiment of most topics is close to zero.25 For example, 
“Statement”, which is mainly an added topic, has a mean and median close to zero and a 
rather symmetric distribution around its median. This distribution suggests that journalists 
equally feature positive and negative firm executive or expert quotes. The overall 
                                                 
25 Figure 3.A4 (Appendix) shows the distribution of the sentiment for the various topics. 
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sentiment of “BusinessOutlook” has a mean of -0.13 (median: 0). The sentiment of this 
topic is more negative when it is a joint topic instead of an added topic (-0.14 vs. -0.08).  
Panel A: Sentiment based on the word count  
 
 
Panel B: Sentiment based on the sentence level  
 
Figure 3.4: Sentiment distribution  
Panel A shows the box plots for the sentiment of the earnings announcements and press articles. 
The difference between the median sentiment of earnings announcements (median=-0.037) and 
media articles (median=-0.200) is significantly different at the 1% level based on a Wilcoxon 
signed-ranks test (z-value=24.856). Panel B shows the box plots for the sentiment of the topics 
on the sentence level. The difference between the median sentiment of added (median=0) and 
joint topics (median=-0.090) is significantly different at the 1% level based on a Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test (z-value=11.286). 
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3.4 How do journalists help investors analyze firms’ earnings news? 
Our second set of empirical tests answers our second research question: how do journal-
ists help investors analyze firms’ earnings news? As noted in the introduction, Guest 
(2018) illustrates that information production by the financial press creates value to in-
vestors, as market reactions to earnings announcements are larger when these earnings 
announcements receive concurrent press article coverage, and these market reactions in-
crease with the proportion of editorial content contained in the press article. However, 
Guest (2018) illustrates a measure of editorial content, dissimilarity between earnings 
announcements and articles, which is fairly opaque with respect to how journalists create 
value or content. This is where our analyses kick in: Using our different measures of 
journalists’ information production that we glean from topic analyses (see Section 3), we 
investigate how market reactions to earnings announcements vary with the amount of 
these different sources of information production. In the remainder of this section, we 
outline our research design (Section 3.4.1) and present our empirical findings from market 
reaction tests (Section 3.4.2). 
3.4.1 Research Design 
3.4.1.1 Model  
To test our expectations regarding the information production role of the media, we esti-
mate the following model:  
(1) 𝑀𝐴𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑥 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛  +𝛽4𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸 + 𝛽6𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
We estimate Eq. (1) using OLS regression, quarter-year and firm fixed effects, and stand-
ard errors clustered at the firm level. Our dependent variable MABHR is the three-day 
market-adjusted buy-and-hold return centered on the earnings announcement day. We use 
the NYSE, AMEX, Nasdaq value-weighted market index for the market adjustment 
(Guest (2018)). We measure earnings surprise (Surprise) as the difference between actual 
earnings per share and the last median analyst forecast before the earnings announcement 
day (both based on I/B/E/S), scaled by stock price on the forecast date (Huang et al. 
(2017)). The coefficient of Surprise, β1, is the earnings response coefficient (ERC) and 
captures the markets’ response to the unexpected portion of the reported earnings.  
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Production represents our various measures of information production by the financial 
press, which we introduced in Section 2.1., and for which we presented descriptive find-
ings in Section 3. Specifically, we estimate different versions of our main model (Eq. (1)) 
for three of our information production measures: additional content (Add_Cont), omitted 
content (Omit_Cont), and sentiment (Sentiment). Continuous production and sentiment 
variables are standardized to facilitate the interpretation of coefficients. 
We do not include our fourth information production measure, Emphasis, in the multi-
variate regressions for two reasons. First, Emphasis is measured on the topic level and 
unique for each topic, which does not allow a meaningful aggregation of the measure on 
the article level. Second, and more importantly, we are interested in how the market re-
action varies based on different levels of information production. Emphasis, however, 
relies on joint topics and, therefore, on information, which journalists (partly) disseminate 
from the earnings announcements. Thus, this proxy does not allow the clear identification 
of information production needed for the multivariate analysis.  
While Production captures the main effect of the three information production proxies, 
our main variable of interest in Eq. (1) is the interaction term Surprise x Production. The 
coefficient β3 captures the conditional relationship between unexpected earnings and in-
formation production in financial press articles. This coefficient assumes values signifi-
cantly different from zero if information production by the press helps investors analyze 
earnings new by firms (Guest (2018)). 
3.4.1.2 Control variables  
The vector Controls in Eq. (1) includes three sets of control variables, which respectively 
control for the information environment of the firm, for firm characteristics, and for in-
formation characteristics of the earnings announcement. To control for the information 
environment of the firm, we include into our vector of control variables three measures 
that proxy for firm coverage by the media and by analysts. Ln_Analyst is the natural log-
arithm of one plus the number of analysts that issue earnings forecasts. Ln_Prior is the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of days with DowJones newswire coverage in 
the year before the earnings announcement. Ln_EA_Press is the natural logarithm of one 
plus the number of DowJones newswire articles about the firm on the day of the earnings 
announcement (Twedt (2016)). 
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Table 3.4: Summary statistics 
   mean  p50  sd  min  p25  p75  max  count 
MABHR  0.001 
 0.001  0.062  -0.472  -0.029  0.032  0.500  6,540 
Surprise  0.001 
 0.000  0.004  -0.017  0.000  0.001  0.021  6,540 
Added_Topics  0.715 
 0.679  0.990  -0.714  -0.172  1.534  3.366  6,540 
Omitted_Topics  0.007 
 -0.038  0.997  -2.652  -0.703  0.703  2.923  6,540 
Sent_Art  -0.182 
 -0.248  1.145  -2.195  -0.978  0.509  2.673  6,540 
Sent_EA  0.002 
 -0.041  1.001  -3.016  -0.714  0.646  3.163  6,540 
Ln_EA_Press  1.604 
 1.609  0.593  0.693  1.099  1.946  3.258  6,540 
Bad_News  0.220 
 0.000  0.414  0.000  0.000  0.000  1.000  6,540 
Ln_Prior  4.254 
 4.205  0.572  2.996  3.861  4.605  5.645  6,540 
Ln_Analyst  2.956 
 2.996  0.432  1.099  2.773  3.258  3.689  6,540 
Ln_Mv  10.061 
 10.009  1.159  7.276  9.278  10.848  12.696  6,540 
BTM  0.418 
 0.335  0.351  -0.418  0.190  0.570  1.694  6,540 
Ret_Sd  0.077 
 0.067  0.039  0.028  0.050  0.091  0.249  6,540 
Ln_Emp  3.611 
 3.593  1.212  1.104  2.698  4.486  6.075  6,540 
Ln_Owner  2.868 
 2.805  1.720  0.056  1.478  3.929  7.279  6,540 
Inst_Ownership  0.698 
 0.772  0.273  0.000  0.652  0.865  1.099  6,540 
Ln_8K  2.418 
 2.565  0.846  0.000  2.197  2.890  3.807  6,540 
Ln_EAD  6.169 
 6.284  0.763  4.159  5.687  6.807  7.294  6,540 
Comp  -0.012  -0.028  1.156  -2.718  -0.780  0.730  3.143  6,540 
Sent_Add_Topics  -0.002  0.082  0.996  -2.308  -0.516  0.480  2.471  5,068 
Sent_Joint_Topics  -0.028  0.000  1.009  -3.928  -0.659  0.621  4.791 
 5,068 
Notes: This table provides summary statistics for the variables. Continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1% level. Variables comprise MABHR (market-adjusted buy-and-hold 
return), Surprise (earnings surprise), Added_Topics (proportion added topics), Omit-
ted_Topics (proportion omitted topics), Sent_Art (sentiment press articles), Sent_EA 
(sentiment earnings announcements), Ln_EA_Press (number of press articles about the 
earnings announcement), Bad_News (negative earnings surprise indicator), Ln_Prior 
(number of days with prior press coverage), Ln_Analyst (analyst following), Ln_Mv 
(firm size), BTM (Book-to-market), Ret_Sd (return volatility), Ln_Emp (number of em-
ployees), Ln_Owner (number of owners), Inst_Ownership (institutional ownership), 
Ln_8K (number of prior 8Ks), Ln_EAD (competing earnings announcements), Comp 
(principal component analysis of textual features of the earnings announcement), 
Sent_Add_Topics (sentiment added topics), and Sent_Joint_Topics (sentiment joint top-
ics). All variables are defined in Table 3.A1 (Appendix). 
To control for general firm characteristics, we further include into Controls several vari-
ables, all of which we measure at the quarter end of the earnings announcement (Fang 
and Peress (2009); Bushee et al. (2010); Drake et al. (2014); Guay et al. (2016); Guest 
(2018)). We use the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (Ln_Mv) as a proxy 
for firm size. BTM is the book value of equity scaled by the market value of equity. LN_8K 
is the natural logarithm of the number of 8-Ks filed in the year before the earnings an-
nouncement. Inst_Ownership is the percentage of institutional ownership on the most re-
cent date available in the three months before the earnings announcement. We measure 
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Ln_Emp as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of employees, whereas 
Ln_Owner is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of owners at the fiscal year-
end. Ret_Sd, a proxy for uncertainty, is the standard deviation of monthly returns over 12 
months prior to the earnings announcement. 
As a last set of control variables, we include variables directly related to the current earn-
ings announcement. Ln_EAD is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of firms 
announcing their earnings in the MABHR window. Bad_News is an indicator variable set 
to one if earnings surprise is negative. Comp is the result of a principal component anal-
ysis of the textual features of the earnings announcement press release (Guest (2018)). 
For this analysis, we include readability, hard information, and specific entities. We meas-
ure readability as the product of minus one and the Gunning Fog index (Li (2008)) of the 
earnings announcement. Hard information refers to the count of numbers in the press 
release text. Following Blankespoor (2019), we exclude years, dates, section numbers, 
and descriptions. We identify specific entities mentioned in the earnings announcement 
using the spaCy Named Entities Recognition (NER) (Hope et al. (2016)). We winsorize 
all control variables at the 1% and 99% level due to outliers. Table 3.4 reports summary 
statistics for all variables. 
3.4.2 Empirical Findings 
3.4.2.1 Added topics  
For our market tests, we create Added_Topics as a measure of information production via 
adding new topics to press articles. Added_Topics adds up the proportion of each 
Add_Cont topic in a press article and thus captures how much of the article is based on 
information production. To further identify the subset of press articles that particularly 
focus on adding content, we create the binary variable Added_Topics_Quart, which as-
sumes the value of one for articles belonging to the top 25% with respect to the proportion 
of added topics and zero otherwise. 
Table 3.5 presents results from estimating our main model (Eq. (1)) for our measures of 
added content. As expected, the coefficient on Surprise is positive and significant in all 
model specifications (1% level), indicating information content of earnings surprises. The 
main effect of the proportion of added topics yields no significant results. The coefficient 
of our main variable of interest, the interaction term of Surprise and Added_Topics, 
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assumes a significant (10% level) positive value of 0.557 (Column (2)), suggesting that 
the more original content the article contains, the stronger is the investor reaction to the 
unexpected proportion of the reported earnings. This finding is consistent with journalists 
helping market participants to understand and interpret the information contained in earn-
ings announcements.  
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Notes: This table shows results from estimating OLS regressions using the market-
adjusted buy-and-hold return (MABHR) as the dependent variable. Variables com-
prise Surprise (earnings surprise), Added_Topics (proportion added topics), and 
Added_Topics_Quart (indicator variable for top 25% of Added_Topics). Unreported 
control variables comprise Ln_EA_Press (number of press articles about the earnings 
announcement), Bad_News (negative earnings surprise indicator), Ln_Prior (number 
of days with prior press coverage), Ln_Analyst (analyst following), Ln_Mv (firm 
size), BTM (Book-to-market), Ret_Sd (return volatility), Ln_Emp (number of em-
ployees), Ln_Owner (number of owners), Inst_Ownership (institutional ownership), 
Ln_8K (number of prior 8Ks), Ln_EAD (competing earnings announcements), and 
Comp (principal component analysis of textual features of the earnings announce-
ment). All variables are defined in Table 3.A1 (Appendix). ***, **, * indicate statis-
tical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, using two-tailed tests 
and standard errors clustered as indicated.  
From Column (4), it can be gleaned that this positive association between added topics in 
press articles and the ERC increases with the magnitude of information production, as the 
coefficient on the interaction term Surprise x Added_Topics_Quart is larger in magnitude 
compared to Column (2), with a value of 1.512. This finding demonstrates that articles in 
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the highest Added_Topics quartile lead to an ERC that is 82% larger compared to earnings 
announcements with corresponding press articles that contain fewer additional content 
(i.e., 1.512/1.852). 
3.4.2.2 Omitted topics 
Similar to the Added_Topics variable (Section 3.4.2.1), we create Omitted_Topics, which 
measures information production via omitting content from the earnings announcement 
on the article level. For this proxy, we aggregate the earnings announcement topic pro-
portions of all Omit_Cont topics. i.e., topics that firms feature in their disclosure, but 
which journalists decide not to report in the corresponding articles. As in the previous 
section, we add an indicator variable (Omitted_Topics_Quart), assuming one for the top 
quarter of Omitted_Topics articles and zero otherwise. Because omission of topics may 
emanate from article space constraints rather than from a journalist’s attempt to leave out 
irrelevant content, we add the proportion of added topics (Added_Topics) as an additional 
control variable to our baseline regression model (Eq. (1)).  
Table 3.6 reports the results from estimating Eq. (1) using Omitted_Topics as the produc-
tion variable of interest. As in Table 3.5, Surprise is positive and highly significant 
through all model specifications. In contrast, the main effect for Omitted_Topics is insig-
nificant and close to zero. Our main variable of interest is Surprise x Omitted_Topics in 
Column (2). This interaction term is significant at the 5% level and obtains a coefficient 
of 0.830. This result suggests that by deciding not to disseminate parts of the content from 
the earnings announcement, the financial press helps investors focus on value relevant 
information, as reflected in the magnified investors’ response to earnings news.  
Columns (3) and (4) introduce the indicator variable for press articles with a particularly 
high proportion of omitted content from the earnings announcements. The interaction 
term Surprise x Omitted_Topics_Quart is significant at the 5% level and has a magnitude 
of 2.128. Therefore, articles omitting most (highest quartile) content from the correspond-
ing earnings announcement prompt an ERC that is about 110% larger compared to articles 
featuring more content from the earnings announcement (i.e., 2.128/1.938). Conse-
quently, our results suggest that a more focused reporting, i.e., omitting more potentially 
irrelevant topics, which might distract investors, induces a more efficient response to 
earnings.  
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Notes: This table shows results from estimating OLS regressions using the market-
adjusted buy-and-hold return (MABHR) as the dependent variable. Variables com-
prise Surprise (earnings surprise), Omitted_Topics (proportion omitted topics), and 
Omitted_Topics_Quart (indicator variable for top 25% of Omitted_Topics). Unre-
ported control variables comprise Ln_EA_Press (number of press articles about the 
earnings announcement), Bad_News (negative earnings surprise indicator), 
Ln_Prior (number of days with prior press coverage), Ln_Analyst (analyst follow-
ing), Ln_Mv (firm size), BTM (Book-to-market), Ret_Sd (return volatility), 
Ln_Emp (number of employees), Ln_Owner (number of owners), Inst_Ownership 
(institutional ownership), Ln_8K (number of prior 8Ks), Ln_EAD (competing earn-
ings announcements), and Comp (principal component analysis of textual features 
of the earnings announcement). All variables are defined in Table 3.A1 (Appendix). 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively, 
using two-tailed tests and standard errors clustered as indicated. 
3.4.2.3 Sentiment 
As outlined in section 3.2.1, we measure the sentiment on the article level (Sent_Art) as 
the difference between positive and negative words, scaled by the sum of positive and 
negative words. The identification of positive and negative words is based on the 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) word lists. We split Sent_Art into two components: 1) 
the sentiment contained in those parts of the press article which cover topics in the earn-
ings announcements, i.e., joint topics (Sent_Joint_Topics), and 2) the sentiment in the 
Information production by the financial press: A closer look 
 90 
press article narratives that contain added topics (Sent_Add_Topics). We measure 
Sent_Add_Topics (Sent_Joint_Topics) on the sentence level, as the difference between 
positive and negative added topic (joint topic) sentences scaled by all added topic (joint 
topic) sentences in an article. We classify a sentence as positive (negative) if the number 
of positive words is larger (smaller) than the number of negative words.  
For our analyses of Sentiment as the production variable of interest, we add to our baseline 
regression model (Eq. (1)) the sentiment of the earnings announcement (Sent_EA) as a 
control variable, as journalists might disseminate content from the earnings announce-
ment and alter the sentiment of this information, but investors still might react to the 
sentiment of the original disclosure. We measure the tone of the earnings announcement 
as the difference between positive and negative words based on Loughran and McDonald 
(2011) scaled by the sum of positive and negative words. 
Table 3.7 reports the results of estimating Eq. (1) using our sentiment variables. In all 
model specifications, Sent_EA obtains insignificant coefficients. Columns (1) and (2) ex-
amine the sentiment on the article level. The main effect of the sentiment is highly statis-
tically significant (1% level) with a coefficient of 0.009 (Column (1)). Column (2) adds 
the interaction term of the article sentiment and the earnings surprise. Surprise x Sent_Art 
is significant at the 5% level with a coefficient of 0.515. This finding suggests that inves-
tors not only value what journalists choose to report on, but also how journalists do so.  
In Column (3), Sent_Art is split into the sentiment of added topics (Sent_Add_Topics) and 
joint topics (Sent_Joint_Topics). Both variables obtain significant coefficients at the 1% 
level. However, the coefficient for Sent_Joint_Topics is larger than the coefficient 
Sent_Add_Topics. An F-test shows that the difference between the two coefficients is 
statistically significant (p-value=0.004, F-statistic=8.38). Column (6) reports results for 
the full model, including the interaction terms of Surprise and the sentiment of added and 
joint topics. In contrast to the main effect, only the interaction term Surprise x 
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Surprise  2.123*** 
 2.499***  2.435***  2.489***  2.847***  2.856***  
 (5.40) 
 (5.87)  (6.38)  (6.81)  (6.65)  (6.76) 
Sent_Art  0.009*** 
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  (1.99)  
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    0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  0.003***  
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H0: Sent_Add_Topics = Sent_Joint_Topics; F-statistic=8.38, p-value=0.004 
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Notes: This table shows results from estimating OLS regressions using the market-
adjusted buy-and-hold return (MABHR) as the dependent variable. Variables comprise 
Surprise (earnings surprise), Sent_Art (sentiment press articles), Sent_EA (sentiment 
earnings announcements), Sent_Add_Topics (sentiment added topics), and 
Sent_Joint_Topics (sentiment joint topics). Unreported control variables comprise 
Ln_EA_Press (number of press articles about the earnings announcement), Bad_News 
(negative earnings surprise indicator), Ln_Prior (number of days with prior press cov-
erage), Ln_Analyst (analyst following), Ln_Mv (firm size), BTM (Book-to-market), 
Ret_Sd (return volatility), Ln_Emp (number of employees), Ln_Owner (number of 
owners), Inst_Ownership (institutional ownership), Ln_8K (number of prior 8Ks), 
Ln_EAD (competing earnings announcements), and Comp (principal component anal-
ysis of textual features of the earnings announcement). All variables are defined in 
Table 3.A1 (Appendix). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively, using two-tailed tests and standard errors clustered as indi-
cated.  
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Taken together, our results suggest that how journalists phrase their additional content 
matters: by “toning down” the topics circulated by firms in their earnings announcement, 
journalists appear to increase investors’ ability to interpret the reported earnings. This is 
consistent with journalists going beyond the dissemination of these “joint” topics by 
providing useful analysis and discussion of firms’ topics. In contrast, our findings do not 
suggest that sentiment produces value for original analysis by journalists, i.e., analyses 
that go beyond the firm’s earnings announcements by adding topics. One explanation for 
this finding pertains to the nature of information journalists add to their articles. As out-
lined in section 3.3.3, the topic that WSJ journalists add most often is “Statement”, i.e., 
direct or indirect quotes from firm executives or analysts. Adding this kind of information 
ties journalists to the wording of the quoted source and potentially limits their ability to 
alter the sentiment. In comparison, for joint topics, journalists have a broader range of 
how to phrase their narratives, which potentially facilitates deliberate information pro-
duction via adding a specific tone.  
3.5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigate how journalists produce information in financial press arti-
cles and whether different forms of information production help investors analyze the 
earnings news. To investigate the information production, we examine the WSJ coverage 
of quarterly earnings announcements of S&P 500 firms between 2010 and 2016. Using a 
topic modeling approach (LDA), we model the content of financial press articles and the 
corresponding earnings announcements. The identification of topics enables us to develop 
four measures of information production: 1) adding content, 2) omitting content, 3), em-
phasizing content, and 4) applying sentiment to the content. In our first set of analyses, 
we provide a nuanced topic-based perspective on information production by the financial 
press, documenting that journalists make extensive, yet varying use of all four dimensions 
of information production. Our second set of analyses demonstrates that these information 
production activities appear to create value for investors. We find that both the activities 
of adding and omitting content in press articles are associated with larger investor re-
sponses to earnings news. For our information production measure “sentiment”, we also 
find such a positive association, which is, however, confined to topics that are also cov-
ered in the earnings announcements. This result is consistent with journalists creating 
value for their audiences by “toning down” firms’ narratives. 
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Our findings contribute to the very recent literature on the information production role of 
the financial press. We corroborate prior evidence that the press assumes such a role, and 
that it does so to the benefit of investors. Going beyond the prior literature, we are able 
to demonstrate how the press assumes its information role: by deliberately adding and 
omitting specific topics, and, with a smaller impact on investor reactions, by “toning 
down” firms’ narratives. These insights increase our understanding of the economic role 
of the financial press as an intermediary of accounting information. At the same time, we 
provide a topic-based explanation for prior empirical findings that rest on potentially am-
biguous measures of journalists’ information production. 
Our findings are subject to several limitations. First, the decision to cover a firm lies with 
the news outlet and is therefore endogenous. For example, journalists may be covering 
firms with specific topics, e.g., executive compensation, M&A activities, etc., or depend-
ing on the availability of new information, e.g., from interviews with executives. While 
this limitation is common in the financial press literature, this endogeneity concern limits 
our ability to draw causal inferences from our results. Second, our results rely on the 
construct validity of our production measures. These production measures derive from 
the LDA model, which is applied using various subjective inputs by the researchers. For 
example, we select the number of topics for which the algorithm estimates the LDA 
model. Also, the topic labels and, therefore, the topic groups are subject to our interpre-
tation of the high-frequency words. Third, our sentiment analysis is based on the 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) dictionary. The authors developed this dictionary for 10-
K disclosure narratives. While the dictionary should thus be suited for the analysis of 
earnings announcements, press articles represent a different kind of narrative, and a more 
general dictionary might be more suited for their analysis. Finally, our findings potentially 
do not generalize to less specialized news outlets and smaller firms with a different infor-
mation environment than S&P 500 firms. 
These limitations aside, our paper sheds a nuanced light on the information production 
role of the financial press and its potential usefulness to investors. It is up to future re-
search to explore in more detail how this information production role varies across dif-
ferent news outlets, exploring further the press landscape. Also, given the structural 
changes in the production and dissemination of information brought about by digital 
transformation, it is an open question how the economic role of the financial press will 
evolve in the very near future.  
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3.6 Appendix 
Appendix 3.A1:  Variable definition 
Panel A: Topics 
Topic number  Topics  Topic number  Topics 
1  BusinessOutlook  11  QuarterEnd 
2  CashFlow  12  RealEstateInvestments 
3  Compare  13  Risk 
4  Earnings  14  Sales 
5  EarningsRelease  15  Segments 
6  ForeignExchange  16  SpecialItems 
7  Growth  17  Statement 
8  IndustrySpecific  18  Tax 
9  M&A     
10 NonGAAP 
      
Panel B: Variables 
Variable  Definition        
MABHR 
 
Market adjusted buy-and-hold return [-1/+1], adjusted for 
NYSE, AMEX, Nasdaq value-weighted market index 
Surprise 
 
Difference between actual earnings per share and the last me-
dian analyst forecast before the EAD (both based on IBES), 




Book value of equity scaled by the market value of equity at 
the quarter-end [ceqq/(chsoq*prccq)] 
Ln_Emp 
 




Percentage of institutional ownership on the most recent date 
available in three months prior to the earnings announcement. 












Standard deviation of monthly returns over 12 months prior to 
the earnings announcement 
Ln_EA_Press 
 
Natural logarithm of the number of DJ news articles about the 
firm on the earnings announcement day 
Ln_Prior 
 
Natural logarithm of the number of days with DJ press cover-
age in the year before the earnings announcement 
Ln_Analyst 
 




Natural logarithm of the number of 8-Ks filed in the year be-
fore the earnings announcement 
Bad_News  Indicator variable set to one if earnings surprise is negative  




Natural logarithm of the number of Compustat firms announc-




First principal component of readability, hard information, and 
specific. 
Readability= -1*Gunning Fog index 
Hard information = (count of number in text/word 
count)*1000 





Topic featured in the article but not in the earnings announce-
ment  
Omit_Cont  Topic featured in earnings announcement but not in the article 
Emphasis 
 
Difference between article topic proportion and earnings an-
nouncement topics proportion  
Added_Topics  Proportion of all dropped topics in articles (standardized) 
Added_Topics_Quart 
 
Indicator variable set to one if article belongs to the top quartile 
of Added_Topics 
Omitted_Topics  Proportion of all dropped topics in articles (standardized) 
Omitted_Topics_Quart 
 





Difference between positive and negative sentences scaled by 
all added topic sentences (sentences with topic that does not 
occur in the earnings announcement) (standardized) 
Sent_Joint_Topics  
 
Difference between positive and negative sentences scaled by 
all joint topic sentences (sentences with topics that occur in 
both earnings announcement and article) (standardized) 
Sent_EA 
 
Difference between positive and negative words in the earn-




Difference between positive and negative words in the article 
scaled by the sum of positive and negative words  
Notes: This table shows variable definitions. All continuous variables (except for 
MABHR, production, and tone variables) are winsorized at the 1% level due to outliers. 
Continuous production and sentiment variables are standardized to facilitate the interpre-
tation of coefficients.  
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Appendix 3.A2:  Statement topic 
Panel A: Topic descriptives 
TextType 
 




























EAs   998   0.01   0.02   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.31 







"I believe we would have recovered had it not been for these two un-
fortunate incidents," Mr. Arison said in a telephone interview Tues-
day. Mr. Arison said it was his decision to step down as CEO and that 
he had been discussing succession plans with the board for years, add-
ing that the move likely had been delayed by the recent mishaps. Stu-
art Subotnick, Carnival's lead independent director, confirmed that 
Mr. Arison wasn't pressured to step down as CEO. "It was not the 
board pushing Micky [out]," Mr. Subotnick said in a separate inter-




Telecom companies, such as Verizon Wireless and AT&T Inc. are 
keeping spending flat for the second half of the year, having tradition-
ally spent more after June, said Juniper Chief Executive Kevin John-
son. "We see similar trends with the top 15 service providers glob-
ally," Mr. Johnson said on a conference call with analysts.  
Any time a company misses like this, they do have to rebuild their 
credibility, said Simona Jankowski, a Goldman Sachs analyst who 
Wednesday removed Juniper from a group of favored stocks called its 
"conviction" list. "They will be in the penalty box, for at least a quar-
ter."  
U.S. Steel  
(0.825) 
 
Sam Halpert, who manages the stake at Van Eck, said he recently pro-
posed to U.S. Steel that it divide itself into three units overseen by a 
holding company, forcing each division to be more transparent and 
turn a profit while exploiting some tax benefits. Soon after, Mr. Surma 
and U.S. Steel's finance chief, Gretchen Haggerty, called Mr. Halpert. 
"They said they had people on the board looking at all kinds of differ-
ent possibilities," Mr. Halpert recalled.  
Notes: This table shows statement topic descriptives (Panel A) and example paragraphs 
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Appendix 3.A3:  Additional analysis (Emphasis) [Table for Figure 3.3] 
Topic  mean  t-stat  sd  min  median  max  count 
BusinessOutlook 0.044  12.90*** 0.143  -0.507  0.039  0.816  1,731 
CashFlow  -0.069  -9.58*** 0.118  -0.422  -0.052  0.277  270 
Compare  -0.053  -2.54** 0.055  -0.151  -0.048  0.032  7 
Earnings  0.244  77.10*** 0.233  -0.825  0.267  0.863  5,405 
ForeignExchange 0.010  3.61*** 0.093  -0.358  0.007  0.779  1,146 
Growth  0.063  16.14*** 0.142  -0.597  0.062  0.598  1,323 
IndustrySpecific 0.023  8.12*** 0.193  -0.749  0.018  0.834  4,560 
M&A  0.038  12.65*** 0.088  -0.384  0.027  0.514  869 
NonGAAP  -0.097  -14.12*** 0.128  -0.570  -0.077  0.312  345 
RealEstateInvestments -0.012  -0.95  0.184  -0.661  0.016  0.532  208 
Risk  -0.024  -2.95*** 0.151  -0.438  -0.008  0.628  343 
Sales  0.069  28.05*** 0.147  -0.708  0.044  0.907  3,576 
Segments  -0.024  -5.52*** 0.112  -0.533  -0.004  0.348  674 
SpecialItems -0.038  -6.86*** 0.099  -0.400  -0.017  0.217  328 
Tax  -0.001  -0.25  0.098  -0.433  0.007  0.355  696 
Notes: This table provides information about the additional analysis (Emphasis) in fi-
nancial press articles. Emphasis excludes the topics “EarningsRelease”, “QuarterEnd”, 
and “Statement”. ***, **, * indicate that the mean topic loading is statistically signifi-
cant different from zero the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively based on a t-test.  
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Appendix 3.A4:  Sentiment distribution  
 
Appendix 3.A4 shows the box plots for the sentiment of the various topics on the sentence 
level. 
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Abstract: While there is ample evidence that investors use non-financial disclosure, ev-
idence for non-investor stakeholders is rare. I use a sample of Fortune’s “100 best com-
panies to work for” list firms between 2005 and 2017 to provide evidence on stakehold-
ers’ attention following positive, externally validated CSR disclosure. Measuring the 
stakeholder attention using abnormal Google search volume, I find a significant increase 
in attention following the list publication. This increase is more pronounced for private 
firms, and the top 10 list ranks. I find that the increase in attention is not followed by an 
increase in applications to the list firms. In contrast, firms seem to increase their CSR 
activities in employee-related matters, as they pay less non-financial misconduct fines 
after being featured on the list. Overall, I find that non-investor stakeholders pay attention 
to non-financial information but fail to act upon it, whereas firms change their CSR ac-
tivities when anticipating increased stakeholder attention. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Regulators such as the EU frequently state that corporate social responsibility (CSR) dis-
closures should not only meet the information demand of investors but also of other stake-
holders like consumers or employees (e.g., Directive 2014/95/EU, recital 3). However, 
there is little evidence whether and through which channels stakeholders use non-finan-
cial information and how they react to its disclosure. This lack of evidence is also due to 
the fact that stakeholder information demand changes over time and is difficult to observe 
because it is often unrelated to monetary incentives (Christensen et al. (2019); Hombach 
and Sellhorn (2018)). Yet, it is essential to understand how non-investor stakeholders use 
non-financial information, for example, to draft effective legislation. In this paper, I aim 
to provide evidence on the link between stakeholders and non-financial disclosure. To 
that end, I examine two research questions. First, I examine whether stakeholders increase 
their attention to a firm after the release of externally validated non-financial information. 
Only if stakeholders pay attention to the information, it is likely to observe any reaction 
on their behalf. Second, I investigate how this attention might have long-term conse-
quences for firms based on stakeholder reactions (e.g., in the form of job applications) 
and their own (pre-emptive) actions (e.g., their CSR investments).  
I examine the Fortune’s “100 best companies to work for” list (BC list) between 2005 and 
2017 as a specific form of non-financial disclosure. The BC list ranks firms according to 
an employee and a culture audit survey and covers areas such as respect, fairness, or ben-
efit programs. As the annual ranking is disseminated trough a well-known information 
intermediary, it is more likely that stakeholders will become aware of this information 
compared to other channels through which firms publish their non-financial disclosure. 
Additionally, the publication in a newspaper makes the information more credible than 
disclosure by the firm itself (Kothari et al. (2009)). Further, the ranking is easy to under-
stand without further background knowledge and thus, facilitates the comparison of var-
ious firms. A key point of the setting is that the list information is disseminated on two 
different dates. This dissemination facilitates the distinction between stakeholder and in-
vestor reactions. I use the first disclosure of the BC list as event 1 and the official issue 
date as event 2. Another important feature is that the list contains information about a 
specific aspect of non-financial information, namely employee-related CSR activities. 
This information is externally validated and should be most valuable to (potential) em-
ployees of the Fortune’s “100 best companies to work for” list firms (list firms). Thus, 
the setting allows me to isolate the reaction of a specific stakeholder group.  
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For the stakeholders, the BC list is a positive signal about the CSR performance of the 
firms, which they consume through an information intermediary. It extends the infor-
mation set of stakeholders and reduces the uncertainty about the working conditions in a 
list firm. Due to this information content, I expect an increase in stakeholder attention 
following the publication of the BC list. As the information is valuable for stakeholders 
when it enters their information set, regardless of the exact timing, I expect an increase 
in stakeholder attention when the information is first disclosed (event 1) and when it is 
more widely disseminated (event 2). 
Based on the new information, the stakeholders update the expected net utility they might 
obtain from working for a list firm. If the updated utility based on the BC list exceeds the 
utility from their current employment, this might trigger stakeholder reactions in the form 
of job applications to the BC firms to maximize the utility they obtain from their employ-
ment (Hombach and Sellhorn (2018)). Consequently, I expect an increase in applications 
to list firms after they are featured on the list.  
Additionally, the BC list facilitates the monitoring of employee-related CSR for the stake-
holders. Consequently, list firms are likely to further invest in their CSR activities to re-
main on the BC list and signal their CSR strength to (potential) employees and prevent 
adverse stakeholder reactions. Therefore, I expect an increase in CSR performance for 
the list firms.  
To answer my first research question regarding the stakeholder attention, I examine the 
stakeholder attention following event 1 and event 2. I measure the stakeholder attention 
using the abnormal Google search volume index (ASVI). In contrast to prior literature, 
which uses ASVI based on ticker to capture (retail) investor interest, I follow Madsen and 
Niessner (2019) and calculate the ASVI based on name searches to capture stakeholder 
attention. Therefore, my proxy for stakeholder attention is independent of channels such 
as the media but is initiated by the stakeholders themselves.  
In line with my expectations, the results for the ASVI tests show positive and statistically 
meaningful results (at the 1% level) following event 1 and event 2 and a generally in-
creased level of attention. Stakeholders pay attention to both ranking improvements and 
deteriorations, while the difference between those two groups is not statistically signifi-
cant. The increase in attention is stronger for firms with a very good ranking (e.g., among 
Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder attention 
 102 
the top 10/20 firms). Overall, my results suggest that stakeholders pay attention to the 
publication of non-financial information.  
However, the name-based ASVI might also capture the interest of retail investors, who 
use the name of a firm to look for financial information online instead of its ticker. To 
alleviate these concerns, I compare the short-term stakeholder reaction with the market 
reaction following the BC list publication. To that end, I estimate three-day market-ad-
justed abnormal returns (MAR) for both events. 
The BC provides valuable information content for the investors because employees with 
a high level of satisfaction are likely to improve their output and remain at their current 
employer, which reduces the uncertainty of the future cash flow. For investors, the infor-
mation is most valuable when it is new. Therefore, I expect a significantly positive market 
reaction to the first event. I do not expect to find a significant market reaction for the 
second event, because the wider dissemination of the BC list information in Fortune does 
not provide new information content. In line with my expectations, I find a positive ab-
normal return following event 1, which is significantly different from zero and non-event 
returns at the 1% level. In contrast, I find no significant results following the second event. 
When splitting the sample into strictly positive and negative news, the analyses show that 
the BC list only provides valuable information content for the positive information sam-
ple. These results suggest a difference in information processing between investors and 
stakeholders, which supports the construct validity of my proxy.  
To further alleviate concerns about the construct validity of the ASVI, I offer three addi-
tional identification steps based on different list characteristics and Google search terms. 
First, I exploit that the BC list features both private and public firms. As the private firms 
have fewer investors, an increase in ASVI is less likely attributable to (retail) investor 
attention and more likely based on stakeholders. I find that the abnormal ASVI for private 
firms is nearly twice as high following both events and significant at the 1% level.  
Second, I compare name-based and ticker-based searches. Prior literature uses this proxy 
to identify investor attention (e.g., Da et al. (2011)). Consequently, and aligned with the 
results for the market reaction, I expect that the ticker ASVI is only significantly different 
from zero for event 1. Yet, I find significant results for both events. To rule out that high-
noise tickers bias the results, I eliminate all tickers with a noise level above 85% based 
on the data provided in deHaan et al. (2019) from the sample. I find that the ASVI 
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decreases in magnitude, whereas the significance levels for the events remain mainly un-
changed. Nevertheless, the ASVI magnitude for name searches for both listed and private 
firms largely exceeds the results I find for ticker searches.  
In the last step, I compare ticker- and name-based searches following the BC list publi-
cation with the search activity after the announcement of quarterly earnings. As earnings 
announcements are among the most important events for investors, the results provide 
evidence which search term investors are most likely to use. I find that, though the ASVI 
is positive and highly statistically significant for both search terms, the ticker ASVI is 
nearly twice as high as the name-based ASVI. This magnitude suggests that investors are 
more likely to use tickers than name searches. Based on all identification steps, I am con-
fident that the name-based ASVI captures stakeholder attention. Cross-sectional analyses 
show that stakeholder attention is more pronounced for firms with more negative press 
coverage, while it increases when the public image is negative.  
To answer the second research question regarding long-term stakeholder and firm reac-
tions, I use two different analyses. First, I examine the stakeholder reaction following 
their increased attention after the list publication. To that end, I focus on labor market 
reactions, as the information of the BC list is closely linked to this stakeholder group. To 
alleviate concerns that the increase in stakeholder attention might emanate from other 
stakeholders such as customers instead of employees, I analyze the ASVI based on an 
employee-specific search term. I collect Google Trends data based on the name of the BC 
firms and add the term “jobs” to the search request. Though the SVI for this search term 
is generally lower, I find a significant increase in ASVI for both private and listed firms 
after both events (1% level).  
Next, I analyze the stakeholder reaction by examining the development of job applica-
tions to a firm after being featured on the list for the first time. I find that there is an 
increase in applications but that this increase is not statistically significant neither for 
listed nor private firms. Overall, it seems like stakeholders pay attention to the publication 
of stakeholder related non-financial information but fail to act upon it.  
For my second analysis, I examine the long-term CSR investment decisions of the list 
firms. I proxy these CSR investments using the non-financial corporate misconduct fines 
a firm must pay due to employee-related topics (e.g., due to workplace safety issues). If 
firms invest in their employee-related CSR performance, this should decrease the number 
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of violations discovered by federal agencies or the number of lawsuits filed against the 
firms. I estimate a differences-in-differences (DiD) model using the first-time list inclu-
sion as treatment and a propensity score matching (PSM) matched sample based on all 
non-list Compustat firms as controls to assess if list firms increase their CSR activities 
after being featured on the list for the first time. In line with my expectations, I find a 
significantly negative average treatment effect for the list firms. Overall, the results imply 
that firms anticipate the increase in stakeholder attention and increase their CSR activities 
to prevent adverse stakeholder reactions.  
My paper contributes to the scarce literature about how stakeholders perceive non-finan-
cial information and how they react to its release. It is essential that we understand which 
non-financial information meets the information demand of stakeholders and how they 
react to its disclosure to draft effective non-financial reporting legislation, which meets 
the aims of regulators such as the EU. My paper builds on Madsen and Rodgers (2015), 
who examine stakeholder attention to corporate disaster relief, e.g., for hurricane victims 
and the resulting financial benefits for the contributing firms. While their proxy for stake-
holder attention relies on newspaper coverage, which is subject to the coverage decision 
of journalists, the Google searches used in my paper are stakeholder initiated and, there-
fore, directly capture their interest. Additionally, employee-related CSR activities are 
likely part of the internal long-term CSR strategy of a firm, and thus, my paper captures 
another CSR dimension than Madsen and Rodgers (2015), which further enhances our 
understanding of the link between stakeholders and CSR.  
As the various stakeholder groups such as customers or employees are rather diverse, it 
is difficult to assess how they process the non-financial information and how it might 
trigger stakeholder reactions. Building on the experimental design of Greening and 
Turban (2000), I isolate the reaction of a particular stakeholder group, i.e., current and 
future employees and examine if they react to the publication of non-financial infor-
mation, e.g., by pursuing jobs from BC list firms. Additionally, I provide evidence on 
how increased stakeholder attention might impact the CSR investment decisions of a firm 
and therefore extend prior literature by capturing the response of firms to increased stake-
holder attention. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 provides insights into the information content 
of the BC list, reviews the related literature, and develops predictions. Section 4.3 outlines 
the research design choices and results for the stakeholder attention analyses. Section 4.4 
Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder attention 
 105 
presents the research design and results regarding the labor market reaction and invest-
ment effect analyses, while Section 4.5 concludes.  
4.2 Background and related literature 
In this section, I present background information on my setting, review the related litera-
ture, and develop my empirical predictions.  
4.2.1 Information content of the “100 best companies to work for” list 
Since 1998, Fortune magazine publishes a list of the “100 best companies to work for” 
(BC list) on an annual basis. To create the list, Fortune collaborates with the Great Place 
to Work Institute. Robert Levering and Milton Moskowitz originally developed the list in 
1984. The news outlet itself is not part of the BC list creation. The external commission 
of the list limits concerns raised by prior literature regarding sensationalism in the media 
to attract readers instead of focusing on accurate reporting (e.g., Ahern and Sosyura 
(2015)). As Kothari et al. (2009) state that the press is a more credible source than analysts 
or the firms themselves, the publication in Fortune should enhance the credibility of the 
list for investors and other stakeholders. 
Originally, Fortune published the list in its January edition but moved it to the March 
issue from 2015 on. The print version of the magazine arrives at the newsstand up to three 
weeks prior to the official publication date. In more recent years, Fortune has additionally 
published the list online on a predetermined date before the release of the current issue.28 
To identify the exact event dates, I use the ProQuest database and look for the first men-
tion of the list, e.g., via firm press releases (Faleye and Trahan (2011)). I use the first 
disclosure as the date when the information becomes publicly known (event 1). In my 
setting, this first disclosure is mainly linked to the upload of the Fortune BC web page. 
As the second event of interest, I use the issue date of Fortune magazine containing the 
BC list (event 2) because the information is more widely disseminated on that date. The 
time lag between the issue and the first disclosure is present throughout the sample period. 
On average, the Fortune issue date is 14 days after the first disclosure of the list results.29 
                                                 
28 Past Fortune list web pages are available online from 2006 on. That is why I assume Fortune has started 
publishing the list online on a specific date in that year. The Great Place to Work Institute announces the 
next publication date on its web page, while Fortune provides the web page of the list. For 2018 and 2019 
the announcement date matches to web page release of the new BC list. I tried to contact both Fortune and 
the Great Place to Work Institute to get insights into their timelines but did not get any feedback from either 
one of them.  
29 Table 4.3 provides the exact event dates for both events in each sample year.  
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The distinction between the two event dates provides a key feature of the setting, which 
I exploit to distinguish between investor and stakeholder attention.  
To be considered for the list, firms must apply approximately eight months before its 
publication at the beginning of the year. The application is restricted to firms that have 
been operating in the USA for more than seven years, with more than 1,000 employees. 
Approximately 400 private and public firms apply for the list each year (Guiso et al. 
(2015); Gartenberg et al. (2019); Gartenberg and Serafeim (2019)).  
The list ranks the firms according to a score, which is the result of two aggregated scores: 
The Trust Index© employee survey and the Culture Audit Survey. For the ranking, it is of 
no interest if the firm is listed or private, as the score only determines the 100 best firms. 
Two-thirds of the final score derive from the Trust Index© employee survey, which cap-
tures the employees’ assessment of the firm. The survey consists of 57 questions and 
covers areas such as credibility, respect, fairness, pride, and camaraderie. The Great Place 
to Work Institute sends the survey to at least 400 random employees from all executive 
levels. The response rate for the survey is about 60%. The applying firms are not allowed 
to interfere with the responses other than to encourage employees to respond to the sur-
vey. The employees send their replies directly to the institute. The remaining part of the 
score derives from a culture audit, for which the management of the firm has to answer 
questions about the demographic makeup, pay and benefits programs, and culture of the 
firm (Garrett et al. (2014); Edmans (2011); Guiso et al. (2015); Gartenberg et al. (2019)). 
Therefore, the final ranking is an external assessment of the CSR activities of the firms, 
which is then disclosed to the stakeholders. In contrast to voluntary CSR reports published 
by the firms, the specific questions prevent firms from covering up or leaving out areas 
in which they do not perform as well as their competitors. The external assessment sup-
ports objectivity and therefore promotes credibility.  
4.2.2 Prior literature  
Overall, my paper contributes to the scarce literature about the link between stakeholder 
theory and CSR. It relates to CSR disclosure, as the BC list features an external assess-
ment of employee-related CSR activities disseminated to the stakeholders through an in-
formation intermediary. In this setting, the non-investor stakeholders are the key target 
group of the information. Additionally, it relates to literature about CSR activities, as I 
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examine the non-financial activities of firms in anticipation of increased stakeholder at-
tention.  
It is reasonable to assume that stakeholders are interested in non-financial activities that 
directly affect them. For example, employees likely care about issues such as workplace 
safety. To that end, Chen et al. (2018) and Christensen et al. (2017) show that firms im-
prove the safety of workspaces (i.e., adapt their CSR activities) when they have to initiate 
mandatory safety disclosure or disclose the information more visibly. Fiechter et al. 
(2019) show that firms increase their CSR activities prior to the effective date of the EU 
disclosure mandate to prevent adverse stakeholder reactions due to simplified monitoring 
by stakeholders.  
The literature about non-financial disclosure mainly focuses on investor reactions and 
their general use of this disclosure type (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. (2011); Flammer (2013); 
Krüger (2015)). Focusing on the BC list, Edmans (2011) and Edmans (2012) examine 
long-term market effects and find that list firm portfolios earn long-term excess stock 
returns. Faleye and Trahan (2011) examine first-time list inclusions between 1997 and 
2005 and find significantly positive short-term returns. These results suggest a positive 
association between the BC list inclusion and financial performance.  
The literature about stakeholder attention to CSR disclosure and their use of the published 
information is limited. However, some papers show that stakeholder interest in non-fi-
nancial aspects goes beyond the information that directly affects themselves. Focusing on 
employees as an important stakeholder group, Greening and Turban (2000) use an exper-
imental design to show that future employees are more likely to apply to firms that behave 
socially responsibly. Bunderson and Thompson (2009) find that employees that are ded-
icated to their work and find a kind of self-fulfillment or broader meaning in their work 
are willing to work for lower wages, i.e., when the firm engages in socially valuable be-
havior. To that end, Guiso et al. (2015), Garrett et al. (2014), Gartenberg et al. (2019), 
and Gartenberg and Serafeim (2019) use the full dataset of successful and unsuccessful 
BC list applications and examine the link between corporate culture, employee trust, and 
employee purpose. The results imply that employees’ belief in purpose is linked to better 
financial performance and disclosure quality. Additionally, this belief in purpose seems 
to vary with the ownership structure of a firm.  
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On a broader level, Madsen and Rodgers (2015) examine stakeholder attention to corpo-
rate disaster relief efforts. The results suggest that the stakeholder attention to corporate 
disaster relief programs ultimately results in financial benefits for the firms. While my 
paper builds on Madsen and Rodgers (2015), I differ from their work in three essential 
ways. First, I measure stakeholder attention using Google searches rather than newspaper 
coverage, as Cahan et al. (2015) find that firms actively manage their media image 
through their CSR activities. Additionally, Google searches are stakeholder initiated, 
while media reports are subject to the coverage decision of journalists. Second, I focus 
on CSR information that mainly affects (potential) employees and am thus able to isolate 
the reaction of a specific stakeholder group. Third, I examine CSR activities that target 
an internal stakeholder group and are likely part of a long-term CSR strategy rather than 
the reaction to an unexpected event.  
4.2.3 Empirical predictions  
4.2.3.1 Stakeholder attention  
Comparable to Servaes and Tamayo (2013), who argue that consumers need to be aware 
of CSR activities to affect firm value, stakeholders need to be aware of the superior em-
ployee-related CSR performance of a firm to react to it. To that end, Christensen et al. 
(2017) show that awareness regarding CSR information depends on where firms disclose 
information. In the case of the BC list, the stakeholders consume the information through 
the press as an information intermediary, which likely renders the information more cred-
ible (Kothari et al. (2009)). This credibility is further enhanced, as the press does not 
directly produce the list but commissions it from an independent institute. The publication 
in Fortune magazine makes the information easy-to-access, as it is widely disseminated, 
and the standardized ranking simplifies the interpretation of the information. It is more 
likely that stakeholders such as employees access this kind of information through the 
press instead of using traditional capital markets disclosure or CSR reports (Hombach 
and Sellhorn (2018)).  
The information contained in the BC list reflects the firms’ CSR performance regarding 
their employees. Contrary to the EU, there is no mandate for US firms to publish non-
financial disclosure. Consequently, stakeholders in this setting might not be able to obtain 
the information of the BC list from other sources. For stakeholders such as employees, 
the positive information conveyed in the BC list reduces the uncertainty about the 
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working conditions in a specific firm and additionally allows them to compare their cur-
rent employer to listed ones. As the BC list presented to the stakeholders conveys valuable 
information content for them, I expect an increase in their online search activity for the 
firm. 
The information content of the BC list should be valuable for stakeholders when it enters 
their information set, independent of the exact timing. The list might enter the information 
set at the first mention of the list, e.g., through a press release (event 1) or when the For-
tune issue is published (event 2), and the information is likely to reach a broader audience. 
Overall, I expect a significant increase in stakeholder attention, proxied by online search 
activities, for both events. 
The degree of employee satisfaction conveyed in the BC list is also beneficial for share-
holders because motivated employees are more likely to make for an effort at work, which 
improves their output. Additionally, good working conditions facilitate staff retention, as 
satisfied employees are less likely to leave the firm. This retention is especially important 
in industries in which highly qualified employees are scarce (Edmans (2011)). Overall, 
the inclusion in the BC list reduces the uncertainty of the future cash flow for investors. 
Consequently, I expect a significant and positive market reaction to the publication of the 
BC list. In contrast to stakeholders, the information about the list is most valuable to in-
vestors when it is new (event 1), as investors are more likely to price the information 
directly. The wider dissemination of the BC list (event 2) does not provide any new in-
formation content. Therefore, I expect a significant market reaction for the first event but 
not for the second one. 
4.2.3.2 Determinants of stakeholder attention  
Additionally, I examine which firm characteristics shape stakeholder attention. My main 
variables of interest for this cross-sectional analysis relate to the public familiarity and 
the image of a firm among stakeholders. I proxy the public familiarity using the amount 
of press coverage of a firm. If firms are featured in the press more often, the stakeholders 
might be familiar with the firms, and thus the information that enters their information set 
might be stale and their search activity lower compared to less publicly familiar firms. 
(Hombach and Sellhorn (2018)). Therefore, I expect a negative association between the 
amount of prior press coverage and the abnormal search volume. I proxy the public image 
of a firm using the sentiment of the firms' press coverage. I do not have a signed prediction 
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for this association. On the one hand, stakeholders might pay less attention to positive 
non-financial information if the firm is continuously featured negatively in the press as 
the signal might not be strong enough to change their prior beliefs about a firm. On the 
other hand, stakeholders might be more interested in the firm if the new information does 
not match their previous opinion.  
4.2.3.3 Labor market reaction and investment effects 
In addition to the short-term stakeholder and investor effects, being featured on the list 
might have two different long-term effect channels for the list firms. The first channel, 
which captures the labor market reaction, might impact the access of a firm to high-qual-
ity employees and is directly tied to stakeholder attention. As outlined above, I expect 
that the BC list attracts the attention of stakeholders, especially of (potential) employees, 
as the information content is linked to employee-related CSR. Based on the list infor-
mation, stakeholders update the expected net utility they might obtain when working for 
a list firm and compare it to their current employment. The additional information the 
stakeholders obtain through their Google searches might further support their belief up-
date.  
Greening and Turban (2000) argue that applicants are more likely to pursue a job when a 
firm acts socially responsible, i.e., the expected net utility for list firms signaling good 
CSR performance might be higher compared to the current employer. Therefore, the pos-
itive CSR signal (list inclusion) might prompt stakeholder reactions in the form of job 
applications to the firm to maximize stakeholders’ utility from their employment. (Hom-
bach and Sellhorn (2018)). Applying to a list firm after the publication of the BC list 
would be comparable to an investor who buys shares of a firm after learning about posi-
tive financial news. The belief update is supposedly larger when Fortune features the firm 
on the list for the first time, as the expected net utility before the BC list publication is 
not affected by prior list information. Overall, I expect a significant increase in applica-
tions to list firms once they are featured on the list for the first time.  
Second, the list inclusion might impact the long-term CSR investment decisions of a firm. 
These investment decisions might be a result of the anticipated increase in stakeholder 
attention. When applying for the list for the first time, the firms lack a benchmark of how 
well they are doing compared to their competitors. Consequently, they might be ranked 
among the top 100 immediately, or they might be rejected. If a firm does not make the 
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list, it can use the rejection as an incentive to further invest in employee-related CSR 
activities to be successful when applying in the next year. If firms invest in their em-
ployee-related CSR performance and start new activities, they might invest in essential 
factors like workplace safety or implement anti-discrimination initiatives, for which fur-
ther investments should decrease the number of violations discovered by federal agencies 
or the number of lawsuits filed against them.  
After being featured on the list for the first time, the BC list creates a monitoring oppor-
tunity for the stakeholders, as it is easy to compare the firms and benchmark their em-
ployee treatment with other list firms (Christensen et al. (2019)). Therefore, the list firms 
are likely to further invest their high standard of employee treatment and their level of 
CSR activities to signal their CSR strengths to potential employees and prevent adverse 
stakeholder reactions (Zyglidopoulos et al. (2012); Fiechter et al. (2019)). These invest-
ments should further reduce the likelihood of federal conduct violations or legal actions 
against the firm. Consequently, I expect to observe fewer employee-related corporate 
misconduct fines once the firms are featured on the BC list. Overall, I expect a negative 
association between the amount of non-financial corporate misconduct fines and the first-
time list inclusion.  
4.3 Effects of CSR disclosure on stakeholder attention 
In this section, I present and discuss the key aspects of the research design for the stake-
holder attention analyses: the sample composition and data sources, the main test of the 
stakeholder attention, the test of the investor reaction, and the supporting identification 
steps.  
4.3.1 Sample and data 
The Fortune lists and the corresponding firm identifiers are available at Alex Edmans’ 
personal web page up to 2012. I continue his firm-identifier list up to 2017 based on the 
Fortune BC list articles. I collect market data from CRSP and firm fundamentals from 
Compustat. Analyst data is available via IBES. I obtain newspaper related data from Rav-
enPack News Analytics (Barber and Odean (2008); Drake et al. (2014)). To test the in-
crease in stakeholder attention following the list inclusion of a firm, I obtain search vol-
ume index (SVI) data from Google Trends. Appendix A gives detailed explanations for 
the collection of Google Trends data and provides some general information about this 
dataset. 
Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder attention 
 112 
Table 4.1: Sample description 
Panel A: Sample selection stakeholder attention 
Selection criteria      Unique firms  Firm-years 
Start: Top100 firms between 2005 and 2017  257  1300 
Less observations of firms:     
private firms (139)  (721) 
with confounding events (-2/+2) (12)  (30) 
with missing data (4)  (103) 
Sample stakeholder attention   102   446 
Panel B: Sample selection matched sample 
First-time firms  45  270 
Less observations of firms:     
missing pre or post (7)  (42) 
firms without match (4)  (24) 
missing data (0)  (24) 
Sample before matching   34  180 
Matched Sample   68   377 
Panel C: Sample selection private firms 
Start: Top100 firms between 2005 and 2017  257  1300 
Less observations of firms:     
listed firms (118)  (579) 
with missing (Google) data  (16)  (40) 
Sample stakeholder attention (private firms)   123   619 
Panel D: Sample distribution per year 
Year   Stakeholder attention   Matched Sample 
  N listed firms   N private firms   N Treatment   N Control 
2004  0  0  7  7 
2005  45  24  10  10 
2006  41  34  15  15 
2007  40  45  19  20 
2008  36  50  17  20 
2009  32  46  17  22 
2010  29  50  19  20 
2011  33  50  16  17 
2012  31  48  13  14 
2013  33  50  11  12 
2014  30  52  9  12 
2015  32  56  8  9 
2016  30  59  7  7 
2017  34  55  7  7 
2018  0  0  5  5 
Total  446  619  180   197 
Notes: This table provides details on the sample selection process for the stakeholder 
attention sample for listed firms (Panel A) and the matched sample (Panel B). Panel 
C shows the sample selection process for private firms. Panel D provides information 
on the annual distribution of each sample outlined in Panel A, B, and C.  
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As Google Trends data is not available until 2004, and because I require ten weeks of SVI 
data before the list publication, my sample consists of list firms between 2005 and 2017. 
The list features both private and listed firms. I move 721 private firm observations from 
the main sample to the private firm sample. Next, I exclude all firms with earnings an-
nouncements within a five-day window around the publication of the Fortune list, as this 
kind of information likely affects public interest in the firm. Finally, I exclude 103 obser-
vations with missing data. This leads to a final stakeholder attention sample of 446 firm-
year observations, which are based on 102 firms. Panel A to C of Table 4.1 outline the 
sample selection process. Panel D of Table 4.1 further shows the sample distributions per 
year.  
4.3.2 Test of stakeholder attention 
While prior literature mainly uses the ticker-based abnormal search volume index (ASVI) 
to capture investor attention (e.g., Drake et al. (2012); Da et al. (2011); Drake et al. 
(2017)), I follow Madsen and Niessner (2019) and use name-based searches to capture 
stakeholder attention. I examine the ASVI on the day of the list publication (event 1) and 
the Fortune issue date (event 2). As outlined in the predictions, I expect a significant 
increase in stakeholder attention following both events.  
Following deHaan et al. (2019) and Drake et al. (2012), I measure ASVI as the SVI for 
firm i on the day of the list publication (event 1) less the mean SVI for the firm on the 
same weekday over 10 weeks prior to the list publication, scaled by the same 10-week 
mean. As I want to compare the stakeholders’ attention after the list information becomes 
public to the level before it is publicly known, I use the same 10-week period to calculate 
the ASVI for event 2 based on the Fortune issue date weekday.30  
Figure 4.1 shows the mean and median stakeholder attention following the BC list publi-
cation proxied by the ASVI based on firm name searches. All firms in this sample are 
listed firms. The vertical line denotes event 1.31 Figure 4.C1 (Appendix) shows the results 
for the absolute SVI.  
 
                                                 
30 The results of the stakeholder attention analysis remain mainly unchanged when using the same SVI 
mean (based on the weekday of event 1) to calculate the ASVI for both events.  
31 To facilitate the comparison, the ASVI in this figure is based on the weekday of event 1 for all weeks. 
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Figure 4.1: Cross-sectional average ASVI around Fortune list publication 
This figure shows the cross-sectional mean and median Google abnormal search volume index 
(ASVI) around the week of the list publication based on the weekday of event 1. Week 0 (vertical 
line) is the week of the list publication based on the first mention of the publication. The sample 
is based on list publications between 2005 and 2017 for listed firms (N=446). ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively (H0=0).  
The figure shows an increase in stakeholder attention leading up to event 1 (week 0). This 
increase is statistically significant at the 1% level. The ASVI remains positive and statis-
tically significant in the following weeks. The AVSI decreases after the initial surge in 
attention but seems to increase after the issue publication (approximately two weeks 
later). Afterward, the ASVI remains comparably stable and significantly different from 
zero. This result suggests that the BC list increases stakeholder attention on a long-term 
basis, as the information might enter the information set of stakeholders at any point in 
time.  
Table 4.2 presents the cross-sectional means and t-tests for the ASVI for both event dates 
(Panel A and C) and a comparison of the ASVI based on various list characteristics (Panel 
B and D). While column (1) in Panel A corresponds to the results of Figure 4.1, the overall 
results in Panel C (column (1)) additionally show a significant increase in stakeholder 
attention for event 2. Though the mean for event 2 is lower, the results are still 
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significantly different from zero on the 1% level.32 Taken together, the results suggest 
that the stakeholder pay attention to both the first disclosure of positive CSR information 
and its wider dissemination via an information intermediary, which is in line with my 
expectations. 
While a place among the 100 best companies is an overall positive signal for both stake-
holders and investors, it can be moderated or reinforced based on the specific list rank of 
a firm. On the one hand, the signal might be stronger if a firm is featured on the list for 
the first time or when the rank of the firm improves. On the other hand, the signal might 
be weaker when the firm is still featured on the list, but lost ranks compared to the prior 
year. Consequently, I also examine whether the information content of the list differs for 
firms based on specific list characteristics. 
Columns (2) to (5) in Table 4.2, Panel A and C show the results based on various charac-
teristics such as a deteriorated or improved ranking for event 1 and event 2, respectively.33 
The results of all four sample splits remain highly significant (1% level) for the first event 
(Panel A). For the second event (Panel C), I find a highly significant ASVI for the sample 
splits based on an improved or deteriorated ranking (columns (2) and (3)), while the re-
sults for the top 10 ranks (column (4)) are not, and the first-time list inclusion (column 
(5)) only marginally statistically significant. Overall, the sample splits support my expec-
tation that stakeholders pay attention to both events.  
Table 4.2 Panel B (event 1) and D (event 2) present t-tests for the comparisons of list 
firms based on their ranking characteristics (e.g., top 10 firms vs. non-top 10 firms). I find 
a stronger increase in stakeholder attention for top list ranks, e.g., firms among the top 10 
for event 1. The magnitude of this effect decreases with the list rank. In contrast, the 
difference between firms with an improved or deteriorated ranking is not statistically sig-
nificant. This implies that stakeholders pay attention to the non-financial information re-
gardless of the ranking development. For event 2, I do not find a significant difference in 
stakeholder attention based on list characteristics (Panel D). Taken together, the results 
suggest that stakeholder attention increases following the disclosure of non-financial in-
formation. This increase is independent of the concrete timing and the specific list rank, 
                                                 
32 For event 2, I drop 12 firms due to confounding events around the issue publication. 
33 The improved ranking groups also features first-time firms.  
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which implies that the list inclusion itself provides valuable information content for the 
stakeholders.  
Table 4.2: Stakeholder attention based on event dates 
Panel A: Stakeholder attention event 1 (date first disclosure) 








Top 10  
First 
time 
  H0=0  H0=0  H0=0  H0=0  H0=0 
N  446  261  172  37  45 
mean  0.343  0.331  0.303  1.406  0.539 
t-statistics   6.073***   4.869***   4.193***   2.834***   3.155*** 
Panel B: Stakeholder attention comparisons event 1 






Top 10  Top 20  
First 
time 
  (N=261)  (N=172)  (N=37)  (N=71)  (N=45) 
Rank firms 0.331  0.303  1.406  0.900  0.539 
Other firms 0.361  0.369  0.247  0.238  0.322 
Difference -0.030  -0.066  1.159  0.662  0.217 
t-statistics  -0.258   -0.570   5.858***   4.371***   1.156 
Panel C: Stakeholder attention event 2 (issue date) 








Top 10  
First 
time 
  H0=0  H0=0  H0=0  H0=0  H0=0 
N  434  254  168  36  43 
mean  0.201  0.230  0.148  0.211  0.328 
t-statistics   4.602***   3.612***   2.658***   1.378   1.695* 
Panel D: Stakeholder attention comparisons event 2 






Top 10  Top 20  
First 
time 
  (N=254)  (N=168)  (N=36)  (N=70)  (N=43) 
Rank firms 0.230  0.148  0.211  0.187  0.328 
Other firms 0.160  0.234  0.200  0.203  0.187 
Difference 0.070  -0.086  0.011  -0.016  0.141 
t-statistics  0.795  -0.964  0.071  -0.137  0.967 
Notes: This table shows the ASVI for listed firms for event 1 (Panel A and B) and 
event 2 (Panel C and D) based on firm name searches. Panel A and C provide results 
of t-tests comparing the ASVI to zero. Column (1) provides information on the full 
sample (N=446), while columns (2) to (5) test different subsamples, e.g., for firms 
with an improved list ranking. Panel B and D provide results of t-tests comparing 
different list groups based on list characteristics. For example, column (1) compares 
the stake-holder attention of firms with an improved ranking (N=261) to the other 
list firms (with deteriorated or constant ranking; N=446-261=185). ***, **, * indi-
cate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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While I use the ASVI as a proxy for stakeholder interest in a firm, it is also possible that 
(retail) investors use name searches to look for the firm online. In this case, the ASVI 
would not only capture stakeholder attention but reflect both investor and stakeholder 
interest. To alleviate concerns about the construct validity of firm name searches to cap-
ture the stakeholder attention, I run several additional tests outlined below.  
4.3.3 Test of investor reaction 
To differentiate between investor and stakeholder attention, I exploit the timing of event 
1 and event 2. As mentioned above, I find a significant increase in name-based ASVI for 
both events. However, I expect that investors only react to the first event, while there 
should be no significant market reaction for the second one because event 2 does not 
contain new information content for investors. This, in turn, would make it less likely that 
the increase in abnormal Google search volume might be attributable to (retail) investor 
searches, especially for the second event.  
To assess the market reaction for the two events and to compare the results with those of 
the stakeholder analysis, I examine the three-day cumulative market-adjusted return 
(MAR) centered on the publication date of the list (event 1) and the Fortune issue date 
(event 2). As I focus on the US version of the BC list, I use the S&P500 index for the 
market-adjustment to proxy the market development without the publication of the list. I 
define MAR as the difference between the cumulative return of the BC list firms and the 
cumulative index firms. If the list is published on a non-trading day, I use the consecutive 
trading day as event date. Following Joos and Leung (2013) and Armstrong et al. (2010), 
I use three-day non-event market-adjusted returns as an alternative benchmark for the 
overall market reaction to the list publication. In line with the ASVI analysis, I exclude 
all firms that publish their earnings within a 5-day window (-2/+2) of the Fortune list 
publication to control for confounding events. 
Table 4.3 reports the results of the overall market reaction for event 1 (Panel A) and event 
2 (Panel B) using three-day MARs. Panel A shows an on average positive abnormal return 
across all 13 sample years, which is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. 
Additionally, I find that the event-day mean return is significantly different from the non-
event mean return at the 1% level. Table 4.3 Panel B presents the same analysis for the 
Fortune issue date. The mean return for this event is not statistically different from zero. 
Further, the mean is not statistically different from the mean of non-event market-adjusted 
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returns.34 Overall, the market reactions suggest that investors value the information con-
tent of the BC list. In line with my expectations, the investors price the information when 
it becomes public (event 1) and do not react to its wider dissemination in Fortune maga-
zine in a statistically meaningful way (event 2). These results contrast those of the ASVI 
analysis and make it less likely that the significant increase in ASVI following event 2 is 
based on investor searches.35 
Though I generally expect the list inclusion to provide positive information content, the 
specific rank characteristics of firms might moderate and strengthen the investor reaction 
comparable to the stakeholder attention. For example, investors might regard an improved 
ranking as good news, while they consider a ranking deterioration to be bad news. This, 
in turn, would affect the results of my MAR analysis. Therefore, I split the sample into 
firms that are featured on the list for the first time or improve their rank (positive list 
ranking) and firms losing ranks compared to the prior years (negative list ranking).36  
Table 4.C2 (Appendix) shows the results for the positive list ranking.37 In line with the 
results for the full sample, I find a significantly positive MAR for the first event, while 
the MAR for the second event is not significantly different from zero. Table 4.C3 (Ap-
pendix) reports the results for the negative list ranking. In contrast to my prior results, the 
MAR is not significantly different from zero for neither event 1 nor event 2. These results 
suggest that while the first disclosure of an improved or first-time ranking provides valu-
able information content for investors, a deteriorated ranking does not. This finding di-
verges from the ASVI results because stakeholders seem to pay attention to both an im-
proved and deteriorated rank as the increase for each subsample is statistically significant, 
and there is no significant difference between the two groups.  
  
                                                 
34 As for the ASVI analysis, I drop 12 firms due to confounding events around the issue publication.  
35 To assess the robustness of the results, I re-estimate the market reaction for the first event using three-
day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) in line with MacKinlay (1997). The estimation window for the 
CARs comprises 175 days and ends 50 days before the annual publication of the list. Untabulated results 
show that the CAR is significantly different from zero. Thus, the results for the market reaction remain 
unchanged. 
36 I further test whether the market reactions yield significant results for the first list inclusion, the first two 
list years and top 10 or 20 ranks, respectively. I find no significant results for the first list inclusion (t-
statistic 1.29), the first two list years (t-statistic 1.60), and top 10 ranks (t-statistic 1.33). I find a slightly 
positive market reaction for a top 20 ranking (t-statistic 1.75). 
37 I exclude firms with an unchanged ranking from this analysis.  
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Table 4.3: Overall Market Reaction event dates 
Panel A: Market reaction event 1 (date first disclosure) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Event Date  List year  N  Cum.ret.  S&P500  MAR  t-statistic 
      (-1/+1)  (-1/+1)  (4)-(5)  (H0= 0) 
10jan2005  2005  45  -0.004  -0.004  0.000  0.042  
09jan2006  2006  41  0.017  0.013  0.004  1.198     
08jan2007  2007  40  -0.004  -0.004  0.001  0.337  
22jan2008  2008  36  0.026  0.004  0.022  1.749 * 
22jan2009  2009  32  0.043  0.034  0.009  0.643  
21jan2010  2010  29  -0.047  -0.052  0.005  1.103  
20jan2011  2011  33  -0.013  -0.009  -0.004  -0.939  
19jan2012  2012  31  0.027  0.017  0.011  1.861 * 
16jan2013  2013  33  0.014  0.007  0.007  1.821 * 
16jan2014  2014  30  0.008  0.000  0.008  1.634  
05mar2015  2015  32  -0.017  -0.017  0.000  0.013  
03mar2016  2016  30  0.012  0.011  0.002  0.324  
09mar2017  2017  34  0.005  0.002  0.003  1.360  
Mean       446   0.006   0.000   0.005   2.945 *** 
Non-event day mean return    0.001    
t-statistic (H0 = non-event mean)      2.997***       
Panel B: Market reaction event 2 (issue date) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Event Date  List year  N  Cum.ret.  S&P500  MAR  t-statistic 
         (-1/+1)  (-1/+1)  (4)-(5)  (H0= 0) 
24jan2005  2005  43  -0.019  -0.006  -0.013  -2.496 ** 
23jan2006  2006  39  -0.012  -0.014  0.002  0.443  
22jan2007  2007  38  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.244  
04feb2008  2008  35  -0.011  -0.030  0.019  1.233  
02feb2009  2009  30  -0.013  -0.008  -0.006  -0.541  
08feb2010  2010  28  0.013  0.007  0.006  1.621  
07feb2011  2011  32  0.021  0.013  0.007  1.912 * 
06feb2012  2012  30  0.019  0.016  0.003  0.668  
04feb2013  2013  33  0.017  0.009  0.008  1.023  
03feb2014  2014  30  -0.016  -0.022  0.006  1.208  
16mar2015  2015  32  0.012  0.004  0.008  1.985 * 
15mar2016  2016  30  -0.004  0.003  -0.007  -1.017  
15mar2017  2017  34  0.008  0.003  0.004  2.167 ** 
Mean       434   0.001   -0.002   0.003   1.432  
Non-event day mean return    0.001    
t-statistic (H0 = non-event mean)    -1.304    
t-statistic (event 1 = event 2) 




Notes: This table provides an analysis of the overall market reaction to the first disclosure of the 
BC list (Panel A) and the publication of the Fortune issue containing the BC list (Panel B). Column 
(4) reports the three-day cumulative return of sample firms centered on each event date. Column (5) 
presents the three-day cumulative return for the S&P500 index. MAR in column (6) is the difference 
between column (4) and column (5). I test whether the mean return for three-day MAR (column (6)) 
is significantly different from zero (H0=0), which is denoted by the t-statistic in column (7). Non-
event day mean return is the average of non-overlapping three-day market-adjusted returns for non-
event days in all sample years. I test whether the mean return for three-day MAR (column (6)) is 
significantly different from the non-event day mean return (H0=non-event mean return). Panel B 
additionally compares the results for event 1 and event 2. All variables are defined in Table 4.C5. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Collectively, the comparison of the stakeholder attention and the investor reaction implies 
that the information processing of stakeholders and investors differs regarding non-finan-
cial information, which allows me to isolate the stakeholder attention. This, in turn, sup-
ports the construct validity of the ASVI as a proxy for stakeholder attention. 
4.3.4 Supporting identification steps  
4.3.4.1 Design  
I use three additional identification steps to alleviate further concerns that the name-based 
ASVI captures investor rather than stakeholder attention. All steps are based on different 
search terms and the corresponding ASVI. I run the supporting ASVI tests for both events 
for all search terms outlined in the supporting identification steps below. 
First, I exploit the fact that the list consists of private and public firms. Public firms might 
have many investors, and consequently, many (potential) shareholders might look for the 
firm after the disclosure of positive news and affect the ASVI. In contrast, the more con-
centrated ownership of private firms reduces the number of investors looking for the firms 
online after the BC list publication and therefore minimizes a potential investor impact 
on the ASVI. If the name searches for public firms were mainly based on investor 
searches, I should find no significant increase in ASVI after the list publication for private 
firms for either event. In contrast, if I found a significant increase in name searches, com-
parable to my results for the public firms, this increase would most likely be based on 
stakeholder attention.  
Second, I compare the name-based and ticker-based ASVI. Prior literature uses ticker 
searches as a proxy for investor attention (e.g., Da et al. (2011); Drake et al. (2012)). 
Based on my results for the market reaction, the ticker ASVI should only yield significant 
results for the first event. Significant results following the second event would indicate 
that less sophisticated investors look for firm information once they become aware of the 
BC list even though there is no new information content, which could also impact the 
results based on name searches. deHaan et al. (2019) show that many tickers are noisy 
due to alternative meanings of their letter combination (e.g., “cat”, which is the ticker for 
Caterpillar). Consequently, there are Google searches for tickers that do not intend to find 
any financial firm information but increase the SVI of the search term regardless. Based 
on a newly added Google Trends feature that allows for category searches (e.g., Finance-
Investor), the authors develop a list of high-noise tickers. These tickers are likely to bias 
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any results I might find for the ticker-based searches, as the term search frequency might 
vary completely unrelated to any information content. I exclude all firms from the sample 
whose ticker has more than 85% noise, according to deHaan et al. (2019).38 I eliminate 
48 observations due to high-noise tickers and repeat the analysis of the second step with 
the reduced sample.  
Finally, I compare the magnitude of the ASVI for name and ticker searches after the BC 
list publication with a mainly financial event, namely the quarterly earnings announce-
ment of a firm. As earnings announcements are among the most important investor events 
(e.g., Basu et al. (2013)), this analysis yields insights into which search terms investors 
are more likely to choose. Madsen and Niessner (2019) run a similar test to validate that 
their ticker-based proxy captures investor interest and find that increases in ticker 
searches after an earnings announcement are much larger than name search increases. If 
I were able to replicate their results with the BC sample, it would seem more likely that 
investors search with tickers after value relevant events, while name searches mainly cap-
ture stakeholder interest. For this comparison, I use the quarterly earnings announcements 
of list firms within a five-month (-3/+2) window of the list publication.  
4.3.4.2 Results  
Figure 4.2 presents the results for the ASVI with respect to the supporting identification 
steps. The results for BC Name in all three panels correspond to the mean shown in Figure 
4.1. As in Figure 4.1, the ASVI is calculated using the SVI 10-week mean for the weekday 
of event 1. BC private shows the ASVI for the private BC list firm (Panel A). BC Ticker 
refers to the same public firms as BC Name but uses their tickers for the online searches 
(Panel B). RDQ Name and Ticker refers to the firm name and ticker searches of list firms 
for the reporting date of quarterly earnings announcements of these firms (Panel C).  
  
                                                 
38 At the moment, the deHaan et al. (2019) working paper only features noise levels for S&P500 firms. The 
authors state that they will publish ticker data for additional firms once their data collection is complete. I 
will remerge the data after the publication to evaluate if my sample contains further noise tickers. If my 
current sample featured noise ticker, the potential bias would increase the SVI level and work against my 
predictions. 
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Figure 4.2: Cross-sectional average ASVI around Fortune list publication for different 
search terms 
This figure shows the cross-sectional mean Google abnormal search volume index (ASVI) around 
the week of the list publication based on the weekday of event 1 for the different search terms. 
Panel A compares the name searches for the public list firms (BC private) with the name searches 
for private firms and the name searches adding the term “Jobs” (BC private jobs). Panel B com-
pares the name searches for the list firms (BC Name) and the ticker searches (BC ticker) for these 
firms. Panel C compares the name searches for the list firms (BC Name) with the name (RDQ 
Name) and ticker (RDQ Ticker) searches for the earnings announcement date (RDQ=report date 
quarterly). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively 
(H0=0). 
Panel A and B of this figure show a significant increase in abnormal search volume for 
the first event. The ASVI is highest for name searches of private firms (Panel A), while 
it is lowest for the BC Ticker searches (Panel B) following the publication of the annual 
list. For the BC list publication, the ASVI based on name searches exceeds the results for 
the ticker searches. I find that for mainly financial events, i.e., the publication of quarterly 
earnings, the ASVI based on ticker searches is nearly twice as large as the name search 
result and also exceeds the results I find for the ticker-based ASVI following the BC list 
publication (Panel C). The ASVI in the first two panels decreases after w=0 but remains 
Panel B: Name and Ticker comparison
Panel C: Name and RDQ comparison
Panel A: Listed and private name comparison
Line BC Name BC private
mean w=0 0.322 0.591
t-statistics 5.704*** 8.630***
Line BC Name RDQ Name RDQ Ticker
mean w=0 0.322 0.245 0.507
t-statistics 5.704*** 8.854*** 13.980***
Line BC Name BC Ticker
mean w=0 0.322 0.118
t-statistics 5.704*** 3.523***
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at an increased level in the following three weeks. Figure 4.C4 (Appendix) shows the 
results of Figure 4.2 for the SVI. 
Table 4.4 presents the cross-sectional means and t-tests for the abnormal Google search 
volume index for both event dates for listed firms and private firms. Additional to Figure 
4.2, this table also features the ticker searches excluding the high noise tickers identified 
by deHaan et al. (2019) and a comparison between event 1 and event 2 on the exact event 
date. Thus, this table features all supporting steps to alleviate identification concerns. I 
will discuss the results of each step in turn.39  
Table 4.4: Supporting identification steps 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








     H0= 0  H0= 0  H0= 0  H0= 0 
Event 1         
 N  423  619  423  375 
 mean  0.322  0.591 
 0.118  0.114 
 t-statistics  5.704***  8.630***  3.523***  3.039*** 
Event 2         
 N  411  619 
 411  364 
 mean  0.218  0.258 
 0.115  0.111 
 t-statistics  4.867***  5.846*** 
 3.170***  2.743*** 
RDQ comparison         
 N  529 
 
  529 
 473 
 mean  0.245 
 
  0.507 
 0.558 
  t-statistics   8.854***       13.980***   14.833*** 
Notes: This table shows the ASVI for the supporting identification steps based on dif-
ferent search terms. Column (1) features results based on firm name searches (as in main 
results), column (2) features results based on firm ticker searches, and column (3) fea-
tures ticker results without high-noise tickers. Column (4) shows name searches for the 
private list firms. RDQ comparison shows a comparison for name and ticker searches 
with a quarterly earnings announcement date. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
My first supporting identification step compares the ASVI of private and listed firms. 
Comparable to the results for the listed firms, I find a significantly (1% level) positive 
increase in stakeholder attention following event 1 for the private firms. Additionally, the 
ASVI remains statistically significant (1% level) for event 2. While the absolute SVI 
magnitude is lower for private firms, the ASVI for private firms is nearly twice as high 
                                                 
39 To facilitate the comparison, I truncate ASVI name observations if the ticker data is missing due to 
Google Trends data restrictions and the N differs from the other ASVI analysis.  
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compared to listed firms. The ASVI for listed and private firms become more alike for 
the second event, yet the private firm ASVI still exceeds the value of the listed firms 
(Table 4.4, Column (2)).  
For my second identification step, I compare ticker- and name-based Google searches for 
the two event dates. Based on the market reaction results presented in this section, I expect 
statistically significant ASVI ticker results only for the first event. The ticker ASVI mag-
nitude is less pronounced than for the name searches of listed or private firms (0.118 vs. 
0.322 and 0.591 for event 1 and 0.115 vs. 0.218 and 0.258 for event 2). However, I find 
significantly positive results for the investor attention proxy following both events. Next, 
I exclude high noise tickers identified by deHaan et al. (2019) from the ticker sample. 
Column (4) shows the results of this analysis. The ASVI results decrease slightly, but the 
significance levels remain mainly unchanged compared to column (3). Therefore, the po-
tential noise of the tickers does not seem to affect my results. Consequently, part of the 
name searches presented in column (1) might be attributable to investors.  
In the last step, I compare the name and ticker ASVI from my BC list events with the 
same proxies following quarterly earnings announcements. In line with the evidence pre-
sented in Figure 4.2, I find that the ASVI based on ticker searches largely exceeds the 
ASVI for the name searches for a mainly financial event. The magnitude for the SVI is 
comparable for both search terms, while the ASVI is nearly twice as high for ticker 
searches and even higher once I exclude the potentially noisy tickers. Therefore, it seems 
that investors use firm tickers rather than firm names when they search for financial in-
formation. Based on the results of my identification steps, I am confident that the name-
based ASVI is a suitable proxy for stakeholder attention. 
4.3.5 Cross-sectional analysis  
4.3.5.1 Design 
In the next step, I want to provide insights into the firm characteristics that shape stake-
holder attention. For all model specifications, I use dependent variables measured on 
event 1. I employ the following regression model:  
(1) 𝐴𝑆𝑉𝐼 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑟 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀 
The variables of interest for the cross-sectional analyses are the proxies for the public 
familiarity and the public sentiment towards the list firms, respectively. I use two different 
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variables based on Ravenpack to proxy these firm characteristics.40 The first version, 
which captures public familiarity, is based on the amount of firm press coverage in the 
year prior to the list publication (Twedt (2016)). I measure prior press coverage as the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of days with press coverage (prior_cov).  
For the second version, which captures the sentiment of the public image, I include the 
sentiment of the news articles in the analysis. Neg_rel captures the ratio of negative press 
articles in the year before the list publication divided by all articles relating to a firm in 
that year. I identify negative articles based on the RavenPack sentiment score.41 To cap-
ture the additional effect of mostly negative press coverage on the dependent variable, I 
interact neg_rel with prior_cov.  
In my cross-sectional tests, I use a set of control variables, which are likely associated 
with media coverage and stakeholder attention. I measure firm attributes at the quarter-
end before the list publication. I use the natural logarithm of the market value of equity 
(mve) as a proxy for firm size (Hahn and Kühnen (2013); Fang and Peress (2009)). Fol-
lowing Cahan et al. (2015) and Flammer (2013), I use the natural logarithm of the number 
of years since the initial firm coverage in Compustat to control for firm age (age). To 
proxy for the growth potential of the list firms, I include the book to market ratio (btm). I 
measure the book to market ratio as the book value of equity at the quarter-end scaled by 
the market value of equity (Hillert et al. (2014)). To control for information available to 
investors and stakeholders through other sources than the firm and the press, I include the 
analyst following of a firm (AF). I measure analyst following as the natural logarithm of 
one plus the mean analyst following of a firm in the year before the list publication. I use 
the return on assets, measured as net income before extraordinary items scaled by total 
assets (roa) as a proxy for firm profitability (Hawn et al. (2018); Dimson et al. (2015)). 
Based on my previous results, I include an indicator variable set to one for a top 10 list 
rank as a control for the list performance (top10_rank).  
The variable definitions are summarized in Table 4.C5 (Appendix). I winsorize AF, btm, 
mve, and roa at the 1% and 99% level to mitigate the potential effect of outliers. Table 
                                                 
40 RavenPack features four different news types: (hot) news flashes, full articles, press releases, and tabular 
material. For my analysis, I only keep full articles, and I eliminate all articles with a relevance score below 
75. 
41 For each article, RavenPack provides an event sentiment score between 0 and 100 based on a categori-
zation by financial experts. A score below 50 indicates a negative event, while Ravenpack classifies a score 
above 50 as positive. 
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4.5 (Panel A) reports summary statistics for the variables used in this analysis. Table 4.C6 
(Appendix) shows the correlation matrix for the different variables. I estimate model (1) 
using firm and year fixed effects. Additionally, I cluster the standard errors at the firm 
level.  
Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Cross-sectional analysis list firms 
Variable   mean   p50   sd   min   max   N 
asvi  0.34  0.13  1.19  -1.00  13.24  446 
prior_cov  4.03  4.25  1.06  0.00  5.38  446 
neg_rel  0.28  0.28  0.11  0.00  0.69  446 
btm  0.33  0.27  0.25  -0.09  1.49  446 
mve  9.48  9.59  1.47  5.10  12.59  446 
AF  2.72  2.79  0.59  0.00  3.64  446 
age  3.06  3.04  0.53  1.61  4.20  446 
roa  0.02  0.02  0.02  -0.04  0.10  446 
top10_rank  0.08  0.00  0.28  0.00  1.00  446 
Panel B: List firms 
Variable   mean   p50   sd   min   max   N 
LnEmp_fines  0.77  0.00  2.96  0.00  16.21  180 
btm  0.38  0.28  0.31  -0.06  1.65  180 
mve  8.90  8.75  1.42  4.53  11.34  180 
AF  2.01  2.46  1.14  0.00  3.16  180 
age  2.85  2.77  0.56  1.79  4.22  180 
roa  0.02  0.02  0.02  -0.06  0.10  180 
Panel C: Control firms  
Variable   mean   p50   sd   min   max   N 
LnEmp_fines  1.53  0.00  4.15  0.00  16.64  197 
btm  0.45  0.38  0.46  -0.94  2.73  197 
mve  8.70  8.45  1.44  5.43  11.34  197 
AF  2.07  2.37  0.96  0.00  3.16  197 
age  2.79  2.71  0.63  1.10  4.22  197 
roa  0.02  0.02  0.02  -0.07  0.09  197 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics. Panel A shows the descriptive 
statistics for the cross-sectional analysis. Panel B shows the descriptive statistics 
for the list firms of the DiD estimation. Panel C shows the descriptive statistics 
for the control firms of the DiD estimation (N DiD=337 (Panel B and Panel C)). 
Variables comprise ASVI, prior_cov, neg_rel (press sentiment), btm (Book-to-
market), mve (market value of quity), AF (number of analyst forecasts), age, roa 
(return on assets), and top10_rank_dummy. All variables are defined in Table 
4.C5 (Appendix). 
4.3.5.2 Results 
Table 4.6 shows the OLS regression results based on the press variables that capture the 
public familiarity and image of a firm. Column (1) shows the results using the number of 
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days with press coverage (prior_cov) as the variable of interest. The results show a neg-
ative association of the ASVI with previous press coverage (5% level). One explanation 
for this association might be that stakeholders do not require additional information about 
firms that they are familiar with and instead search for firms that have been unknown to 
them before the list publication.  
Table 4.6: Cross-sectional analysis of shareholder attention 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variable  ASVI  ASVI  ASVI 
prior_cov  -0.889**  -0.831**  -1.460*** 
  (-2.05)  (-2.07)  (-9.64) 
neg_rel    -0.965  -17.009*** 
    (-0.95)  (-5.29) 
prior_cov x neg_rel     3.897*** 
      (5.66) 
mve  0.003  -0.008  -0.058 
  (0.02)  (-0.04)  (-0.27) 
btm  -1.180***  -1.125**  -0.782* 
  (-2.63)  (-2.59)  (-1.89) 
AF  -0.349  -0.310  0.059 
  (-1.05)  (-0.98)  (0.21) 
age  -0.241  -0.290  -0.068 
  (-0.34)  (-0.44)  (-0.15) 
roa  -2.998  -3.200  -6.238* 
  (-1.00)  (-1.05)  (-1.90) 
top10_rank  0.620  0.642  0.571 
  (1.50)  (1.50)  (1.48) 
       
R2  0.531  0.532  0.589 
N   446   446   446 
Cluster  Firm  Firm  Firm 
FEs   Firm, Year   Firm,Year   Firm, Year 
Notes: Results from estimating an OLS regression using the abnormal search volume 
index (ASVI) as the dependent variable. Variables comprise ASVI, prior_cov, neg_rel 
(press sentiment), btm (Book-to-market), mve (market value of quity), AF (number of 
analyst forecasts), age, roa (return on assets), and top10_rank_dummy. All variables 
are defined in Table 4.C5 (Appendix). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
In column (2), I add the indicator dummy for mainly negative press coverage (neg_rel) 
and interact it with the amount of prior press coverage (prior_cov). In line with column 
(1), prior_cov is significantly negative (1% level) in column (3). Further, the dummy 
variable for negative press coverage is highly significant (1% level) and negative. The 
interaction term (prior_cov x neg_rel) is positive and significant at the 1% level. As the 
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combined coefficient for prior_cov and the interaction term is positive, this means that 
the increase in stakeholder attention is more pronounced when the firm attracts more neg-
ative media attention before the BC list publication. Figure 4.C7 (Appendix) shows a 
margins plot based on the neg_rel distribution and underlines the results of Table 4.6 
(column (3)) graphically. Negative press coverage might shape how stakeholders feel to-
wards a firm. The positive information conveyed in the BC list alters the information set 
of stakeholders regarding this list firm and might, therefore, increase their interest in a 
firm as a potential employer, as the new information does not match the previous image.  
4.4 Labor market reaction and investment effects  
In this section, I present and discuss the key aspects of the research design and results for 
the two different long-term reaction analyses: the stakeholder reactions (labor market re-
action) and the firm reactions (investment effects). 
4.4.1 Research design 
4.4.1.1 Sample 
Being featured on the BC list might have two different long-term effect channels for the 
list firms. First, firms might see an increase in job applications after their first list ranking, 
as potential employees might be more willing to work for a firm with good employee 
treatment. Second, the list inclusion might impact the long-term CSR investment deci-
sions of a firm in anticipation of the stakeholder attention. As my sample period starts a 
few years after the first publication of the BC list in Fortune in 1998, some firms are 
featured on the list during the entire sample period. For these firms, I am unable to observe 
labor market reactions or investment effects, as those would have, at least partially, ma-
terialized before the start of my sample period. Therefore, I exploit the fact that the first-
time list ranking of some firms is dispersed throughout my sample period for both long-
term analyses. Examining the first list ranking facilitates the identification of potential 
labor market reactions and CSR investment effects based on pre/post comparisons at the 
firm level. The effects should be most pronounced for this subset of observations. There 
are 45 listed first-time list firms in my sample between 2005 and 2017. These 45 firms 
are the starting point for both long-term effect samples. I drop several observations from 
these samples due to data restrictions as outlined in the respective analysis.  
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4.4.1.2 Labor market reaction  
To examine the long-term stakeholder implications of the increase in their attention, I 
focus on labor market reactions and test whether the number of applications a firm re-
ceives increases after being featured on the list for the first time. As stakeholders comprise 
various groups, the BC list might also affect other stakeholders such as customers and 
result in product market reactions if they alter their buying behavior. However, the firms 
on the BC list are from various industries. While some firms have a “business-to-cus-
tomer” model and might be more exposed to customer reactions (e.g., Starbucks), the list 
also features business service firms or firms from the oil industry. For these firms, it is 
less likely to observe product market reactions. Therefore, I focus on the effect that the 
BC list has on potential employees because the link between the information content of 
the list and potential stakeholder reactions is strongest for them. Additionally, the infor-
mation is valuable for employees regardless of the industry or other specific characteris-
tics of the list firms.  
My previous analyses show an increase in stakeholder attention following the publication 
of the BC list. To examine labor market reactions, this increase needs to be based on 
employee attention instead of other stakeholders. To alleviate concerns that the increase 
emanates from other stakeholders and to isolate the employees’ attention, I collect Google 
Trends data based on the name of the list firms and add the term “jobs” to the search 
request (e.g., “Autodesk jobs”). As this search term is rather specific, any increase in 
Google searches after the list publication should be related to current or future employees. 
To test my prediction regarding the application behavior of stakeholders once the firms 
are featured on the list, I compare the number of job applications in the first list year to 
the second and third year. For their BC list application, the management of the firms must 
provide internal items, including the number of applications they received and the total 
number of employees. Fortune displays these items on its web page accompanying the 
BC list. I collect the number of applications alongside the number of US, non-US, and 
total employees from the Fortune web page.42 If a firm is featured on the list for the first 
time, the number of applications stated in the Fortune survey refers to the pre-period, i.e., 
to the time before the firm signaled its good CSR performance to potential employees. In 
                                                 
42 The web page information is available from 2006 on. Therefore, I exclude 2005 from the sample period 
for this analysis. As the application data is only available for list firms, it is not possible to estimate a DiD 
model comparable to the CSR investment effects.  
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contrast, the number of applications in the second year reflects the level of applications 
after the first positive signal when stakeholders start updating their beliefs. As it might 
take some time for the positive signal to materialize in job applications, I also compare 
the first year to the third year of the list membership.  
The data items collected from Fortune are available for private and listed firms. There-
fore, I also examine whether the labor market reaction differs for these firms. The variable 
of interest for the t-tests is appl_scaled, for which I divide the number of applications 
stated on the Fortune web page by the mean number of total employees in both compari-
son years. For this analysis, I use the 45 first-time firms of the sample. I drop 13 (22) 
firms because of missing application or scaling data in one of the comparison years. I end 
up with 32 (23) firms for the second (third) year comparison. In addition to the listed 
firms, I also examine the labor market reaction for private firms. There are 89 first-time 
private firms on the BC between 2005 and 2017. I drop 33 (45) firms because of missing 
data and end up with 56 (44) private firms for the application comparisons.  
4.4.1.3 Long-term firm investment effects  
As outlined in Section 4.2, I expect an increase in CSR activities once a firm is featured 
on the list. These long-term investments represent pre-emptive firm reactions to avoid 
adverse stakeholder reactions after the facilitated monitoring through the BC list. Prior 
literature such as Lys et al. (2015) and Fiechter et al. (2019) uses CSR scores based on 
the Asset4 database as a proxy for CSR expenditures and the consequent CSR activities. 
These scores capture and aggregate various dimensions of firms’ CSR activities. For ex-
ample, the Asset4 social score includes multiple employee aspects such as turnover rates 
or salary gaps but also features information about product responsibility, like revenues 
from alcohol or tobacco.  
However, I am only interested in a specific aspect of CSR, namely the employee-related 
CSR activities. Additionally, the scores are also sensitive to the overall coverage of the 
database. For example, Asset4 largely extended its coverage in 2008, which affects the 
score of the previously covered firms. As my sample includes years before and after 2008, 
using Asset4 scores might bias my results. Therefore, the scores are less suited for my 
analysis. While the database offers various scores, the data available for items that are not 
part of a score is limited. For example, no item directly captures the extent of CSR in-
vestments. Thus, I abstain from using Asset4 data and use the fines a firm must pay due 
Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder attention 
 131 
to non-financial corporate misconduct as a proxy for the prior CSR performance instead. 
To focus on employee-related CSR activities, I only include fines related to employee 
aspects such as workplace safety. In contrast to CSR scores, the non-financial misconduct 
fines are less susceptible to changes in firm disclosure about their CSR activities. 
I follow Raghunandan (2019) and Heese and Perez-Cavazos (2020) and obtain infor-
mation about previous non-financial misconduct of BC firms from a novel dataset called 
Violation Tracker43 by Good Jobs First. The database features fines for corporate wrong-
doing between 2000 and 2018 from 47 federal agencies like the Department of Justice or 
the Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division. It classifies the fines into different 
primary-offense categories such as consumer protection, environmental, and bribery. It 
features the agency that charged the firm and the penalty amount. The database links 
every fine to the respective agency documents and offers more background information. 
I collect the employee-related fine record of each sample firm from the database.44 Ap-
pendix B provides more detailed information about the Tracker database and the fines 
used in my analyses. 
To test my prediction empirically, I employ a difference-in-difference model (DiD) to 
examine the average treatment effect of the list inclusion. LnEmp_fines, which is the de-
pendent variable in my DiD model, is the natural logarithm of the total amount (in USD) 
of fines that a firm had to pay due to employee-related non-financial corporate miscon-
duct in the previous year based on the Violation Tracker data. For the DiD analysis, I 
estimate the following OLS-regression using standard errors clustered at the firm level:  
(2) 𝐿𝑛𝐸𝑚𝑝_𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡_𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 ∗ 𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝛽3𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀 
Using the first list inclusion as treatment provides a clear dichotomy between the list and 
control firms. To be considered as a treatment list firm, the firm must switch from a non-
list firm to a list firm within the sample period. Additionally, I exploit the fact that the 
first list inclusion is dispersed throughout my sample period. As I expect some time-lag 
for the fines (e.g., if a court sets the fine), I set the indicator variable post to 1 for the year 
                                                 
43 https://www.goodjobsfirst.org/violation-tracker 
44 The employee related fines in the sample feature the following categories: Family and Medical Leave 
Act, Employment discrimination, Employment screening violation, Labor relations violation, Wage and 
hour violation, Workplace safety or health violation.  
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after the first list inclusion.45 The analysis features three pre and three post years. For each 
list firm, I require a minimum of five out of six possible observations.46 Due to this re-
striction, I drop seven list firms.  
Firms in my sample decide to apply for the BC voluntarily. Therefore, they self-select 
into the treatment (list firms) and the control group. This endogenous treatment decision 
might lead to a potential self-selection bias. Prior research, such as Bushee et al. (2003) 
or Butler et al. (2007), addresses this bias using selection models, for example, maximum 
likelihood estimations or a two-step approach based on Heckman (1979). Both ap-
proaches model the firms’ decisions to choose a treatment, e.g., the disclosure of quarterly 
reports and, therefore, control for bias based on a linear combination of both observable 
and unobservable factors (Tucker (2010)) within one approach.  
Though the decision of the firms to apply for the list is endogenous, their final list rank is 
exogenous, as it is based on the list criteria, which firms cannot influence. Consequently, 
I need to model the decision to apply or not to apply to the BC list to address the selection 
bias based on unobservables, regardless of the firm making the list or not. However, For-
tune only publishes the 100 best companies, while the name and theoretical rank of the 
other (approximately) 300 unsuccessful applicants remain private. Due to this data re-
striction, I abstain from estimating a selection model.  
Instead, my research design addresses the potential self-selection bias in two ways. First, 
I employ a propensity score matching (PSM). The PSM controls for selection bias based 
on observable factors. The matching procedure creates a sample of comparable list and 
non-list firms, thus reducing bias from a potential functional form misspecification 
(Tucker (2010); Shipman et al. (2017)). Additionally, my DiD design addresses potential 
bias caused by time-invariant unobservables (Lennox et al. (2012)). Yet, my research 
design would not provide an effective control for the self-selection bias if the selection 
decision was associated with time-varying unobservables (Lennox et al. (2012)). This 
restriction limits my ability to draw causal inferences from the DiD analysis.  
 
                                                 
45 The results remain mainly unchanged when setting post to 1 in the year of the first list inclusion.  
46 I require a minimum of four observations for the list firms whose first-time list inclusion is at the start 
(2005) or end (2017) of my sample period.  
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Figure 4.3: Parallel trends for list and control firms of the DiD estimation 
This figure shows the cross-sectional mean of LnEmp_fines for the list and control firms for the 
DiD sample years, indicating parallel trends before the first-time list membership (treatment). The 
table at the bottom of the figure documents the sample composition. 
For the matched sample, I employ a PSM based on all Compustat firms that have never 
been on the BC list up to 2018 and the list firms.47 To obtain the propensity scores, I 
estimate a probit model of the list firm indicator variable and the covariates I use in the 
DiD model (Model (2)) based on the fundamentals two years before the list firms are first 
featured on the BC list.48 These covariates are the same variables I use as control variables 
in the cross-sectional analysis except for the list rank (AF, age, roa, mve, and btm). Using 
a caliper of 0.01, I match the list and control firms without replacement (Leung and 
Veenman (2018); Shipman et al. (2017)). Due to the caliper, I am unable to match four 
firms and drop them from the sample. The final sample consists of 34 list and 34 control 
firms. Table 4.C8 (Appendix) shows that these firms are similar after the matching in the 
pre-list period because there are no significant differences between the covariates. Table 
4.1 (Panel B) features information about the composition of the matched sample. Figure 
                                                 
47 Excluding firms that are on the list at a later point of time reduces the risk of using a list applicant as a 
control firm. If I used an applicant as a control firm, this would reduce any effect I might find using the 
DiD analysis, as these firms might also increase their CSR activities and the difference between treatment 
and control group would be smaller.  
48 The results remain mainly unchanged when matching based on fundamentals one year before the first list 
ranking.  
Year -2 -1 0 1 2 3 Total
List_firms
without penalty 28 29 30 28 25 22
with penalty 3 5 4 4 2 0
Total 31 34 34 32 27 22 180
Control
without penalty 29 28 31 27 28 26
with penalty 2 6 3 7 4 6
Total 31 34 34 34 32 32 197
Total 62 68 68 66 59 54 377
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4.3 shows the cross-sectional mean of the dependent variable (LnEmp_fines) for the list 
and control firms for the six years of the DiD analysis. The mean increases for both groups 
two years before the list inclusion and decreases in the year before the treatment. Overall, 
the figure supports the pre-years parallel trend assumption necessary for the estimation 
of a DiD model. Table 4.5 (Panel B and C) provide information about the summary sta-
tistics for the list and control firms.  
4.4.2 Results 
4.4.2.1 Labor market reaction  
In a first step, I isolate the increase in employee attention by examining an employee-
specific search term. Thus, I add “jobs” to the name search term. Table 4.7, column (1) 
shows the result of this analysis for the listed firms. Comparable to the name searches, I 
find a significant (1% level) increase in Google searches for both events.49 The magnitude 
of the ASVI is similar to the ASVI name magnitude and exceeds the values I find for the 
ticker searches. Column (2) shows the results for the private firms. Again, I find a signif-
icant increase (1% and 5% level, respectively) in Google searches following both events. 
In line with the name searches, the private mean ASVI for the jobs search exceeds the 
mean of listed firms. Figure 4.C9 shows the SVI and ASVI comparisons for the search 
terms outlined above.  
Table 4.7: Jobs searches 
   (1)  (2) 
   Listed firm (Jobs) Private firms (Jobs) 
     H0=0  H0=0 
Event 1      
 N  249  229 
 mean  0.334  0.500 
 t-statistics  4.463***   4.620*** 
Event 2      
 N  240  221 
 mean  0.190  0.581 
 t-statistics  2.959***  2.200** 
Notes: This table shows the ASVI for name searches adding the term "jobs". 
Column (1) features results for listed firms, while column (2) shows private 
firms. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively.  
                                                 
49 Due to Google Trends data restrictions the N in this analysis is lower compared to the previous one.  
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In a second step, I examine the number of job applications before and after the first list 
ranking. Table 4.8 shows the results of the mean comparisons of job applications for the 
listed firms (Panel A). I find an increase in the number of applications scaled by mean 
employees. This increase is more pronounced when comparing the first list year with the 
third one. Nevertheless, neither increase is statistically significant. Panel B shows the 
results for private firms. Again, there is an increase in applications for both periods. This 
increase is larger than for listed firms. Yet, the comparisons yield no significant results. 
Overall, it seems like there is no systematic increase in applications for the firms after 
being featured on the BC list for the first time. Though the previous analyses indicate an 
increase in stakeholder attention, the application tests show a lack of stakeholder reaction 
following their attention. If the information obtained from the BC list does not prompt 
the stakeholders to act, their Google searches might be based on curiosity rather than 
information gathering to support their decisions.  
Table 4.8: Application data 
Panel A: Listed firms 
First and second-year comparison  First and third-year comparison 
  N   Mean    N   Mean 
First-year  32  8.935  First-year  23  7.272 
Second-year   32   9.826  Third-year   23   10.217 
Difference    -0.891  Difference    -2.945 
t-statistics     -0.264  t-statistics     -0.959 
Panel B: Private firms 
First and second-year comparison  First and third-year comparison 
  N   Mean    N   Mean 
First-year  56  7.172  First-year  44  6.588 
Second-year   56   8.574  Third-year   44   7.818 
Difference    -1.402  Difference    -1.230 
t-statistics     -0.971  t-statistics     -0.788 
Notes: This table shows the mean comparisons of appl_scaled in the first and second 
(third) list year for listed (Panel A) and private firms (Panel B). Appl_scaled is the 
number of applications the firm received scaled by the mean employees in the test 
years. Both items are based on Fortune list data. ***, **, * indicate statistical signifi-
cance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
4.4.2.2 Long-term firm investment effects 
Table 4.9 reports the results of the DiD model using an OLS regression. Column (1) es-
timates a plain model, while columns (2) and (3) add the controls and fixed effects. The 
main effect of the list firm indicator variable suggests that list firms do not pay less non-
financial corporate misconduct fines in the pre-period, which is in accordance with the 
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means presented in Figure 4.3. The estimated average treatment effect of the BC list firms 
(list_firm*post) is significant (10% level and 5% level, respectively) and negative in all 
model specifications of Table 4.9.  
Overall, the results suggest that list firms increase their employee-related CSR activities 
in anticipation of the increased stakeholder attention and thus must pay fewer non-finan-
cial corporate misconduct fines in the following years. This supports my prediction that 
firms invest in their employee-related CSR performance before making the list for the 
first time. Additionally, this result suggests that firms are aware of the increased stake-
holder attention and the additional accompanying monitoring following the list publica-
tion. Thus, they remain at a higher CSR level after making the list to keep sending positive 
signals to (potential) employees and avoid adverse stakeholder reactions.  
Table 4.9: Difference in difference estimation 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variable  LnEmp_fines 
 LnEmp_fines  LnEmp_fines 
list_firm  -0.148  -0.205   
  (-0.22)  (-0.31)   
post  0.569  0.510   
  (1.44)  (1.25)   
list_firm x post -1.152*  -1.157**  -1.122* 
  (-1.96)  (-2.01)  (-1.81) 
btm    -0.221  -0.361 
    (-0.26)  (-0.38) 
mve    0.266  0.830 
    (1.01)  (1.33) 
AF    -0.106  -0.271 
    (-0.55)  (-0.67) 
age    -0.006  -4.467 
    (-0.01)  (-1.50) 
roa    -7.126  -9.059 
    (-0.90)  (-0.74) 
       
R2  0.020  0.033  0.600 
N  377  377  377 
Cluster  Firm  Firm  Firm 
FEs  No  No  Firm, Year 
Notes: This table shows the results from estimating a DiD model using the natural 
logarithm of employee-related fines as the dependent variable based on a matched 
sample. Variables comprise LnEmp_fines, btm (Book-to-market), mve (market value 
of quity), AF (number of analyst forecasts), age, and roa (return on assets). All vari-
ables are defined in Table 4.C5 (Appendix). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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4.4.3 Robustness test  
For the DiD model outlined in this section, I allow firms to have missing years, which 
leads to a varying number of list and control observations in Table 4.9. To limit concerns 
that this varying number of observations biases the estimation, I re-estimate equation (2) 
using a fully balanced sample. Therefore, I drop several list and control firms, which leads 
to a rather small number of observations (matched sample N=204). Table 4.C10 (Appen-
dix) features the results of this robustness test. The average treatment effect remains neg-
ative and slightly significant for all models. Overall, the results of Table 4.C10 support 
the main results that firms pay fewer non-financial corporate misconduct fines after mak-
ing the Fortune list for the first time.  
Table 4.C11 (Appendix) shows the application t-tests based on the balanced sample. I 
find an increase in applications when comparing the first and the second list year, though 
the difference is not statistically significant. Additionally, I examine the first year and the 
third year of list inclusion. For this comparison, I find an increase in applications, which 
is slightly statistically significant (10% level). Overall, these results support the main re-
sults.  
4.5 Conclusion  
In this paper, I investigate the link between stakeholder reactions and the publication of 
non-financial disclosure. I use a sample of Fortune’s “100 best companies to work for” 
firms between 2005 and 2017 to provide evidence on the short-term stakeholder attention 
following positive, externally validated CSR disclosure. Additionally, I provide evidence 
on the long-term stakeholder reactions and how firms respond to these actions.  
I measure the stakeholder attention using the abnormal Google search volume index and 
find a highly significant increase in stakeholder attention following the BC list publica-
tion. To alleviate concerns about the construct validity of the ASVI, I offer various iden-
tification steps based on the timing of the list, the listing status of firms, and different 
Google search terms. The results of each step support the ASVI as a proxy for stakeholder 
attention. My results further suggest that stakeholders and investors process non-financial 
information differently.  
In additional analyses, I examine the potential long-term effects of the increased stake-
holder attention, namely the labor market reaction and investment effects. I find that there 
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is an increase in job applications to list firms, which is not statistically significant neither 
for listed nor private firms. Estimating a DiD model, I find that list firms increase their 
CSR activities once they are featured on the list. Overall, it seems like stakeholders pay 
attention to the publication of stakeholder related non-financial information but fail to act 
upon it, whereas the firms invest in their CSR activities in anticipation of the stakeholder 
attention.  
My results are subject to several limitations. First, the results are based on a rather small 
sample, which limits my possibilities to perform subsample analyses. Yet, as the list firms 
vary in their characteristics (e.g., private vs. listed firm), the effect on the stakeholder 
attention might still be generalizable to other settings. Second, my results rely on the 
construct validity of the ASVI to capture stakeholder attention. Although I try to offer 
several identification steps to alleviate concerns about the proxy, the ASVI might never-
theless capture some retail investor attention. Third, the analysis of the applications is 
only based on list firms, as I am unable to observe the application numbers for firms that 
are not on the list. Therefore, I lack a control sample for this analysis. 
Finally, the BC list firms choose to apply for the BC list, which means that the treatment 
firms self-select themselves into list and control firms. This potential endogeneity arises 
from the decision of a firm to apply for the list, which I cannot observe. Though my 
research design addresses this potential self-selection bias, it would not provide an effec-
tive control for the self-selection bias if the selection decision was associated with time-
varying unobservables (Lennox et al. (2012)). Therefore, the nature of my results does 
not allow causal inferences.  
Despite these limitations, my paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence 
about how non-investor stakeholders perceive CSR disclosure and how they react to this 
type of externally validated disclosure of CSR activities. Furthermore, my results con-
tribute to the question of how firms react in anticipation of increased stakeholder atten-
tion. As outlined above, it is important to understand the relationship between stakehold-
ers and CSR information to draft effective legislation to meet the information demand of 
non-investor stakeholders.  
  
Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder attention 
 139 
4.6 Appendix 
Appendix 4.A – Abnormal search volume  
Google Trends provides search term frequency data from January 2004 onwards. Google 
does not provide the number of searches but a search volume index (SVI). For this index, 
Google Trends scales the data by the maximum search request volume during the request 
window. Google provides the SVI data on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis, depending 
on the length of the request window. In case of very few Google searches, Google trun-
cates the data and provides an SVI of 0.  
Prior literature uses firm tickers to capture the investor reaction following financial news 
(e.g., Drake et al. (2012); Da et al. (2011)). As I want to capture the stakeholder reaction 
following the BC list publication, I follow Madsen and Niessner (2019) and use Google 
Trends data based on firm name searches. Following deHaan et al. (2019), I measure 
ASVI as the SVI for firm i on the day of the list publication less the mean SVI for the 
firm on the same weekday over 10 weeks prior to the list publication, scaled by the mean 
SVI for the firm on the same weekday over 10 weeks prior to the list publication.  
Over the sample period from 2005 to 2017, the data is only available on a monthly level. 
To calculate the above mentioned ASVI, I need daily Google SVI data for the entire sam-
ple period. I follow deHaan et al. (2019) to obtain daily SVI for the sample period. First, 
I download monthly SVI data for 2004 to 2017. Second, I download daily SVI for each 
month in which the firm is part of the list, starting three months before the list publication 
(list window). Finally, I need to rescale the data. I multiply the daily data obtained in step 
2 by the monthly data collected in step 1 and rescale it with the maximum monthly SVI 
overserved for a list firm during the list window. Consequently, each list firm has a max-
imum value of 100 during its list window.  
To collect the SVI data, I prepare the firm names. In a first step, I check for significant 
names changes and exclude these firms from the sample. If firms only partly changed 
their names (e.g., from “Deloitte” to “Deloitte & Touche”), I keep the firm in the sample 
using the original name. In the next step, I remove all special characters from firm names 
like “&” and remove typical firm name endings like “Group” or “Company”. With these 
cleared names, I collect the monthly and daily SVI. I remove firms from the sample if the 
SVI for the firm on the same weekday as the list publication over 10 weeks before the list 
publication is zero more than 7 times. For both events 1 and 2, I use the SVI for the firm 
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on the respective weekday over 10 weeks before event 1 to calculate ASVI because I do 
not want the stakeholder reaction after event 1 to impact the ASVI for event 2.  
Panel A: Qualcomm name search 
 
Panel B: Qualcomm ticker search 
 
Panel C: Qualcomm name and ticker search comparison 
 
Figure 4.A1: Example of Google Trends data 
This figure shows an example for Google name searches (Panel A), Google ticker searches (Panel 
B) and comparison for both search terms (Panel C).   
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Appendix 4.B – Violation tracker database  
Appendix 4.B1:  Corporate misconduct of list firms between 2005 and 2017 
Primary Offense Freq. Perc. Cumm. Mean amount 
(in $ Mio.) 
Over  
$1 Mio. 
Fair Credit Reporting Act violation 1 0.04 0.04 2.300 1 
False Claims Act and related 77 3.28 3.33 40.329 68 
Family and Medical Leave Act 11 0.47 3.8 0.021 0 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 18 0.77 4.56 10.796 15 
HHS civil monetary penalties 1 0.04 4.61 0.204 0 
Servicemembers Civil Relief Act 1 0.04 4.65 12.000 1 
accounting fraud or deficiencies 6 0.26 4.9 75.250 6 
anti-money-laundering deficiencies 3 0.13 5.03 58.867 3 
aviation consumer protection violation 23 0.98 6.01 10.105 3 
aviation safety violation 678 28.91 34.93 0.021 1 
banking violation 15 0.64 35.57 7.108 8 
bankruptcy professional violation 1 0.04 35.61 2.350 1 
benefit plan administrator violation 33 1.41 37.01 15.654 21 
campaign finance violation 1 0.04 37.06 0.217 0 
civil contempt 1 0.04 37.1 2.000 1 
consumer protection violation 68 2.9 40 11.100 25 
data submission deficiencies 2 0.09 40.09 0.848 1 
discriminatory practices 4 0.17 40.26 0.351 0 
drug or medical equipment safety violation 10 0.43 40.68 52.494 10 
economic sanction violation 9 0.38 41.07 0.074 0 
employment discrimination 52 2.22 43.28 2.393 13 
employment screening violation 4 0.17 43.45 0.483 0 
environmental violation 475 20.26 63.71 2.578 40 
excise tax violation 3 0.13 63.84 0.186 0 
export control violation 5 0.21 64.05 4.985 1 
federal leasing royalty violation 3 0.13 64.18 1.104 1 
financial institution supervision failures 4 0.17 64.35 8.590 4 
foreign exchange market manipulation 1 0.04 64.39 120.000 1 
fraud 1 0.04 64.43 8.250 1 
illicit political contributions 1 0.04 64.48 12.000 1 
investor protection violation 15 0.64 65.12 239.300 6 
kickbacks and bribery 12 0.51 65.63 34.615 9 
labor relations violation 108 4.61 70.23 0.036 0 
mortgage abuses 4 0.17 70.41 101.710 4 
motor vehicle safety violation 5 0.21 70.62 0.020 0 
off-label/unapproved promotion medical prod. 30 1.28 71.9 285.580 27 
offshore drilling violation 9 0.38 72.28 0.028 0 
pipeline safety violation 1 0.04 72.32 0.037 0 
price-fixing or anti-competitive practices 10 0.43 72.75 17.052 5 
privacy violation 20 0.85 73.6 14.212 13 
product safety violation 9 0.38 73.99 1.109 3 
railroad safety violation 55 2.35 76.33 0.009 0 
securities issuance or trading violation 10 0.43 76.76 17.917 8 
tax violations 13 0.55 77.31 0.034 0 
telecommunications violation 29 1.24 78.55 10.721 14 
tobacco litigation 1 0.04 78.59 0.100 0 
toxic securities abuses 5 0.21 78.81 1797.600 5 
wage and hour violation 198 8.44 87.25 5.417 76 
workplace safety or health violation 299 12.75 100 0.014 0 
Notes: This table provides information about the corporate misconduct of list firms between 2005 and 
2017 (bold letters indicate employee offenses).  
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Panel A: Starbucks Penalty record in 2011 
Panel B: Individual record Starbucks 
 
Figure 4.B2: Example of Violation Tracker data 
Figure B1 shows an example of the Violation Tracker data. Panel A shows the penalty record for 
Starbucks, while Panel B shows an individual record from the ones listed in Panel A.  
Table B1 and Figure B1 feature information from the Violation Tracker by Good Jobs 
First. The database features fines for corporate wrongdoing between 2000 and 2018 from 
47 federal agencies like the Department of Justice or the Department of Labor Wage and 
Hour Division. The database classifies the fines into different primary-offense categories 
like shown in Table B1. It features the agency that charged the firm and the penalty 
amount (Figure B1, Panel A). The database links every fine to the respective agency doc-
uments and offers more background information (Figure B1, Panel B).   
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Appendix 4.C – Additional tables and figures  
 
Figure 4.C1: Cross-sectional average SVI around Fortune list publication 
This figure shows the cross-sectional mean and median Google search volume index (SVI) around 
the week of the list publication based on the weekday of event 1. Week 0 (vertical line) is the 
week of the list publication based on the first mention of the publication. The sample is based on 
list publications between 2005 and 2017 (N=446). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
 
  
Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder attention 
 144 
Table 4.C2: Overall Market Reaction event dates (positive list ranking) 
Panel A: Market reaction event 1 (date first disclosure) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Event Date  List year  N  Cum.ret.  S&P500   MAR  t-statistic 
         (-1/+1)  (-1/+1)  (4)-(5)  (H0= 0) 
10jan2005  2005  29  0.000  -0.004  0.004  1.291  
09jan2006  2006  23  0.019  0.013  0.006  1.298  
08jan2007  2007  26  -0.004  -0.004  0.000  0.029  
22jan2008  2008  23  0.033  0.004  0.028  1.980 * 
22jan2009  2009  20  0.034  0.034  0.000  -0.002  
21jan2010  2010  16  -0.043  -0.052  0.009  1.404  
20jan2011  2011  18  -0.011  -0.009  -0.002  -0.379  
19jan2012  2012  16  0.031  0.017  0.014  1.880 * 
16jan2013  2013  19  0.012  0.007  0.005  0.762  
16jan2014  2014  15  0.002  0.000  0.002  0.386  
05mar2015  2015  18  -0.019  -0.017  -0.002  -0.399  
03mar2016  2016  16  0.010  0.011  -0.001  -0.111  
09mar2017  2017  22  0.003  0.002  0.001  0.933  
Mean       261   0.006   0.001   0.005   2.306 ** 
Panel B: Market reaction event 2 (issue date) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Event Date  List year  N  Cum.ret.  S&P500  MAR  t-statistic 
         (-1/+1)  (-1/+1)  (4)-(5)  (H0= 0) 
24jan2005  2005  28  -0.018  -0.006  -0.012  -2.113 ** 
23jan2006  2006  22  -0.012  -0.014  0.002  0.463  
22jan2007  2007  26  -0.002  0.001  -0.003  -0.557  
04feb2008  2008  22  -0.025  -0.030  0.006  1.078  
02feb2009  2009  18  -0.012  -0.008  -0.004  -0.239  
08feb2010  2010  15  0.016  0.007  0.009  1.404  
07feb2011  2011  17  0.022  0.013  0.009  1.638  
06feb2012  2012  16  0.022  0.016  0.005  1.253  
04feb2013  2013  19  0.011  0.009  0.002  0.617  
03feb2014  2014  15  -0.013  -0.022  0.009  1.518  
16mar2015  2015  18  0.015  0.004  0.011  1.879 * 
15mar2016  2016  16  -0.010  0.003  -0.013  -1.068  
15mar2017  2017  22  0.006  0.003  0.003  1.102  
Mean       254   -0.001   -0.002   0.001   0.555  
t-statistic (event 1 = event 2) 
   
1.279 
    
Notes: This table provides an analysis of the overall market reaction to the first dis-
closure of the BC list (Panel A) and the publication of the Fortune issue containing 
the BC list (Panel B). Column (4) reports the three-day cumulative return of sample 
firms centered on each event date. Column (5) presents the three-day cumulative 
return for the S&P500 index. MAR in column (6) is the difference between column 
(4) and column (5). I test whether the mean return for three-day MAR (column (6)) 
is significantly different from zero (H0=0), which is denoted by t-statistic in column 
(7). Panel B additionally compares the results for event 1 and event 2). All variables 
are defined in Table 4.C5. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively. The sample is limited to firms with a ranking improve-
ment.  
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Table 4.C3: Overall Market Reaction event dates (negative list ranking) 
Panel A: Market reaction event 1 (date first disclosure) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Event Date  List year  N  Cum.ret.  S&P500   MAR  t-statistic 
         (-1/+1)  (-1/+1)  (4)-(5)  (H0= 0) 
10jan2005  2005  14  -0.014  -0.004  -0.010  -1.789 * 
09jan2006  2006  17  0.013  0.013  0.000  0.078  
08jan2007  2007  14  -0.002  -0.004  0.002  0.513  
22jan2008  2008  12  0.024  0.004  0.019  0.781  
22jan2009  2009  10  0.038  0.034  0.004  0.333  
21jan2010  2010  13  -0.052  -0.052  0.000  -0.010  
20jan2011  2011  15  -0.015  -0.009  -0.006  -0.887  
19jan2012  2012  14  0.024  0.017  0.007  0.762  
16jan2013  2013  12  0.017  0.007  0.010  1.813 * 
16jan2014  2014  14  0.014  0.000  0.014  1.838 * 
05mar2015  2015  13  -0.015  -0.017  0.002  0.359  
03mar2016  2016  13  0.017  0.011  0.007  1.200  
09mar2017  2017  11  0.007  0.002  0.006  0.891  
Mean       172   0.004   0.000   0.004   1.591  
Panel B: Market reaction event 2 (issue date) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Event Date  List year  N  Cum.ret.  S&P500  MAR  t-statistic 
         (-1/+1)  (-1/+1)  (4)-(5)  (H0= 0) 
24jan2005  2005  13  -0.025  -0.006  -0.019  -1.734  
23jan2006  2006  17  -0.013  -0.014  0.001  0.192  
22jan2007  2007  12  0.012  0.001  0.011  1.799 * 
04feb2008  2008  12  0.022  -0.030  0.052  1.182  
02feb2009  2009  10  -0.017  -0.008  -0.009  -1.287  
08feb2010  2010  13  0.011  0.007  0.003  0.783  
07feb2011  2011  15  0.019  0.013  0.005  0.988  
06feb2012  2012  13  0.017  0.016  0.001  0.151  
04feb2013  2013  12  0.027  0.009  0.018  0.847  
03feb2014  2014  14  -0.021  -0.022  0.001  0.142  
16mar2015  2015  13  0.009  0.004  0.005  0.920  
15mar2016  2016  13  0.001  0.003  -0.001  -0.240  
15mar2017  2017  11  0.011  0.003  0.008  2.098 * 
Mean       168   0.004   -0.002   0.006   1.406  
t-statistic (event 1 = event 2) 
   
-0.246 
   
Notes: This table provides an analysis of the overall market reaction to the first dis-
closure of the BC list (Panel A) and the publication of the Fortune issue containing 
the BC list (Panel B). Column (4) reports the three-day cumulative return of sample 
firms centered on each event date. Column (5) presents the three-day cumulative re-
turn for the S&P500 index. MAR in column (6) is the difference between column (4) 
and column (5). I test whether the mean return for three-day MAR (column (6)) is 
significantly different from zero (H0=0), which is denoted by t-statistic in column (7). 
Panel B additionally compares the results for event 1 and event 2). All variables are 
defined in Table 4.C5. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% level, respectively. The sample is limited to firms with a ranking deterioration. 




Figure 4.C4: Cross-sectional average SVI around Fortune list publication for different 
search terms 
This figure shows the cross-sectional mean Google search volume index (SVI) around the week 
of the list publication based on the weekday of event 1 for the different search terms. Panel A 
compares the name searches for the public list firms (BC private) with the name searches for 
private firms. Panel B compares the name searches for the list firms (BC Name) and the ticker 
searches (BC ticker) for these firms. Panel C compares the name searches for the list firms (BC 
Name) with the name (RDQ Name) and ticker (RDQ Ticker) searches for the earnings announce-
ment date (RDQ=report date quarterly). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% level, respectively (H0=0). 
  
Panel B: Name and Ticker comparison
Panel C: Name and RDQ comparison
Panel A: Listed and private name comparison
Line BC Name BC private
mean w=0 0.322 0.591
t-statistics 5.704*** 8.630***
Line BC Name RDQ Name RDQ Ticker
mean w=0 0.322 0.245 0.507
t-statistics 5.704*** 8.854*** 13.980***
Line BC Name BC Ticker
mean w=0 0.322 0.118
t-statistics 5.704*** 3.523***
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Natural logarithm of the market value of equity at 





Indicator variable set to one if the firm belongs to 









Notes: This table shows variable definitions. * denotes the variable is winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% level due to outliers.  
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Table 4.C6: Correlation matrix 
   ASVI 
 prior_cov  neg_rel  mve  btm  AF  age  roa  top10_rank 
ASVI  1.000                 
prior_cov  -0.212***  1.000               
neg_rel  -0.194***  0.613***  1.000             
mve  -0.032  0.065  0.004  1.000           
btm  0.014  0.003  0.030  -0.222***  1.000         
AF  -0.071  0.143**  0.091  0.653***  -0.171***  1.000       
age  -0.057  0.162***  -0.022  0.283***  -0.099*  0.063  1.000     
roa  -0.084  -0.080  -0.068  0.081  -0.265***  -0.023  0.148**  1.000   
top10_rank  0.268***  -0.062  0.074  0.147**  -0.056  0.121*  -0.142**  -0.021  1 
Notes: This table provides details on the correlation between the independent variables. All variables are defined in Table 4.C5 
(Appendix). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 4.C7: Interaction plot prior press coverage and negative press sentiment for ASVI 
This figure shows the margins plots of model (1), including the interaction term of prior_cov x 
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Table 4.C8: Propensity score matching covariates 
Panel A: Probit model   
(1) 
 
     
Pre-period 
 






   




















































   
FEs   Year         
Panel B: Mean differences   
Mean value  Difference (1) vs. (2) 
Variable   (1) Treated  (2) Controls  Difference  t-statistic 
LnEmp_fines  1.10  1.22  -0.12  0.23 
btm 0.35  0.38  -0.03  0.71 
mve 
 
8.84  8.72  0.12  -0.58 
AF 
 
2.02  2.21  -0.18  1.36 
age 
 
2.79  2.70  0.09  -0.94 
roa   0.02   0.02   0.00   -0.12 
Notes: Results from estimating a probit regression with an indicator variable (1 = 
Treatment and 0 = Control) as the dependent variable. Variables comprise 
LnEmp_fines, btm (Book-to-market), mve (market value of equity), AF (number of 
analyst forecasts), age, and roa (return on assets). All variables are defined in Table 
4.C5 (Appendix). Sample details are described in Table 4.1. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Figure 4.C9: Cross-sectional average SVI for “jobs” searches 
This figure shows the cross-sectional mean Google search volume index (SVI) and abnormal 
search volume index (ASVI) around the week of the list publication based on the weekday of 
event 1 for the different search terms. Panel A shows the SVI for name searches for listed firms 
and “jobs” to the search term. Panel B shows the SVI results for name and “jobs” searches for 
private firms. Panel C shows the ASVI for name searches for listed firms and “jobs” to the search 
term. Panel D shows the ASVI results for name and “jobs” searches for private firms.  
  
Panel A: SVI Name/Jobs comparison Panel B: SVI Private Name/Jobs comparison
Panel C: ASVI Name/Jobs comparison Panel D: ASVI Private Name/Jobs comparison
Line BC Name BC Name jobs
mean w=0 0.322 0.334
t-statistics 5.704*** 4.463***
Line BC private BC private jobs
mean w=0 0.591 0.500
t-statistics 8.630*** 4.607***
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Table 4.C10: Difference in difference estimation (balanced sample) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Variable  LnEmp_fines 
 LnEmp_fines  LnEmp_fines 
list_firms  0.310  0.103   
  (0.35)  (0.11)   
post  0.828  0.402   
  (1.30)  (0.71)   
list_firms x post -1.709**  -1.573**  -2.078** 
  (-2.12)  (-1.98)  (-2.01) 
btm    0.761  1.653 
    (0.65)  (1.22) 
mve    -0.329  0.483 
    (-1.07)  (0.61) 
AF    0.229  0.440 
    (1.17)  (1.17) 
age    1.590  -5.105 
    (1.16)  (-0.93) 
roa    -0.020  8.645 
    (-0.00)  (0.94) 
       
R2  0.026  0.087  0.553 
N  204  204  204 
Cluster  Firm  Firm  Firm 
FEs  No  No  Firm, Year 
Notes: This table shows the results from estimating a DiD model using 
the natural logarithm of employee-related fines as the dependent variable 
based on a matched sample. Variables comprise LnEmp_fines, btm 
(Book-to-market), mve (market value of quity), AF (number of analyst 
forecasts), age, and roa (return on assets). All variables are defined in 
Table 4.C5 (Appendix). ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4.C11 Application data (balanced sample) 
First and second-year comparison  First and third-year comparison 
  N  Mean    N  Mean 
First-year  16  6.196  First-year  13  6.100 
Second-year   16   9.424  Third-year   13   13.251 
Difference    -3.228  Difference    -7.150 
t-statistics     -1.530  t-statistics     -2.028* 
Notes: This table shows the mean comparisons of appl_scaled in the first and 
second (third) list year for listed firms. Appl_scaled is the number of applica-
tions the firm received scaled by the mean employees in the test years. Both 
items are based on Fortune list data. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance 





5 Conclusion  
5.1 Summary of major findings and implications of the thesis 
Based on three empirical studies, this thesis addresses and extends two general streams 
of literature: first, the stream on the financial press an information intermediary (e.g., 
Drake et al. (2014); Bushee et al. (2010); Guest (2018)), and second, the stream on the 
link between stakeholder theory and non-financial disclosure (e.g., Madsen and Rodgers 
(2015); Hombach and Sellhorn (2018)).  
Contributing to the literature related to the financial press as an information intermediary, 
the first and the second study differentiate the information dissemination and information 
production role of the financial press. To provide evidence on these roles, both studies 
examine different attributes of financial press articles. To that end, the first study provides 
explorative insights into the coverage decision of (financial) news outlets and the content 
that the articles supply for the readers. Focusing on quarterly earnings announcements of 
S&P 500 firms, the study performs a content analysis collecting all quantitative items 
from the articles. The evidence presented in the first study suggests that the press assumes 
both an information dissemination and production role. While the dissemination focuses 
on key performance indicators such as earnings or revenues, the information production 
features background information such as M&A activities. Probit regressions reveal that 
both the coverage and information production are associated with firm fundamentals such 
as firm size and do not vary substantially between specialized and general-interest news-
papers. Analyses of the quotes in the articles suggest that the information production is 
not limited to quantitative items but extends to the textual features of the articles.  
To glean additional insights into how the financial press produces information based on 
the textual features of the articles and what kind of information is produced, the second 
study of this thesis provides evidence using a topic modeling approach (LDA). To that 
end, the study applies the LDA model to press articles covering quarterly earnings and 
the corresponding firm press releases. The study identifies four measures of information 
production by comparing the topics in the articles and the earnings announcements. The 
first measure investigates original article content. On average, the journalists add 1.5 top-
ics per article. Second, the study identifies topics that journalists decide not to report in 
their articles. On average, the articles omit 5.5 topics. Multivariate analyses show that 
adding and omitting topics helps investors analyze earnings news. Third, journalists pro-
duce additional information by (de-) emphasizing specific topics. At last, journalists 
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produce information based on how they phrase their content. Articles have, on average, a 
more negative sentiment than the earnings announcements. The sentiment of added topics 
is significantly more positive compared to joint topics. However, multivariate analyses 
suggest that only the sentiment of joint topics helps investors analyze earnings news, 
while there is no significant association for the sentiment of added topics.  
Taken together, the first two studies of this thesis support that the financial press creates 
value for its readers based on information production and exceeds a mere entertainment 
role. The results imply that information production is a multi-attribute concept because 
articles produce information on the quantitative, on the topic, and on the sentiment level. 
Interestingly, both studies, though using a different research approach, show that journal-
ists frequently include quotes (statements) from firm executives, analysts, or other experts 
to provide additional content. This result suggests that journalists can produce this infor-
mation due to their personal ties with the quoted persons, which is in line with how jour-
nalists describe their work according to Call et al. (2018). Additionally, it seems like what 
journalists write in their articles is more important than how they say it.  
Contributing to the second stream of literature, the third study examines if stakeholders 
pay attention to non-financial information disseminated in the press and how this attention 
might have long-term consequences for firms based on stakeholder reactions and their 
own actions. To that end, the study examines the Fortune’s “100 best companies to work 
for” list as a specific form of non-financial disclosure. Using Google searches as a proxy 
for the stakeholder attention, the study finds an increase in stakeholder attention following 
the first disclosure of the information and its wider dissemination in the Fortune issue. 
Additionally, the list provides valuable information content for investors when the infor-
mation is first disclosed. However, the increase in attention is not followed by corre-
sponding stakeholder actions in the form of job applications. Based on a difference-in-
difference model, the study finds an increase in employee-related CSR activities of the 
firms once they are featured on the list.  
Overall, the results imply that stakeholders pay attention to the publication of stakeholder 
related non-financial information in Fortune magazine. Therefore, the value of infor-
mation dissemination through the media extends to non-financial information and non-
investor stakeholders. Consequently, the press is a suitable channel for firms to dissemi-
nate their non-financial disclosure. However, the results also imply that stakeholder 
awareness is not enough to trigger stakeholder reactions. In contrast, the results support 
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prior literature that firms react in anticipation of increased stakeholder attention and adapt 
their CSR activities to prevent adverse stakeholder reactions.  
5.2 Limitations 
The findings of this thesis are subject to several limitations, as outlined in the respective 
chapters. First, all three studies are subject to endogeneity concerns. For the first and 
second study, the decision to write an article lies with the news outlets and is therefore 
endogenous. The characteristics that shape the coverage decision might also change over 
time. For example, the WSJ merged its news desk with the Dow Jones Newswire in 2013. 
Consequently, this change in resources might have impacted the coverage decisions of 
the WSJ (e.g., due to free resources after eliminating overlapping coverage), which might 
also affect the information production of the outlet. As this restructuring occurred during 
the sample period of both study 1 and study 2, the merge might affect the results of both 
studies. For the third study, the endogeneity arises from the self-selection of the firms 
because they decide to apply to the Fortune list. Endogeneity issues are common in the 
accounting literature, especially in the literature stream related to the financial press. 
Overall, these concerns keep the papers from drawing causal inferences. Yet, Glaeser and 
Guay (2017) point out that research designs that allow the identification of causal rela-
tionships are rare and that we should, therefore, use studies on particular research fields 
using various samples and methodologies as input to update our priors about the theory 
being tested in a Bayesian manner.  
Second, the studies rely on the validity of the empirical constructs. In the second study, 
most test variables are based on the LDA model and the basic model assumptions of this 
algorithm, such as the irrelevance of the order of words in a document or the documents 
within the sample. In the third study, the construct validity of the Abnormal Search Vol-
ume Index (ASVI) is crucial. Though the study offers several identification steps, it is 
still possible that retail investor searches bias the estimates. Additionally, I cannot directly 
observe the CSR activities of the firms and thus need to rely on the observable non-finan-
cial corporate misconduct fines. Third and related, the studies, especially the third one, 
are subject to data constraints. For example, I am unable to observe the application data 
for firms that apply to the Fortune list but do not end up among the 100 best firms. Simi-
larly, I cannot observe which firms choose to apply for the list in the first place.  
Conclusion 
 157 
Fourth, the results of the studies might not generalize to other settings. Study 1 and study 
2 use a US setting. This might limit the generalizability of the results regarding the finan-
cial press in other countries. Additionally, both papers focus on S&P 500 firms. These 
firms are large and well-known. Thus, their information environment might be different, 
which might also impact the information production of the press for these firms. The third 
study examines a specific form of non-financial disclosure. Therefore, the results might 
not translate to more traditional disclosure types like CSR disclosure in annual reports. 
Similarly, the long-term results might not transfer to other stakeholder groups, which are 
not directly affected by the disclosed non-financial information.  
Finally, some research design choices are subjective. For example, the content analysis 
of the first study relies on the classification of the researcher. Additionally, the topic 
names in study 2 are based on the researchers’ assessment of the high-frequency words 
in each topic.  
5.3 Outlook 
The findings of the thesis point at additional research opportunities regarding the two 
main streams of literature. For example, future research might examine organized stake-
holder responses and the (financial) consequences for firms, e.g., based on customer boy-
cotts resulting from irresponsible corporate behavior with regard to the environment. This 
“stakeholder activism” might trigger costly firm actions to avoid “punishment” from the 
stakeholders. To examine the stakeholders’ use of and reaction to non-financial infor-
mation, the initiation of mandatory non-financial disclosure in the EU offers a suitable 
setting. This regulation requires large firms (>500 employees) to provide information 
about various non-financial aspects, for instance, product responsibility and the protection 
of human rights. Thus, the regulation might enable researchers to examine stakeholder 
groups, such as customers, to establish how the information demand of the various stake-
holder groups might differ and what kind of consequences conflicts with the stakeholder 
groups might have for the firms. One challenge in this setting is to distinguish between 
CSR disclosure and CSR activities initiated in anticipation of the new disclosure require-
ments (e.g., Fiechter et al. (2019)). Nevertheless, the variation between the various Euro-
pean jurisdictions regarding the effective date and the disclosure threshold (less than 500 
employees) allows researchers to employ research design choices suitable to establish 
causal inferences.  
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The lack of causal inferences also affects the literature about the financial press as an 
information intermediary. There are few papers (e.g., Engelberg and Parsons (2011)) that 
can link the market outcome directly to newspaper coverage. Therefore, future research 
should focus on settings allowing causal inferences such as the merger of large news 
organizations or external regulation of press outputs (e.g., the EU copyright directive for 
news aggregators and online media). Additionally, more research is needed on the differ-
ence between information production and dissemination outside the context of earnings 
announcements to paint a broader picture of the work of the press as an information in-
termediary. The extension of textual analysis, e.g., sentiment analysis or topic models, in 
accounting research might help to identify information production in other contexts (e.g., 
Loughran and McDonald (2016)).  
A development that affects the general dissemination of information to investors and 
stakeholders is the extension of digital offerings and especially the rise of social media. 
For example, by disseminating their earnings announcements through Twitter, firms can 
effectively create the same attention as a newsflash. To that end, Blankespoor et al. (2014) 
show that Twitter dissemination lowers information asymmetries. If firms can substitute 
the dissemination role of the press using social media, the press must provide other ser-
vices such as information production to justify its position in the market. To save re-
sources and focus on firms with current issues, the news outlets might also rely on com-
puter-generated articles for less interesting firms (Blankespoor et al. (2018)). Therefore, 
it might be of interest for future research to examine how the information production 
changed over time considering the technological changes.  
The dissemination of information via social media makes it easier for stakeholders to find 
it. Further, these platforms facilitate direct communication between the firms and the 
stakeholders, as most of them are two-way disclosure channels. Therefore, the stakehold-
ers can raise issues more easily and organize adverse stakeholder reactions when the firms 
do not meet the demand of their stakeholders (e.g., Cade (2018)). Negative stakeholder 
feedback via social media might also imply reputational costs for the firms. Overall, the 
evolving disclosure landscape for firms and stakeholders, as well as technological inno-
vations, offer a variety of fruitful avenues for future research about the dissemination and 
production of financial and non-financial information.  
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